Natalia Shlikhta

"Ukrainian" as "Non-Orthodox": How Greek Catholics Were "Reunited" with the Russian Orthodox Church, 1940s - 1960s

Natalia Shlikhta - Associate Professor, Chair of the History Department at the National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" (Kyiv, Ukraine), nshlikhta@gmail.com

Drawing upon archival, published, and oral sources as well as recent studies on the correlation between religion and nationality, the paper argues that formal "reunification" of the Greek Catholics with the Russian Orthodox Church has become a successful "subaltern strategy", ensuring the survival of the Greek Catholic Church through the Soviet period. The article demonstrates that the "Church within the Church", coming into existence as a result of "reunification", was for decades preserving its separate identity within the Russian Orthodox Church. The "Church within the Church" did not oppose directly the regime's assimilation policy while positioned itself as a Ukrainian and therefore as a non-Orthodox (because a non-Russian) and even as a non-Soviet. Concrete research issues are examined within a wider context of the survival of the Church in the Soviet state.

Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Church within the Church, national Church, communist (Soviet) regime, reunification, ecclesiastical nationalism.

Introduction

The "UNIATE problem", which the Stalinist leadership undertook at all costs (and with the help of the Moscow Patriarchate) to solve immediately after the end of World War II, was far from the only national challenge for Moscow. Previously, such challenges were the existence of Ukraine-

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the existence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (both the 1921 and 1942 models), as well as the existence of the Ukrainian Autonomous Church headed by Archbishop Alexy (Gromadsky), which, in justifying its autonomous rights, referred to the Regulations on the Ukrainian Exarchate of 1921. The religious situation in the Ukrainian Exarchate, which became much more complicated in national terms (mainly during the war), significantly influenced the official vision of the" uniate problem " as primarily a national problem. And the perception of Greek Catholics being integrated into the Orthodox Church - and through it, paradoxically, into Soviet society-in turn influenced the formation of their "subaltern strategy" (as defined by Sheila Fitzpatrick), 1 significantly strengthening the national component in the process of their daily survival.

The liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), as most researchers agree, was the only logical option for the Stalinist leadership since the annexation of the "Western territories" in 1939. This solution of the "Uniate problem" was supported by both the historical tradition and the anti-Vatican orientation of the USSR's foreign policy after World War II. The main argument in favor of the final liquidation of the UGCC was its indissoluble connection - in the eyes of both the population of the region and the state leadership - with Ukrainian nationalism, its image as the "cradle" of Ukrainian nationalism (according to Dmytro Pospelovsky 2) or its "cornerstone" (according to Serhiy Yekelchik 3). French researcher Danielle Hervier-Leger sees religion as a "chain of memory", that is, as a form of collective memory that protects the community from historical amnesia.4 If we take this statement into account, it becomes clear why the struggle against "nationalist" variants of historical memory in Galicia provided for the need to liquidate the UGCC.

The decision to liquidate the UGCC through its "reunification" with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) also looked half-hearted.-

1. See: Fitzpatrick Sh. Stalin's peasants. Social history of Soviet Russia in the 30s. Derevnya, Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2008, p. 12.

2. Pospielovsky, D.V. (1984) The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917 - 1982, Vol. 2, p. 306. Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.

3. Єкельчик С. Імперія пам'яті: Російсько-українські стосунки в радянській історичній уяві. К.: Критика, 2008. С. 95.

4. Hervieu-Leger, D. (2000) Religion as a Chain of Memory. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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It was not logical, historically justified, and caused fewer misunderstandings in the atmosphere of state-church rapprochement after 1943 than under any other circumstances. The ultimate goal of the campaign to "reunite" and "exonerate" Greek Catholics was not to assimilate them into the Church. It was no less about "educating Galicians as citizens of Soviet Ukraine, an integral part of the Soviet Union"5. Many researchers agree that the Orthodox - Russian - Soviet identity was taken for granted by the regime when it came to its social, national, and religious policies in Western Ukraine.6
Despite its own interests and ambitions, the Moscow Patriarchate also considered the union and its liquidation mainly in the national-political, rather than in the religious plane. 20 years after the official liquidation of the UGCC, Archbishop Alexy (Riediger) of Tallinn and Estonia, managing director of the Moscow Patriarchate, emphasized the "national and political significance" of the struggle against the union in Western Ukraine. He ended his detailed examination of the "church history of Southwestern Russia"from this angle with a short remark about the additional "religious and theological aspect" of this age-old struggle (from an official speech of April 23, 1966, at the celebrations in Lviv dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the Lviv Council) .7
One can only guess to what extent this approach to the "Uniate problem" and "reunification" was determined by the church authorities ' own vision, and to what extent it was dictated by the regime. Considerations of their own survival certainly led to the use of terminology from the official Soviet dictionary, which became especially important for the Church during the Khrushchev anti-religious campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

5. Єкельчик С. Імперія пам'яті. С. 99.

6. См., например: Markus, V. (1976) "The Suppressed Church: Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union", in R.T. De George, J. P. Scanlan (eds.) Marxism and Religion in Eastern Europe: Papers Presented at the Banff International Slavic Conference, September 4 - 7, 1974, p. 121. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; Bociurkiw, B. R. (1972) "The Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine, 1953 - 1971", Canadian Slavonic Papers XIV (2): 192 - 193.

7. Central State Archive of the highest authorities and management of Ukraine (TsGAVO). f. 4648. Op. 5. d. 17. l. 104-105.

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An important methodological caveat should be made here: The use of the term "reunification" should not be limited chronologically, for example, to the second half of the 1940s. This term is used in our article not only to refer to the fact (i.e., the Lviv Council of March 8, 1946), but also to refer to the long process of turning "former Uniates" into "Orthodox" and "Soviet". The documentation of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and later the Council for Religious Affairs does not always consistently distinguish the terms "reunification" (as the fact of the liquidation of the UGCC) and "rehabilitation" (as the process of necessary changes in the religious life of "reunited"people). These terms are distinguished more consistently in church documentation8.

