Researchers consider Georgian-Abkhazian relations of the last two decades in the context of bipolar confrontation between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians. According to the author of the article, Abkhazia is not a bipolar society in which pro-Russian Abkhazians dominate over non-Abkhazians, partly Georgian-oriented (Mingrelians), but rather a sphere of multi-ethnic interests and aspirations. The main focus of this work is on two Abkhazian transnational ethnic and confessional minorities-Armenians and Muslims. The purpose of the article is to find out their role in the internal political life of Abkhazia and in Abkhazian-Georgian relations.

Keywords: transnational actors, interstate relations, Black Sea frontier, Armenians, Muslims, Armenian Apostolic Church, Turkish Diyanet, Council of Muftis of Russia.

Only recently have works begun to appear that demonstrate the important role of transnational minorities in Abkhazian politics: Mingrelians, Armenians, Russians, and representatives of other Slavic peoples [Trier, Lohm, Szakonyi, 2010; O'Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal, 2011, p. 1-36; Matsuzato, 2009, p. 239-262]. A survey conducted by O'Loughlin and his colleagues in Abkhazia in March 2010 found that 79% of ethnic Abkhazian respondents supported the independence of the republic, while 20% supported its accession to Russia. On the contrary, 51% of local Armenians, who are traditionally considered like-minded Abkhazians, hoped for Abkhazia to become part of Russia, while only 44% of them preferred to live in an independent republic. The latter point of view was supported by as many as 48% of the Mingrelians, who are considered to be a Georgian sub-ethnic group; the opinions of the remaining Abkhazian Mingrelians were divided with a slight margin in favor of reunification with Georgia (about 15%) in relation to those in favor of joining Russia (less than 10%) [O'Loughlin, Kolossov, Toal, 2011, p. 31 - 33].

Their position can be described using the "triadic nexus" model proposed by Roger Brubaker [Brubaker, 1995, p. 107-132]. Brubaker analyzed the aggravation of the interethnic situation in Croatia in the late 1980s and early 1990s through the prism of the synergy of three factors. The first one is " national-

¹ This article is an original author's Russian-language version of the work published earlier on the pages of the journal "Nationalities Papers" in English. The editorial board of the journal "Vostok (Oriens)" and the author thank the editorial board of "Nationalities Papers" for permission to publish this work in Russian.

² In Japanese tradition, the last name precedes the first name. The author is an employee of the Center for Slavic Studies at Hokkaido University in Japan.

a nationalizing "state" that could not stay out of the conflict. The second is the transnational Serbian minority, which has - the third factor - a homeland outside ⁴. In the case of Abkhazia, the following should be taken into account. First, both "socialist internationalism" (friendship of peoples) and the concept of "titular nations" as components of national policy were more deeply rooted in the Soviet Union than in Yugoslavia. The legacy of internationalism limited the freedom of action of "nationalizing states" after the collapse of the USSR.⁵ At the same time, public recognition of the concept of "titular nations" in post-Soviet States weakened the position of national minorities. Abkhazian Mingrelians and Armenians agree with the dominance of Abkhazians as a titular nation in the country's political life and are not inclined to protest, unlike Croatian Serbs.

Secondly, while in the former Yugoslavia the titular nation came into conflict with national minorities, the development of the situation in Abkhazia was influenced by the fact that the" titular " Abkhazians themselves found themselves in the position of a national minority in independent Georgia. In addition, Abkhazia has long been home to various transnational minorities with an external homeland. As a result, Abkhazia follows the same multinational model of state-building as Transdniestria, and both entities differ from the mono-ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. During the years of growing separatism and armed conflicts, the leaders of Abkhazia and Transdniestria put forward the idea of building multinational states to justify their struggle with the former "overlords" (Georgia and Moldova, respectively), who, according to their ideas, went along the path of creating mono-ethnic states. The third amendment to the Brubaker model in relation to Abkhazia should be based on the fact that transnational minorities can count on support not only from the States of their historical homeland (Armenia, Turkey or Russia), but also from such non-State transnational actors as the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Turkish Diyanet6 and the Russian Council of Muftis. These States and transnational actors do not always share their interests and concerns. To avoid confusion, we refer to the patron State as the "homeland outside" and the foreign non-State patron as the "foreign patron".

So, based on the Brubaker system, we intend to analyze the relationship between various transnational minorities (Abkhazian Armenians and Muslims) and the state (Abkhazia), as well as with their homelands outside and foreign patrons.

BLACK SEA REGION AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS

Before starting to study these national minorities, it should be recalled that the problems associated with them are important not only in the context of the gru-

³ A state that considers itself not yet fully national and therefore tries to maximize the dominance of the titular nation on its territory.

⁴ In the development of Brubaker's concept, Michael Mann argues that ethnic tensions tend to turn into genocide if two ethnic groups claim to establish their own state on the same territory (or even part of it), and the weaker of them behaves more belligerently, counting on outside help [Mann, 2005, p. 369-381]. At the same time, Mann criticizes Brubaker and other ethnosociologists for underestimating the class factor. From his point of view, ethnic conflicts are aggravated not only by mutual segregation and cultural discord; they occur when one (or both) parties begin to feel themselves the object of someone else's exploitation, and the ethnic split only worsens the class one.

⁵ That is why, for example, when Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power, unlike Franjo Tujman, he was forced to cover up his former slogan "Georgia for Georgians" and try to improve relations with Abkhazia in 1991.

⁶ Department of Religious Affairs.

the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, but also to characterize the macro-regional situation in the Black Sea region as a whole. International relations specialists continue to study the role of States on a global scale, often ignoring the regional context. Meanwhile, it is obvious that if states continue to be the dominant actors in some regions, the situation in others will be determined by transnational actors capable of epistemological manipulation. Published in 1970, a collection of articles edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Naya put transnationalism represented by various transnational actors on the research agenda, including the Vatican, international trade unions, and revolutionary movements [TransnationalRelations..., 1970]. In 1995, a quarter of a century later, Thomas Risse-Kappen and his co-authors focused on the activities of multinational corporations and international non-governmental organizations. At the same time, they tried to find out under what conditions transnational actors gain significance. Risse-Kappen criticized Keohane and Nye's thesis that the relationship between states and transnational actors is an antagonistic game (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Although both of these collections acquired an epochal significance, their authors remained equally ignorant of the "geography" of their theoretical constructions. Risse-Kappen and his colleagues ' concept of harmony in relations between States and transnational groups was obviously based on the experience of Europe, the United States, and Japan, which have a long national-state history. Studying transnational politics in the Black Sea region, we come to conclusions that differ from those of Risse-Kapien, but we do not pretend to discover any global political trend of the current century.

The Black Sea region is one of the new border regions surrounding the Eurasian "heartland" (Mackinder, 1919), which emerged as a result of deepening ties between the periphery of the former Soviet bloc and neighboring regions (Matsuzato, 2010 (a), pp. 42-53). The activity of transnational actors is typical for all new border regions, but the Black Sea region has features that are absent elsewhere. First, the Orthodox and pre-Chalcedonian (Armenian and Syrian) churches and Muslim communities act as major transnational actors here. This is a legacy of the past, when the Black Sea was an inland sea first of the Byzantine and then of the Ottoman Empire. As another example of religious dominance in the new frontier, let us point out the role of Islam in the region that can be called Little Central Eurasia and includes Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chinese Xinjiang. At the same time, in other new border regions, signs of the influence of religious communities on the macro-regional political process are not noticeable; local cooperation in the Baltic States, the Barents Sea region, Central Europe and Northeast Asia is based on secular interests. Confucianism may be contributing to the East Asian partnership, but the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea rarely refer to their Confucian community. When studying the role of Orthodox Churches in Abkhazia, Transdniestria, and North Ossetia, I came to the conclusion that Orthodoxy is no less transnational than Catholicism and Islam [Matsuzato, 2010(b), pp. 271-297].

Another characteristic feature of the Black Sea region is the abundance of small states in it. During the 20th century, the region successively experienced the fall of three states - the Russian Empire in 1917, the Ottoman Empire in 1922, and the USSR in 1991. Since the successor countries of the Ottoman Empire and the USSR failed to create homogeneous national states, a mosaic of cross - border national groups-Russians, Ukrainians,Armenians, and Armenians-emerged in their territory. Bulgarians, Moldovans, Mingrelians, Adjarians, Gagauzians, Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians) and the so-called Circassian

diasporas ⁷. In the Black Sea region, the population of only four states (Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Romania) exceeds 10 million, and in seven (Georgia, Armenia, Moldova and four other de facto independent states) it does not reach even five million. These small states cannot exist economically and politically independently, and this creates the ground for transnational interaction.