In turn, the "reunited" themselves also used both terms. The term "sign Orthodoxy "(as well as the derivative" subscription priest") was used to emphasize the exclusively formal nature of the oath to the Patriarch of Moscow. At the same time, the official term "reunification" was also used, especially when it was necessary to emphasize one's own loyalty (as opposed to "stubborn Uniates") and, thus, to protect one's own isolation. Galicians ' use of the term "reunification" is a clear example of discursive strategies that, according to Andrew Stone, "allowed believers to saturate the official discourse with different meanings, thus creating a space where their "normal" Soviet life can coexist with religion."9
All of the above explains why our written sources go far beyond the 1940s. In the early 1970s (in 1971, the 25th anniversary of the Lviv Cathedral was celebrated on a grand scale), "reunification" as an actual process was discussed in Moscow, Kiev, and (with a completely different subtext) in Western Ukraine.

The result of the Lviv Council was the" self-destruction " of the UGCC. The response of its faithful and clergy was not unanimous. Some favorites-

8. The term "reconsecration" / "Orthodox churching" was used in church documentation after 1946 to refer to the process of "introducing former Uniates into the fence of Orthodox ecclesiasticism". See, for example: Synodal decree of July 8, 1947, GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 59a. L. 57-58.

9. Stone, A.B. (2008) "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': The Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union", Russian Review 67 (2): 299.

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whether the path of open disagreement, refusing to "return to our fatherly holy faith and the Russian Orthodox Church" (from the formula of the Lviv Council)10. The image of the Uniate nationalist anti-Soviet underground has been fixed for many decades for those who decided to go to the catacombs in order to preserve the "purity of the true faith" and their loyalty to the Holy See. The majority (according to the official statistics of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church - 3,289 parishes and 1,296 priests 11) chose a different path. A path that, despite their own arguments and justifications, both members of the "catacomb" Church and the Ukrainian national historiography define as the path of "compromise and betrayal". If we resist the temptation to use well-known historiographical cliches and squeeze reality into a convenient opposition-collaboration dichotomy, we can trace how formal "reunification" became an effective "subordinate strategy" that ensured the survival of the Greek Catholic Church in Soviet times. To study the survival strategies of Ukrainian Greek Catholics after the violent liquidation of their church, we used both written sources (unpublished and published letters, sermons, internal church documentation, documents of Soviet authorities) and oral sources. The latter were collected during the large-scale oral history project "The Image of the Power of the Spirit: A Living History of the UGCC underground" of the Institute of Church History (Lviv). From 1992 to 2013, the Institute's staff collected about 2,200 interviews that can be used to study both the" catacomb "existence of Greek Catholics and the life of "reunited" dioceses during the Soviet era. For our research, 50 interviews were selected, of which 17 are cited on these pages. The following criteria were used for interview selection:: 1. age: respondents who experienced the Lviv Cathedral already at a conscious age were selected. The oldest of them is born in 1906, the youngest is born in 1931. The exception is two respondents born in 1940 and 1941, whose memories are not used to reconstruct the situation in the 1940s.;

10. "... повернутись до нашої батьківської святої православної віри і Руської Православної Церкви" - см. Нескорена Церква: Подвижництво греко-католиків України в боротьбі за віру і державу/упор. В. Сергійчук. К.: Дніпро, 2001. С. 109.

11. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 256. L. 1-2.

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2. Territorial principle: respondents represent all regions of Western Ukraine; 1 respondent is a Greek Catholic priest from Transcarpathia;

3.Interviews of both clergy ("reunited" and "underground") and lay people were analyzed.

Of course, these interviews are just as subject to criticism as any other source of oral history. However, with proper critical reading and comparison with written evidence, they still allow us to reconstruct how the Galicians perceived the Orthodoxy imposed on them and tried to preserve their religious and national isolation after 1946.

Our research shows that as a result of the "reunification" on the territory of Western Ukraine, a kind of "church within a church"was formed, 12 which preserved its religious, cultural and national characteristics, remaining a foreign body within the Russian Orthodox Church for decades. Members of the" church within the church " (believers, clergy, episcopate), regardless of their sincerity and motives for converting to Orthodoxy, were closely linked by a common awareness of their difference from the Russian Orthodox Church, other religious and national identities, and a desire to survive in a state that was not going to tolerate their otherness.

Moreover, if we use the Hervier-Leger concept (which, in addition to defining religion as a form of collective memory, offers a view of it as a tool for uniting a particular community - community chain13), it becomes clear that at the basic level, the choice of " church within the church "was not very different from the choice of the" catacomb " UGCC. Both choices are local projects for the survival of the Church, which have become a serious obstacle to the implementation of Moscow's assimilatory plans for Western Ukrainians. And if the behavior of the "catacomb" Church is almost pure " defiant nationalism "(nationalist defiant, as defined by Sabrina Ramet 14),

12. For the original concept of "church within the church", see Markus, V. (1989) " Religion and Nationality: The Uniates in Ukraine", in S. P. Ramet (ed.) Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, p. 153. Durham and London: Duke University Press; Markus, V. (1976) "The Suppressed Church: Ukrainian Catholics in the Soviet Union", pp. 122 - 123.

13. Hervieu-Leger, D. Religion as a Chain of Memory.

14. Ramet, S. P. (1988) "Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction", in S. P. Ramet (ed.) Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, p. 18. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

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The national component has also become decisive in the identity of the "church within the church".

The problem of correlation of religious and national, church and nationality, religion and nationalism has a long and complex history in the works of theologians, historians and sociologists. We will formulate those observations of researchers that are important in methodological and theoretical terms for the issue under consideration.

First, in the Soviet state, which declared itself atheistic and international, "religion and nationalism were thrown out of the communist society, where they found each other as natural allies" (Arto Luukkanen)15.

Secondly, in the complete absence of other "autonomous ethnic institutions, the national church becomes a refuge for national traditions and culture," which explains the desire of "the imperial leadership and the imperial Church to break this religious-ethnic symbiosis by any means" (Bohdan Bociurkiw).16.

Third, the national component significantly enhances the default oppositional role of the church in a communist state; the combination of religion and national identity turns society/social group into a subject that has greater resistance to the policies of any repressive regime (Sabrina Ramet)17.