Based on the above, we can come to the following conclusion. In the region under consideration, the religious factor and the attitude of the great powers to the region are becoming particularly important, while the "counter" desire of its states to attract even more attention, and the mosaic of ethnic groups and religious communities suggests that transnational actors in the Black Sea region are not only strong, but also capable of epistemological manipulation.

ARMENIANS

The Armenians now living in Abkhazia and the coastal region of Russia's Krasnodar Krai are descendants of those who fled the 1915 genocide. ⁸ These Armenians speak a Western Armenian (Anatolian) dialect that differs from the literary language of the Republic of Armenia. In Abkhazia, Armenians mostly live in the Gagra, Gulripsha and Sukhumi regions. In 1989, at the end of the Abkhazian ASSR's existence, Armenians made up 14.6% of the republic's population; by 2003, they were already 20.8% (44,870 people). The main reason for such a significant increase in their share in the population of the republic was the mass exodus of Georgians, but even in terms of natural population growth, Armenians outnumber Abkhazians. If in Sochi, Adler (where Sochi Airport is located) and other resorts of the Russian Krasnodar Territory, Armenians control retail trade and taxis, then Abkhazian Armenians sarcastically call themselves "the poorest Armenian diaspora in the world." Nevertheless, their representatives hold important positions in Abkhazia, such as the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, deputy ministers, and district-level leaders. There are 33 Armenian schools operating in Abkhazia [Matsuzato, Interview with Hovsepyan..., 17.09.2009]. Like their fellow tribesmen everywhere in the world, Abkhazian Armenians try to behave in a way that does not cause fear among representatives of the autochthonous group - Abkhazians.

The majority of Abkhazian Armenians consider themselves to be members of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), which has about 60 dioceses worldwide. In the Caucasus region, it is" squeezed " between Muslim Turkey and Azerbaijan, with which Armenia has no diplomatic relations. In Christian Georgia, the Armenian Apostolic Church has developed an unfavorable situation: the Georgian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church is still deprived of its official status.⁹ In other words, the Armenian Apostolic Church, like Armenia and Karabakh, is constantly fighting for survival. Its most reliable ally is the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Back in Soviet times, the hierarchs of the Armenian Church studied at the theological academies of Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad) and Leningrad. In those years, the ROC was experiencing a shortage of currency, and it was the Armenian Apostolic Church that helped it, being in a better position in this regard thanks to the Armenian Diaspora in the West [Matsuzato, Interview with Fr. Alexander..., 18.08.2010]. A Christological dispute with Orthodox Christians does not affect co-operation-

⁷ In contrast to the ethnographic definition of Circassians as peoples who speak the languages of the Abkhazian-Adyghe (West Caucasian) language group. During the mass emigration of the Caucasian mountaineers after the Caucasian War with Russia in the 19th century, the Ottomans did not distinguish them from each other and called them indiscriminately Circassians (Cerkezleri). This "ethnonym" continues to exist in modern Turkey.

⁸ Armenians appeared in what is now Krasnodar Krai and the North Caucasus in the early Middle Ages after the fall of the Ani Kingdom. ed.).

⁹ The Armenian Apostolic Church, like the Russian Orthodox Church, was registered as a civil organization, not a church [U.S. Annual Report on Georgia: Religious Freedom, 27.10.2009]. In addition, the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church argue about the historical and legal affiliation of a number of churches (see, for example: [Ghazinyan, 7.07.2006]).

the Russian Orthodox Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church, which in this case demonstrate a pragmatic approach to dogmatic issues. The Russian Orthodox Church helped the Armenian Apostolic Church to resolve the Karabakh issue by acting as a mediator in its negotiations with the Azerbaijani Spiritual Administration of Muslims (DUM). Even the joint declaration of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the DUMA that the Karabakh conflict was not a religious war appeared as a result of the mediation of the Russian Orthodox Church [Matsuzato, Interview with Largev..., 30.08.2010].

During the escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in Abkhazia in 1989-1992, local Armenians tried to remain neutral, like any national group of the diaspora type, instinctively not wanting to be involved in the conflict. Despite this, in 1992, during the outbreak of the war, the Georgian troops did not bypass the Armenians in their atrocities. They broke into Armenian villages, "smoothed" cultivated fields with tank and armored vehicle tracks, looted, killed, raped, abducted people, and then sold the bodies of the victims to their relatives.¹⁰ The Abkhazian Armenians had no choice but to form their own national self-defense battalion, which fought throughout the war. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia V. Ardzinba called this Armenian formation "one of the best battalions of Abkhazia" [Abkhazia: Chronicle of the undeclared War, 1992, p. 92; Matsuzato, Interview with Minasyan..., 21.09.2009].

During the Soviet atheist era, Armenian churches in Abkhazia were closed, and priests from Sochi and Adler were invited here to perform baptismal rites and other sacraments. During and immediately after the war, the Armenian community in Abkhazia was cut off from Armenia. This made their religious life especially difficult, as for Abkhazian Armenians, communication with the Armenian Apostolic Church's Catholicosate in Etchmiadzin was too expensive. To serve their fellow believers in Abkhazia, the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church and ordinary priests had to and still have to travel by a circuitous route through Moscow, since the Georgian authorities forbid them to travel through Georgia, because their flock not only lives in the "occupied territory", but is also an ally of the"invaders". For this reason, Abkhazian Armenians belong to one of the two Russian dioceses of the Armenian Church - the South Russian One. Adler priests and business donors, who are wealthier than their Abkhazian co-religionists, continue to provide assistance to the Abkhazian laity of the Armenian Apostolic Church. This is different from the situation in Transnistria, where the Orthodox diocese is part of the Chisinau-Moldavian Metropolia of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Kishinev Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church manages the activities of Catholic parishes in Transnistria." In other words, although two secular states - Moldova and Transdniestria-emerged on the territory of the former Moldavian SSR, Christians on both banks of the Dniester River are still part of a single episcopate.-

¹⁰ The reason for the atrocities committed by Georgian paramilitaries in the early stages of the Abkhazian war was that Georgia did not have a regular army at that time, and independent "national guardsmen", among whom there was a high percentage of criminals, invaded Abkhazia. Well-known Georgian political analyst Gia Nodia describes this situation: "What was called the Georgian army was actually a collection of self-governing (i.e., unruly) battalions with poetic names and poor coordination, in which romantic patriots fought alongside bandits. Their constant atrocities against civilians (not only Abkhazians) alienated the local population (including the Georgian population) and significantly undermined Georgia's international image "[Nodia, 1998, p. 50]. The lack of discipline in these Georgian paramilitary units predetermined their subsequent defeat. First, while they were engaged in looting and violence, the Abkhazian government managed to evacuate Sukhum to Gudauta. Second, by failing to isolate the Abkhazians, they pushed all non-Georgians into a single anti-Georgian camp. Third, as Boris Nikolayevich Pastukhov, then Deputy Minister of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who was authorized by another Boris Nikolaevich to resolve the Abkhazian conflict, later told me after a vivid description of what he saw in the first days of the war: "Abkhazians are not good boys. They responded to the Georgians as the customs Union deserved" [Matsuzato. Interview with Pastukhov..., 25.08.2010].

¹¹ Catholics in the northern part of Transdniestria and Moldova emerged after these territories were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

pat (RCC) or Metropolitan area (ROC). This is a powerful peacemaking factor that Georgia and Abkhazia, alas, lack [Matsuzato, 2009; Matsuzato, 2010 (b)] ¹².

Abkhazian adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church cannot always count on the help of Russian Armenians, but initially it was obvious that if the Armenian Church appoints a permanent representative to Abkhazia, this will cause discontent of official Tbilisi, which may close its transit through seaports for Armenia. For a long time, Etchmiadzin did not dare to risk the interests of Armenia in order to help the Abkhazian Armenians. The decision came from outside. In October 2005, the Vatican's Apostolic Nuncio to the South Caucasus, Claudio Gugerotti, visited Abkhazia, where he met with representatives not only of the unrecognized Abkhazian Orthodox Church, but also of local Armenians.¹³ After learning of their difficulties caused by the lack of his own clergy, he persuaded Garegin II, Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church, to send a priest to Abkhazia [Matsuzato, Interview with Fr. Taronom..., 21.09.2009]. In 2006, Garegin II decided to entrust this mission to his young secretary, Hieromonk Taron (Gulikyan), who was sent to Gagra.