Finally, it is the historical tradition that legitimizes the possible oppositional role of each particular national church in relation to the communist regime (Peter Sugar).18.

15. Luukkanen, A. (1994) The Party of Unbelief : The Religious Policy of the Bolshevik Party, 1917 - 1929, p. 29. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura.

16. Bociurkiw, B. R. (1990) "Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies", in L. Hajda, M. Beissinger (eds.) The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Policies and Society, p. 152. Boulder: Westview Press.

17. Ramet, S. P. (1989) "The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, p. 4.

18. Sugar, P. (1989) "The Historical Role of Religious Institutions in Eastern Europe and Their Place in the Communist Party-State", in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, pp. 42 - 59.

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Gavriil Kostelnik's "reunion" concept

Natalia Madei claims that through" reunification "with the Russian Orthodox Church, the leader of the" Initiative Group for the Reunification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church "Gavriil Kostelnik" sought to implement his concept of the Greek Catholic Church, adapting it to the conditions of a totalitarian regime. " 19 This assessment of Kostelnik's views stands out in modern historiography. On the other hand, the first Orthodox bishop of Lviv and Ternopil, Makary (Oksiyuk), whose task was to help the Initiative Group in its "politically important" case, accused Kostelnik of "autonomist" intentions and a desire to use the "reunification" with the Russian Orthodox Church as some kind of "nationalist experiment", such as " Polikarpovshchina 20 in Volhynia and Lipkovschina 21 in Ukraine " 22.

In an official speech at the Lviv Cathedral, Kostelnyk presented the main points of his understanding of "reunification". He emphasized the need to preserve the church as an institution in order to meet the religious needs of Western Ukrainians and described in detail his vision of religious life after the "reunification". Kostelnik expressed his conviction that any changes to Greek Catholic rites and customs and religious practices can be implemented "so wisely and carefully as not to divert the people from the Church and not extinguish the religious spirit in them."23 He argued that the" reunited " dioceses should preserve their identity within the Russian Orthodox Church, clearly preserving differences between

19. Мадей Н. М. Концепція української греко-католицької церкви Г. Костельника в контексті історії уніатських церков: Автореф. дис... канд. філ. наук: 09 - 00.11/Ін-т філос. ім. Г. С Сковороди НАН України. K, 2001. p. 11.

20. "Polikarpovshchina" is a reference to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which operated during the Second World War under the leadership of Archbishop Polikarpus (Sikorsky) of Kovel and Lutsk.

21. "Lipkovschina" is a reference to the Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church headed by Vasily Lipkovsky, which was proclaimed in October 1921 and which the Bolshevik authorities tolerated until 1930.

22.Cit. по: Лисенко О.Є. Церковне життя в Україні, 1943 - 1946. К: НАН України, Інститут Історії України, 1998. С. 170 - 171.

23. "... так мудро і обережно, щоб не відхилити народ від Церкви і не гасити в ньому релігійного духу". Костельник Г. Про мотиви возз'єднання Греко-Католицької Церкви з Російською Православною Церквою // Костельник Г. Ф. Вибрані твори. К: Видання Екзарха всієї України митрополита Київського і Галицького, 1987. С. 21.

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The "All-Russian Church" and the "Western Ukrainian Church"24. Kostelnyk separately stressed that the "reunited" must preserve their national character by countering any attempts at Russification from Moscow. He concluded his speech with the eloquent phrase: "We are in Ukraine and Ukrainians, and no one will take this away from us and the Church." 25
The strong conviction of the leader of the Initiative Group that the "reunited" should preserve their separate identity, not merging into the single body of the Orthodox Church, was determined by several factors. The image of the Russian Orthodox Church as a "conservative", "traditionalist" church, which does not keep up with the demands of the time, had a significant impact on him. Already during his first meeting with Patriarch Alexy (Simansky) on December 23, 1944, Kostelnik suggested: "The [Orthodox] religion needs to be modernised, as it is now, it cannot be presented to cultured people. It was suitable for the dark masses. " 26
The main reason why the" reunification ""according to Kostelnik" did not coincide in any way with the expectations of the Stalinist and patriarchal leadership should be sought in the national plane. In his speech at the Lviv Cathedral, Kostelnyk addressed the widespread fears among Galicians that "our unity with the Russian Orthodox Church will lead to the Russification of our Western Ukrainian Church"27. He expressed his hope that the Russian Orthodox Church would respect their "national principles" and "national feelings", and argued that there is no identity between "conversion to Orthodoxy" and "conversion to Russian Orthodoxy". Kostelnik consistently carried out this idea both in his public speeches, documents, and in private conversations with the relevant "comrades".

Already during his trip to Moscow in December 1944, Kostelnik summarized:: "If the instructions are given for Russification of the church... In this case, the Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine-

24. Ibid., p. 22.

25. "Ми на Україні і українці і цього нам і Церкві ніхто не відбере". In the same place.

26. Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939 - 1946). Документи радянських органів державної безпеки. К.: ПП Сергійчук М. І., 2006. Т. 1. С 290.

27. "... така наша єдність з Російською Православною Церквою потягне за собою русифікацію нашої Західноукраїнської Церкви". Костельник Г. Про мотиви возз'єднання Греко-Католицької Церкви. С. 22.

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28. In a conversation with the head of the NKGB task force S. Karin, responsible for the "reunification" action, on April 15, 1945 (almost immediately after the mass arrests of the UGCC hierarchs), he stressed that he skillfully manipulated the regime's fears:

The most important [question] is whether we will be reunited with the Krajina or Russian Orthodox Church. Please note that this is a very serious problem in our conditions. After all, we are a Ukrainian church and must be reunited with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, otherwise they will assume that we have fallen out of the Moscow region, and this circumstance, in particular, is widely used by Bandera members. 29
In the abstract of August 3, 1945, the fear of Russification was described as "apart from faith in the papacy, the greatest obstacle - the difficulty for our action." 30 Debunking these fears and at the same time using this opportunity to convey his message to the relevant addressees, Kostelnik explained::

I convince the priests that this is a groundless fear, because Ukraine is a state where the state language is Ukrainian, all our civil servants are Ukrainian, and the Ukrainian language is spoken in schools, which means that the same course should be followed in the church.31
Moreover, considering the prospects of the national church, Kostelnik did not limit himself to "reunited" dioceses. Merging with Orthodoxy, as required by the regime, was seen as a step with a certain positive potential. This unity was presented in terms of the restoration of the religious unity of Ukrainians, even the revival of the Ukrainian national Church. "When the entire Ukrainian people united into a single state body, then so did its Church

28. Ліквідація УГКЦ. Т. 1. С. 287.

29. Ibid., pp. 541-542.

30. "... побіч віри в папство, найбільшою перешкодою - трудністю для нашої акції". Ibid., vol. 2, p. 136.

31. "Я переконую священиків, покликаючись на те, що це безпідставне побоювання, тому що Україна є державою, в якій урядова мова є українська, всі наші державні службовці є українці, в школах українська мова, отже і в церкві мусить бути респектований той самий курс". Ibid., p. 137.

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it must unite in one Church. " 32 This vision of the future was already expressed in the first official appeal of the Initiative Group to the Soviet Government on May 28, 1945.

An important condition for "reunification" and at the same time an obstacle to possible Russification, according to Kostelnik, was the preservation of ritual traditions and customs, everyday religious practices of the "reunited" parishes. "Sacred religious feelings cannot change abruptly without re-education; this requires some time and a special method," Kostelnik argued in the earliest "provosconnective" abstract of April 18, 194533. In a letter to Patriarch Alexy dated October 3, 1945, he emphasized: "Changes in the rite will have to be carried out slowly, for decades, so our Galician Church must delay its expressive difference, as it were, its autonomy in the Orthodox All-Russian Church [...] Orthodoxy for decades to come... at first, it will only be an external coating"34.

Gavriil Kostelnik's concept of "reunification" (especially because of his emphasis on the national differences between the "reunited" and the Moscow Patriarchate) looked too unrealistic (if we take into account the official understanding of "reunification" as a necessary condition for national assimilation and Sovietization of the region's population). However, the life of the" reunited " dioceses after 1946 proved their high resistance to the assimilation policy of the authorities, which allowed them to remain "a church within a church"for decades.

The self-perception of Ukrainian Greek Catholics can be defined using the category of "ecclesiastic nationalism" proposed by Sabrina Ramet. "Ecclesiastical nationalism" proceeds from the assumption that if " the church is deeply rooted in the national ethos, then the national ethos, the national culture cannot survive without the church. If a nation is identified with a religion, then the nation will acquire a religion.-

32. "Коли весь український народ об'єднався в один державний організм, то і його Церква мусить об'єднатися в одну Церкву". The Church is not destroyed. P. 62.

33. "Святі релігійні почуття не можуть змінюватись нагло, без перевиховання, на що треба якогось часу і спеціального методу". Ліквідація УГКЦ. Т. 1. С 551.

34. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 286-287.

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the transcendent character melts away and a change in religion becomes tantamount to assimilation. " 35 " [The Church and its ministers] are representatives of the people and must speak on behalf of the people "(Kostelnik during a trip to Moscow on December 22, 1944)36. "Our Church has never been separated from the national state" (Greek Catholic priest Petro Dutchak, born in 1926) 37.

This is the same type of relationship between religion and nation that Rogers Brubaker describes in terms of their "intertwining." At the same time, religion "provides myths, metaphors, and symbols that are central to the discursive or visual representation of the nation," and answers the central question, " who are we?"38 It becomes clear that in such a situation, both passive and open resistance to forced "reunification" is perceived in national terms and is reinforced by such identification. Moreover, there are many precedents in history (as shown, for example, by Ricarda Vulpius 39).

Image of the Russian Orthodox Church

The negative image of the Russian Orthodox Church in the eyes of Galicians was a serious reason why the prospects for" reunification "and" divestment " remained dubious from the very beginning, despite the commitment of a significant part of the Greek Catholic clergy to the Eastern rite. Because of their" ecclesiastical nationalism", Galicians could not perceive the ROC as anything other than the Russian Church, a voluntary agent of Moscow's Russification policy.

35. Ramet, S. P. "Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity", p. 8.

36. Ліквідація УГКЦ. Т. 1. С. 288.

37. "Ніколи наша Церква не була окремо відділена від національної держави". Інтерв'ю з о. Петром Дутчаком, 20.05.94, с. Лисець, Тисменицький р-н., Івано-Франківська обл. // Архив Института истории Церкви (Львов) (АИИЦ). P-1-1-385. P. 25.

38. Brubaker, R. (2011) "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches. Forthcoming in Nations and Nationalism", pp. 11 - 12 [http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/bruba ker/, accessed on 14.10.2014].

39. Вульпіус Р. Релігія та нація: унійна церква, православ'я та "держава-протектор Росія" // Україна. Процеси націєтворення/упор. Andreas Kappeler; per. z nim. K.: K. I. S., 2011. pp. 105-107.

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The Russian Orthodox Church was primarily perceived as a "Moscow Church", and "Russian" was clearly associated with"alien". Interviews conducted in the framework of the project "Image of the Power of the Spirit: a Living History of the UGCC underground" contain the following explanations for the impossibility of accepting Orthodoxy. "The Moscow Orthodox Church is absolutely harmful to the Ukrainian people... it has always brought great losses to the Ukrainian people. " 40 Conversion to Orthodoxy was seen as a step towards an indispensable and complete Russification. The Orthodox Church was completely identified with the Moscow regime, whose policy towards the conquered peoples, as the Galicians were sure, always amounted to attempts to Russify and completely assimilate them. "The Russian Orthodox Church is an enemy for all conquered peoples... It followed the military everywhere, followed the enslavers, and immediately planted its imperial [faith]. " 41 "Stalin started Orthodoxy (like Peter I) ... in order to throw his Russian Orthodox faith over our Ukraine." 42
The following quote is taken from an anonymous letter to the editorial board of the Orthodox Bulletin, the official organ of the Ukrainian Exarchate. Written in 1971, this letter shows that the attitude of Galicians towards the Russian Church has changed little in the decades since the formal "reunification". "Why are you so... do you want to whitewash and sanctify Russian Orthodoxy, or rather Moscow Orthodoxy, and convince us believers of its sanctity and infallibility? " 43

The Russian Orthodox Church was perceived not just as an agent of Moscow's Russification policy - its associations with the regime were much stronger. The Russian Orthodox Church was a "Bolshevik / state / state-owned" church, completely dependent on the atheist regime

40. "Московська православна церква для українського народу є абсолютно шкідливою і... вона завдала українському народові величезні втрати". Інтерв'ю з о. Иосифом Кладочним (монахом Єремією), 27.05.93, м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1-1-304 P. 29.