The appointment of Father Taron to Abkhazia worsened relations between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). However, even without that, they left much to be desired, and the leadership of the Armenian Church did not attach much importance to this reaction. Bishop Hovakim (Manuyan), head of the Department of Inter-Church Relations of the Catholicosate of the Armenian Apostolic Church, told the author of these lines that "we are not interested in the reaction of a 'third party' to the appointment of our spiritual pastor for Abkhazia." At the same time, he noted that the Abkhazians understand that Armenia does not recognize Abkhazia only because if it does, Georgia will close the border and thereby cut off Armenia from the sea [Matsuzato, Interview with Bishop Ovakim..., 28.08.2010].

Father Taron began his mission by laying the foundation stone of a church in Gagra. Before that, only a small chapel existed in the city with an Armenian population of eighteen thousand. President S. Bagapsh promised to allocate a construction site for the Armenian Apostolic Church in Sukhum, but during his nearly five-year stay in Abkhazia (from 2006 to 2010), Fr.Taron could not even finish the construction of the Gagra church. He told us that since it would be useless to count on the same relations between priests and laity in Abkhazia as in Armenia, he tried to become just a friend of the local flock; the catechism and other religious foundations are forgotten here, and, according to him, "people are wild" [Matsuzato, Interview with Fr. Taron..., 21.09.2009]. Although it is obvious that about. Taron overestimates the piety of the inhabitants of " big "Armenia, it should be recognized that the" resort " lifestyle of the population of Abkhazia, regardless of religion and nationality, creates huge difficulties that any religious figure, whether Orthodox, Muslim or Armenian priest, can face here.

According to Hajik Minasyan, Chairman of the Armenian community in Gagra, the most important task of any Diaspora community outside of Armenia is to help Armenian schools. Although there are 12 Armenian schools in Gagra (as of 2009), only about 50-100 students attend each school, and the number of students continues to decrease. In Soviet times, Abkhazian Armenians could receive higher education in Yerevan and return to work in Abkhazia. Now they are not allowed to cross Georgian territory, and Armenian students who study in Yerevan are forced to go home via Moscow during the holidays, which for many Armenian families in Abkhazia is not possible.

¹² A nurse at a Catholic clinic that belongs to the local Catholic Church and is supported by Polish donations in the village of Sloboda-Rashkovskaya (Kamensky district of Transnistria) told me that neither she nor her fellow countrymen perceive Moldova as a foreign state; in her words, this is the opinion of the "upper classes" [Matsuzato, Interview with Logina, 30.12.2009].

¹³ This visit provoked a violent protest from the Georgian Foreign Ministry, which called on Gugerotti and demanded an apology [Vatican Ambassador..., 11.01.2006].

within your means. Therefore, both Armenian youth and their parents prefer to get higher education in Russian universities, especially in the south of the country. But in order to be accepted to a prestigious Russian university, an Abkhazian Armenian must complete a Russian school. This weakens the desire of Armenian youth for their native language and ultimately leads to its assimilation.

During our stay in Gagra in September 2009, Minasyan actively campaigned for Sergei Bagapsh as a presidential candidate. From his point of view, Bagapsh was the only worthy candidate, since his rival Raul Khadzhimba is an Abkhazian nationalist and therefore undesirable for the national minorities of Abkhazia [Matsuzato, Interview with Minasyan..., 21.09.2009].

MUSLIMS

Turkey has a strong influence on the Muslims of the Caucasus and Crimea. The Turkish Diyanet Religious Affairs Department, although representing Sunnis, provides theological training not only to Sunni peoples14, but also to Azerbaijani Shiites. Diyanet's foreign activities, which began in the 1980s, were mainly aimed at discouraging Turkish and Kurdish emigrants in Europe from participating in leftist movements and groups. The secular Government welcomed this kind of activity. The end of the Cold War has stripped Turkey of its strategic importance as the southeastern flank of NATO. Instead, Ankara began to promote its own image of a valuable springboard for actions in the Caucasus and Central Asia for the United States and Western Europe, and as a model of a secular Muslim state for the countries of these regions. The Turkish ruling elite and the public have been startled to see the European Union admit former opponents from Eastern European and Baltic states to its ranks, while still delaying a decision on this issue in relation to Turkey itself. Considering that they had made a greater contribution to the victory in the Cold War than others, the ruling circles of Turkey began to realize the futility of their country remaining only as an obedient member of NATO. It was in this socio-psychological atmosphere that the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party came to power. The new government of Turkey began to pay serious attention to the neighboring countries of the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Another component of Ankara's new course was its reliance on" soft power", which, in turn, increased the value of Diyanet. During the years of the Republican People's Party, Diyanet's employees were nothing more than obedient bureaucrats. The Justice and Development Party replaced them with largely independent Muslim intellectuals, which eventually led to the emergence in Turkey of virtually another (after the Foreign Ministry) foreign policy structure. As a NATO member, Turkey has no right to officially recognize Abkhazia as an independent state. Nevertheless, it helps it by supporting the development of sports, culture, and trade. This is partly the result of pressure from the Circassian population of Turkey, which is not indifferent to the fate of its historical homeland. The Circassian minority in Turkey operates in a consolidated manner, and politicians cannot ignore its disciplined electorate [Matsuzato, Interview with Khvatysh..., 23.09.2009].

Religious history in Abkhazia can be divided into the following successive periods: pre-Christian, Christian (IV-XV centuries), Islamic (XV-XIX centuries), Christian-Islamic (from the second half of the XIX century to 1993) and predominantly Christian (after 1993). Ottoman Empire of Ustano-

¹⁴ Diyanet sent 25 imams to Ukraine: 22 to Crimea, one each to Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Mariupol [Matsuzato. Interview with Hermez..., 29.03.2007; Matsuzato. Interview with Savuran..., 16.03.2010]; see also [Korkut..., 2010, pp. 117-139].

in the second half of the XVI century, the Orthodox Catholicosate was forced to leave the coastal Pitsunda and move to the famous Gelat Monastery of the Virgin Mary near Kutaisi in Imereti. Fr. Dorofey (Dbar) claims that the result of the "Georgization" of the church in this way was the decline of Christianity in Abkhazia [Hieromonk Dorofey, 2006, pp. 10-13]. In the mid-19th century, at the end of the Caucasian War, when the tsarist government began to implement the re-Christianization of Abkhazia, many local Muslims resettled or were forcibly resettled to the Ottoman territory (which became known as the Mahazhir movement). The Russian government assigned the task of re-Christianizing the Caucasus to the exarch of Georgia in Tiflis. Since then and up to the Abkhazian War of 1992-1993, Abkhazians often called themselves Muslims or pagans, since the Orthodox Church, represented first (before 1917) by the Georgian exarch of the ROC, and then by the GOC, was a powerful tool for assimilating the non-Georgian population. After the Abkhazian war, the Abkhazian clergy created their own diocese, even if not a canonical one, and the threat of church Georgianization disappeared. In such circumstances, after 1993, Abkhazians began to convert to Christianity en masse.

Abkhazian Christianity and Islam equally carry remnants of paganism. Even during the reign of Islam, Abkhazians did not refuse to eat wine and pork, rarely made pilgrimages to Mecca, and rested on Sundays instead of Fridays. By subjecting boys to the rite of circumcision, fasting, and celebrating Eid al-Adha, they also celebrated Christian holidays (Smyr, 1972), which, in turn, were characterized by pagan features.¹⁵

Unlike Orthodox Christianity, Abkhazian Islam experienced a decline in 1993-2006. The local Muslims were unable to maintain their authority during the Abkhazian war, which was gained thanks to the active participation of their North Caucasian co-religionists in it. In a conversation with us in August 2006, Timur Dziba, the head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Abkhazia (DUM RA), said that only two hundred people practice Islam in the country and there are only two mosques, in Sukhum and Gudauta. Its Office itself was established only in 1999, and all its employees, including muftis, worked for free, on a voluntary basis. In the 2000s, the situation changed. Religious educational institutions in Arab countries began to demand tuition fees for young people coming from Eurasia to study Islam. The Turkish Diyanet could not help Abkhazian Muslims in this matter, fearing the discontent of the Georgian government.