41. "Російська Православна Церква то є ворог для всіх поневолених народів... Вона всюду йшла за військовими, за поневолювачами, зразу вона насаджувала свою імперську [веру]". Інтерв'ю з пані Лідією Зеленчук-Лопатинською, 11.11.97, м. Моршин, Львівська обл. // АИИЦ. P-1 - 1-780. From 35.

42. "Сталін заводив православіє (як Петро І) ... щоби накинути свою російську православну віру над нашою Україною". Інтерв'ю з владикою Софроном Дмитерком, 06.11.97. м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1-1-419. P. 22.

43. "Що ж Ви так... хочете обілити, освятити руське Православ'я, а точніше би сказати Московське Православ'я, переконати нас віруючих в його святості і непогрішимості?". TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 5. D. 278. L. 181.

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(as before from the imperial power) and controlled by it. The letter of believers to the editorial office of the Orthodox Messenger contains another revealing passage: "The current state of Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church is so sad and pitiful... it ekes out a miserable existence under the authority and guardianship of godless communism and materialism, cut off and driven away from its own people. "44 The Russian-Orthodox" Bolshevik Church "was clearly gloriously in the service of the state apparatus." 45
Analyzing the traditions of the UGCC and the Russian Orthodox Church from the height of historical experience, which determined their attitude to the Soviet government and, accordingly, the attitude of the regime towards them, Greek Catholic Bishop Michael Sabriga (born in 1940) explains::

We see, when we compare our Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church, that any authority had power over the Orthodox Church, the power to govern... When this Orthodox Church has the characteristic feature of submitting to all, the Catholic Church has its First Hierarch... The world pursues what it has no power over. Hates things that can't be dictated to 46.

Due to the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church was a "Bolshevik/state/state-owned" church, completely dependent on atheist commissioners and following the orders of the godless regime, the canonicity of ordinations of the Orthodox clergy and episcopate was questioned. "It is not known whether he [an Orthodox priest] was properly ordained. After all, the Bolsheviks exhausted the entire hierarchy first, and then all the impostors were " 47.

44. "Сьогоднішній стан руського Православ'я і РПЦ такий сумний і жалісний. РПЦ... веде жалюгідне існування під авторитетом і опікунством безбожного комунізму і матеріалізму, віддалена, відігнана від свого народу". Ibid., l. 183.

45. Інтерв'ю з владикою Софроном Дмитерком, 26.п.93, м. Івано-Франківськ. С. 5; Інтерв'ю з о. Іваном Кубаєм, 10.04.93. с. Зимна Вода, Пустомитівський р-н., Львівська обл. // АИИЦ. P-1 - 1-192. P. 39.

46. "Бачимо коли порівняємо нашу Церкву Греко-Католицьку з Церквою Православною, то бачимо, що над Православною Церквою люба влада мала силу, владу керувати... Коли має ця Православна Церква характеристичну рису, підкорятися всім, то Католицька Церква має свого Першоієрарха... Світ переслідує те, над чим не має власті. Ненавидить те, чому не можна диктувати". Інтерв'ю з єпископом Михайлом Сабригою, від 30.03.94. м. Тернопіль // АИИЦ. P-1-1-321. P. 49.

47. "Не знати, чи він [православный священник] має свячення правдиве. Бо то більшовики свою ієрархію винищили спочатку, а потім, то все були самозванці". Інтерв'ю з о. Миколою Маркевичем, 17.03.93, м. Миколаїв // АИИЦ. P-1-1-337. P. 60.

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Due to the proximity of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet regime, an indissoluble link was established not only between "Orthodox" and "Russian", but also between "Orthodox" and "Soviet", "communist". "And as Orthodox, they were communists. " 48 Paradoxically, all those involved in the" reunification " campaign agreed that "to be Orthodox" meant "to be Soviet," although the reasons for this view and the very understanding of this identity differed significantly.

For the Russian Orthodox Church, the link between "Orthodox" and " Soviet "became the most important component of forming a" correct " identity, ensuring its existence in the Soviet space. 49 For the Soviet leadership, recognition of the link between "Orthodox" and "Soviet" was a necessary condition for the desired assimilation of Western Ukrainians. For the Galicians themselves, the recognition of the link between "Orthodox" and "Soviet" meant the problem of sincere conversion to Orthodoxy and, consequently, integration into Soviet society. Like the leadership of the Soviet state, they saw the "divestment" as a step on the way to the complete destruction of the church in the region, to their complete dissolution in the atheistic "Russian-Soviet" society. 50
The rejection of the Russian Orthodox Church was also expressed through the contrast between "modernity" and "traditionalism", "real faith" and "ritualism" ("superficial piety" of the Russian Orthodox), emphasized by Kostelnik. The Russian Orthodox Church was perceived as a church of "uncultured people", mainly peasants, whose pastors had only a superficial theological education.51 Greek Catholics were convinced that the Russian Orthodox did not even know the real essence of religion: "He can cross himself, but he can't do more." 52
48. "А як православні, вони комуністи були". Інтерв'ю з о. Мироном Бескидом, 05.06.96, м. Мукачево, Закарпатська обл. // АИИЦ. P-1-1-687. P. 6.

49. For more details on the ROC's survival strategy in the Soviet state, see: Shlikhta N. Tserkva tich, khto vizhiv. Радянська Україна, середина 1940-х -початок 1970-х ррХарків: Акта, 2011. С 107 - 118.

50. GARF. f. 6991. Op. 1 S. D. 222. l. 4; TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. d. 436. L. 409; Likvidatsiya UGCC. Vol. 1. pp. 127-130.

51. ГАРФ. Ф. 6991. Оп. 2. Д. 256. Л. з; Інтерв'ю з о. Ізидором Бутковським, 28.01.94. м. Львів // АИИЦ. П-1 - 1-294. С. 58; Інтерв'ю з Анною Свірською (сестрою Дарією, Чин Святого Василія Великого), 23.04.93. 24.05.93. м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1 - 1-55-P. 56.

52. "Вміє перехреститися, більше не вміє". Інтерв'ю з о. Михайлом Дацишиним, 11.02.93, м. Стрий, Львівська обл. // АИИЦ. P-1-1-97. P. 9.

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Identity and everyday survival of the "church within the church"

"Reunification" was unacceptable to the Galicians, because it meant incorporation into the church, which was contemptuously considered "backward", "completely compromised in the eyes of the people" because of its cooperation with the godless regime and was feared as an agent of Russification. "Reunification" was not accepted because it was imposed by a regime that was nationally and ideologically hostile and served its interests. Because of the inextricable link between "Orthodox" and "Soviet", the rejection of an Orthodox identity called into question the political loyalty of Galicians, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of Soviet leaders.

Based on the historical heritage of the UGCC, the self-perception of its members is more correctly defined using the category of "sectarian" rather than "ecclesiastical" identity proposed by Glannis Young. Analyzing the self-perception of Orthodox Christians and their attitude to the Bolshevik regime, Young clearly distinguishes them from the all-encompassing "sectarian" identity. Due to the "ritualism" inherent in the Orthodox Church, the behavior of believers was usually considered more important than internal experiences. Therefore, "it is much easier to combine [with some other loyalty] one's own belonging to Russian Orthodoxy than one's own belonging to sectarianism." 53 In the case of the Greek Catholics, the latter did not work, and therefore it was much more difficult for them than for the Orthodox to resolve the conflict between the Christian faith and loyalty to a regime that was anti-religious in nature. Myron Beskid (born in 1925), a Greek Catholic priest, notes that the Soviet identity had certain chances to be accepted by Western Ukrainians because of the attractiveness of the Soviet social project for many, but only if atheism as a state ideology was abandoned.: "I have often thought to myself that if communism, the idea of communism, removed from its ideology a negative attitude towards religion... an anti-religious ideology... then maybe they would attract the whole nation... that is, exclusively God-fearing-

53. Young, G. (1997) Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia: Religious Activists in the Village, p. 91. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

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our people " 54. In contrast to the Orthodox perception, the reconciliation of Christian and Communist loyalties was rejected by the Galicians as impossible, because "it is impossible to serve two gods", especially if each demanded complete and unconditional loyalty.55
The "catacomb" church offered one of the alternatives. Those who went underground decided at all costs to preserve their religious and national identity by rejecting the imposed identities-Orthodox and Soviet-thus deliberately choosing to be excluded from Soviet society and persecuted for "nationalist anti - Soviet" activities. A clear conscience and an aura of martyrdom for the faith in this case were a kind of compensation.

The choice of "church within a church" was different. Outwardly declaring their Orthodox and Soviet loyalties, these Galicians constructed a new or, according to David Thompson's definition, temporary, now-lived identity, 56 which helped preserve their own religious and national identity. This identity was opposed to the imposed ones and was based on a clear distinction of us/them. "They" were "Orthodox" in the ideological, national, and cultural meanings given to the term by the Galicians. "We" consisted of priests who had formally "signed on to Orthodoxy" and their parishioners who continued to attend "their own" churches, even if those churches were formally declared Orthodox.

Such concepts as "our", "our own", "real", "Galician", "Ukrainian", as well as a sense of internal unity reinforced by external threats became the central elements of the identity of the "church within the church". "People went to church because it is their own church. This is our church,

54. "Я не раз про себе думав, що якби комунізм, ідея комунізма вичеркнула зі своєї ідеології негативне отношеніє до релігії... антирелігійну ідеологію.., то вони може би захопили весь народ.., то є ісключітельно богобойний народ". Інтерв'ю з о. Мироном Бескидом. С. 47.

55. Інтерв'ю з Модестом Радомським, 03.09.93. м. Львів // АИИЦ. П-1 - 1-231. С. 12; Інтерв'ю з пані Марією Лазар, 13.08.00, м. Червоноград, Львівська обл. // АИИЦ. P-1 - 1-1141. P. 20.

56. Thompson, D. M. (2002) "Earthen Vessels or God's Building? The Identity of United and Uniting Churches". Unpublished paper for the World Council of Churches' Sixth Consultation of United and Uniting Churches. Driebergen, Holland (used with the kind permission of the author).

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we built it."57" People said, " Where will we go, this is our native, our native Church, we don't have any more, and where will we go?"58. The" ecclesiastical nationalism "of the" reunited " manifested itself in the opposition of "our" Ukrainian Church and "their" Orthodox Church. "Will the Ukrainian Church have the same rights as the Orthodox Church?" the faithful of the Stanislavskaya oblast asked back in March 1945,59 according to the authorized Council. In their "own" church, the "reunited ones" maintained their "real faith", which was opposed to the" superficial piety "of the Orthodox, and continued to perform" our Galician " rites. "The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has always been, is and will remain a national church, preserving its native rite, which is a mirror and outward manifestation of the true faith of our Ukrainian people." 60
The need for a more or less safe, legal " life in the church "is an important reason why" church within the church " was the most suitable form of religious life for Galicians after the violent liquidation of the UGCC. The faithful were not very concerned about the fact that their "own" priests, who served in parishes for decades before the Lviv Cathedral, "signed" Orthodoxy. What they were concerned about was the preservation of local religious practices. First of all, this provided for the traditional performance of rituals, the preservation of popular local customs and religious holidays. It also provided for the preservation of the usual appearance of churches and the appearance of clergy. In his abstract of August 3, 1945, Kostelnik described in detail all the concessions that the authorities had to make in order to ensure the conversion of Ukrainians to Orthodoxy:

57. "Люди ходили до церкви тому, що то своя церква. То наша церква, то ми її будували". Інтерв'ю з пані Любомирою Венгринович, 05.11.01, м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1 - 1-218. P. 66.

58. "Люди казали: "А де ми підемо, то є наше рідне, наша рідна Церква, ми більше ніякої не маєм і де ми підемо?"". Інтерв'ю з о. Іллею Огурком, 20.10.97, м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1-1-739. P. 16.

59. Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine (TsGAOO). F. 1. Op. 23. d. 1638. L. 26.

60 "Українська Греко-Католицька Церква завжди була, є і залишиться національною церквою, зберігаючи рідний свій обряд, який є дзеркалом і виявом назовні правдивої віри нашого українського народу". Інтерв'ю з о. Іваном Кубаєм. С. 37.

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The religious struggle with the people is very difficult: it will be necessary to fight for every image, for every custom, even the smallest. Even those of our rites and customs that are contrary to the teaching and cult of the Orthodox Church (for example, the Heart of Christ) will only need to be slowly eliminated ... and those of our church customs that are in agreement with the teaching and cult of the Orthodox Church would be foolish to eliminate, because they support piety among the people.61
Popular conservatism ensured the preservation of the "church within the church" as a formal component of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Vlad Naumescu argues that the focus on practice-a defining feature of the liturgical church - has made it easier for Greek Catholics to convert to Orthodoxy for the simple reason that the ceremonial difference between the two churches is not so significant.62 On the other hand, it was this focus on practice that excluded the possibility of full, effective incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church. The preservation of local religious practices (from the Greek Catholic tradition of consecrating Easter cakes to the popular gayovok, mayovok, carols and veneration of the Heart of Christ) was seen as a necessary condition for"reunification". Violent changes in traditional practices will remove believers from the Orthodox Church and call into question the appropriateness of staying in it, and this at a time when the "nationalist" "harmful and malevolent agitation of uniate believers" continues, as the bishops of the "reunited" dioceses explained their "passivity" in the matter of "exoneration" in their report to Patriarch Alexy dated 23 March 1959 63.

61. "З народом релігійна боротьба дуже тяжка: треба буде боротись за кожний обряд, за кожний і найдрібніший звичай. Навіть ті наші обряди і звичаї, які не є в згоді з наукою та культом православної церкви (наприклад Серце Христове), треба буде тільки поволі усувати; а ті наші церковні звичаї, які є в згоді з наукою і культом православної церкви, було б нерозумно усувати, тому що вони піддержують побожність в народі". Ліквідація УГКЦ. Т. 2. С. 139.

62. Naumescu, V. (2008) Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine, p. 15. Berlin: Lit Verlag.

63. Letters of Patriarch Alexy I to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of People's Commissars - Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1945-1970. Vol. 2: Letters of Patriarch Alexy I to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of People's Commissars - Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1953-1970. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010, p. 244.

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Gavriil Kostelnik explained back in 1947 how important the viability of the "catacomb" church is for the preservation of the "reunited" dioceses as a "church within a church": "Strange as it may seem, our opposition is useful to us, because the Soviet government counts with us as long as this opposition exists. Without it, we would have long ceased to be considered "64. The" anti-Soviet nationalist "activity of the" persistent Uniates "was emphasized at every opportunity, and it was skillfully - and with the use of official cliches - contrasted with the emphatically loyal"reunited" ones. Archbishop Hryhoriy (Zakalyaka) of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod, in his message on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the "reunification", used the official discourse and the stereotypical image of the enemy ("uniate nationalists"): "Orthodoxy has been alive for centuries and often the strongest ring that united the triune Russian people... Therefore, from a historical perspective, it is clear that the enemies of Russia saw in Orthodoxy not so much a religious as a national-political force."65. The ultimate goal was to defend the religious needs and local characteristics of the "reunited", which were clearly opposed to these "enemies".

Only" our own "priests could serve in" their own " Galician churches. "Give us an Orthodox priest, but only so that he does not wear a beard, but is always shaved." Such a promise was made by the "reunited" faithful to Archbishop Makarii (Oksiyuk), who wanted to appoint an Orthodox priest to the parish (1948) .66 "Church in the Church" became a kind of community closed to "strangers" - Russian Orthodox "priests". The designation "Russian Orthodox" in this case was not at all limited to the ethnically Russian clergy - it extended to all priests "sent from the East", including Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine. In the documentation of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church Affairs, cases of refusal of parishes from Orthodox priests are often analyzed. The refusal of an Orthodox priest was either open (parishioners did not give him the keys to the church and were not allowed to enter the church), or passive (parishioners simply did not attend his services). Both tactics were quite effective, and sent to-

64. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 24. D. 3613. L. 26.

65. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 5. D. 17. L. 74-75.

66. TSGAOOO. F. 1. Op. 23. D. 5667. L. 74.

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new priests did not stay in these parishes for long if they were not ready to change (including externally) and adapt to local religious practices.

"We had to save our Church." "We saved what was ours." This is how the priests who "signed Orthodoxy" explained their choice, emphasizing the lack of a real alternative and the pressure of the authorities ("I let myself be broken to some extent"67). The understanding of "reunion" as a mere formality and one's own belief that "I remained the way I was" became the main components of the identity of the "subscribed" priest as a member of the "church within the church".

The task of "saving the Church "in the sense of the" reunited " clergy was twofold. First, it was necessary to preserve the formal church structure so that lay people could legally and openly meet their religious needs (in registered churches). No less urgent was the need to protect "one's own" church and "one's own" parishioners "from the Russian Orthodox." "[If] the priests had not signed Orthodoxy, others would have come from there, they would have given priests from the East... Mikhailo Linda (born in 1912) 68. In view of the negative image of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox clergy among Galicians, it is not surprising that the priests justified their decision in this way: claiming that the appointment of an Orthodox priest to a parish and the destruction of this parish are inextricably linked.

The" reunited " priests claimed that they "remained the same", "remained Greek Catholics", and kept apart from the Orthodox. "If we didn't have any Orthodox people, we were all Catholic priests at heart."69 Significant differences from the Orthodox clergy were not just felt by them. Both the underground priests and the Moscow authorities recognized their existence. Despite the general negative attitude towards the "reunited", the" catacomb " church clearly distinguished

67. "... я до якоїсь міри дав себе зломити". Інтерв'ю з о. Олександром Бодревичем-Буцем, 25.09.98, м. Львів // АИИЦ. P-1-1-907. P. 47.

68. "[Если бы] священики не підписали би православ'я, прийшли би другі звідтам, зі Сходу би дали священиків... Люди не пішли би до храму". Інтерв'ю з о. Михайлом Линдою, 30.10.99, с Лішня // АИИЦ. N 2029. pp. 27-28.

69. "А жодних православних в нас не було, то всьо були в душі католицькі священики і всьо". Інтерв'ю з о. Олександром Бодревичем-Буцем. С. 24.

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between them and "Russian priests from the Russian Orthodox Church", almost never identifying them 70.

While catacomb priests mainly took into account the beliefs and self-perception of the "reunited" clergy, state officials, as well as inspectors from the Moscow Patriarchate, primarily paid attention to external characteristics. Their conclusions were disappointing: even decades after the Lviv Council, the appearance of "former Uniate nationalists" was clearly different from that of Orthodox Christians. The following observation was made by the authorized D. Kislyakovin 1959, He used the terminological distinction between the Ukrainian paroch and the Russian priest to emphasize the differences: "I have not seen a single priest from the former Uniates in a cassock, with his hair or beard let down, with a breast cross and other characteristic attributes of a "priest"... Most of them carefully preserve the appearance of the Greek Catholic priest "paroch" "71. "" Look at him, he is shaved, shorn. He came here to strengthen the union, not Orthodoxy" (from the criticisms of the" Old Orthodox " opposition 72 to Bishop Gregory of Drohobytsk and Sambir)73.

It is easy to assume that only "our own" bishop could manage a diocese in Western Ukraine. Kostelnik stated in a letter to Patriarch Alexy dated October 3, 1945: "I <...> have come to such a conviction that according to the principle, all our new Orthodox bishops should definitely be our people, from the uniates "74." Bishops should be ours, because otherwise the clergy and faithful will regard this as the beginning of Russification, " explained a member of the Initiative Group (future bishop of Drohobytsky and Samborsky Mikhail Melnik in his next conversation in the NKGB in August 1945 75.

70. Інтерв'ю з єпископом Михайлом Сабригою. С. 37.

71. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 1c. D. 538. L. 13.

72. Old Orthodox - an original term for small groups of Orthodox Christians who lived in Western Ukraine before 1946. They themselves clearly distinguished themselves as "true Orthodox" -from "reunited".

73. TsGAVO. F. 4648. Op. 1. D. 429. L. 99.

74. Ліквідація УГКЦ. Т. 2. С. 288.

75. Ibid., p. 171.

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The example of the appointment of the first bishop to the Lviv-Terno-Polish see is particularly revealing. In their letter to Khrushchev, written in September 1945, the leaders of the Initiative Group explained why the candidacy of Bishop Makarii (Oksiyuk) would not receive support from the residents of the region. Mikhail Oksiuk was not the first candidate for this department, which was considered in Moscow. First, they wanted to appoint Bishop Nikon (Petin) of Donetsk and Voroshilovgrad to the largest of the future "reunited" dioceses. His candidacy was eventually rejected "because of ignorance of the Ukrainian language" (formula from the journal of meetings of the Holy Synod No. 8 of April 18, 1945)76.Archpriest Oksiyuk was recommended to the patriarchal leadership by the Russian Orthodox Church Affairs Council, mainly because he was a native of Podlasie, and therefore spoke Ukrainian and understood the "specific situation in Western Ukraine" much better than natives of Eastern Ukraine or Russia. 77 Nevertheless, the Initiative Group also opposed this candidacy:

The local Greek Catholic bishop cannot be replaced by the current Orthodox Bishop Macarius, because although he is of Ukrainian origin, in the eyes of both the people and the clergy, he is alien in his clothes and appearance, in the way he performs the Service of God, and even in his Christian mentality... Bishop Macarius does not represent his particular Ukrainian Orthodox Church 78.

Conclusion

The campaign for the" reunification "of the" former Uniates " with the Moscow Patriarchate, on which the Soviet leadership had placed such hopes, suffered a crushing defeat. And the reason should be sought not only (we can assume that even

76. GARF. F. 6991. Op. 2. D. 34a. L. 9.

77. Chumachenko T. A. State, Orthodox Church, Believers. 1941-1961 (Series "The first monograph"), Moscow: "AHPO-XX", 1999, p. 56.

78. "Місцевого єпископа з греко-католиків ніяк не може заступити нинішній православний єпископ Макарій, бо хоч він українець за походженням, в очах і народу, і духовенства він чужий своїм одягом і зовнішністю, і своєю відправою Служби Божої та навіть християнською ментальністю... Єпископ Макарій не репрезентує своєю особою української православної церкви". Цит. по: Лисенко О. Є. Церковне життя в Україні. С. 300.

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not so much) in the "defiantly nationalistic" activities of the "catacomb" church. The explanation for the failure of the "reunification" campaign should mainly be sought in the daily life of the" reunited "dioceses, that is, not at all in the bright and heroic struggle against the regime, but in what was the result of a compromise and was perceived by many as a"betrayal".

"Church within a church" emerged after the "reunification" - as a result of an amazing interweaving of many factors: "ecclesiastical nationalism" and popular religious conservatism of Galicians; the corresponding historical tradition; reflections of those who formally led the "reunification" action on the impossibility of actual incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church; as well as persistent, for decades, resistance "of the "reunited" clergy and episcopate and any changes in the usual course of church life. This resistance proved to be a very successful strategy of the Greek Catholics after the violent liquidation of their church.

The "Church within a church" fulfilled its role as a local survival project, becoming an obstacle to the national assimilation and Sovietization of the region's population, which the regime sought. Moscow has not been able to come up with anything to counteract this strategy. After all, formally the "reunited" became Orthodox, and therefore loyal citizens of the Soviet state, and they never forgot to remind them of this ... in order to protect their own separateness.

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