The Abkhazian Orthodox Church is also in a difficult situation: it failed to achieve canonical status; the Russian Orthodox Church continues to insist on its canonical affiliation with the GOC even after the August 2008 war. Unlike the governments of South Ossetia and Transdniestria, which have turned Orthodoxy into a state religion, the Abkhazian authorities are not interested in its development within their borders. In particular, V. Ardzinba, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and then the first President of Abkhazia, as a professional orientalist, emphasized that since Islam is an integral element of Abkhazian history and culture, the Orthodox should not claim a monopoly in the spiritual life of the republic [Orthodox Abkhazia, 1993, p.4]. If we recognize, therefore, that Abkhazian Christianity is also forced to exist in not entirely favorable circumstances, the state of Islam in Abkhazia in 1993-2006 cannot be considered only as a consequence of difficult objective conditions. Local leaders of both faiths point out the incompatibility of strict restrictions of Islam (in particular abstinence from drinking wine and smoking alcohol).-

¹⁵ For example, after the Easter liturgy, which is held in the ancient (X century) church of Lykhna, priests and parishioners go to the pagan sanctuary of Lykh-nykha to worship the Shakryl clan. This rite was revived in the early 1990s [Krylov, 1998, p. 4].

Kaza from paganism, which is inseparable from idolatry) and with the worldview of Abkhazians, and with the aforementioned "resort" way of their daily life. At our first meeting in 2006, Timur Dziba looked annoyed and hurt that, despite his energy, he was unable to prevent the decline of Islam in Abkhazia, unprecedented even by Soviet standards. Complaining about the" liberalism " of the leaders of the Abkhazian Orthodoxy, he grumbled: "We are criticized for abandoning national traditions. But what are the traditions? Half-naked women? Drunk men? The number of people living in Abkhazia according to the law of Christ is even less than two hundred local Muslims" [Matsuzato, Interview with Dzyba..., 23.08.2006].

The picture changed radically in 2007-2009. In 2005 The RA Mufti Council signed an agreement with the Russian Council of Muftis under the leadership of Ravil Gainutdin, which came into force in 2007.The August 2008 war and the subsequent recognition of Abkhazia by Russia gave Turkey's Diyanet a free hand to help Abkhazian Muslims. According to Mehmet Germez, Diyanet's vice president responsible for its international relations, " Russia's recognition of Abkhazia has created a new legal situation." The Muslims of Abkhazia ^requested assistance from Diyanet through official channels - through their parliament and the Duma of RA16. In order not to irritate Tbilisi, Diyanet began to provide it not directly, but through the Diyanet Waqf Foundation, which is formally a public organization (unlike Diyanet, a state institution) and, accordingly, allegedly independent of Diyanet. The Diyanet Waqf Foundation sent donations collected during Eid al-Adha to Abkhazia and sent a representative to dispose of them. President Bagapsh welcomed this step and personally expressed his gratitude to the representative of the Foundation. So far, neither Georgia, the United States, nor the European Union countries have criticized Diyanet's assistance to Abkhazian Muslims. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, fearing an international reaction to the aid to the unrecognized state, asked Diyanet not to send its representative to Sukhum. However, taking advantage of the fact that the Foreign Ministry has no legal grounds to restrict Diyanet's foreign policy activities, the Turkish Spiritual Administration ignored this request. Due to the forced Christianization of Adjara, Diyanet's relations with Tbilisi are very strained even without the problem of Abkhazia [Matsuzato. Interview with Hermez..., 22.03.2010].

Having received assistance from Russia and Turkey, the Abkhazian Muslim community began to develop intensively. The number of converts to Islam is growing, especially among young people; many accept it while studying or working in Moscow and continue to practice it after returning to Abkhazia. Sukhumi mosque is full of parishioners. It was visited by UN officers from Muslim countries (until July 2009), as well as by peacekeepers from Dagestan, Tatarstan and other Muslim regions [Amelina, 2010, p. 3]. Beginning in 2007, first the Russian Council of Muftis and then the Turkish Diyanet began inviting Muslim leaders of Abkhazia to various international conferences. Both Russia and Turkey promise to provide young Muslim leaders in Abkhazia with the opportunity to receive a spiritual education. As Dziba, who recently became vice-mufti, puts it, "There are 25 million Muslims in Russia. Muslims, and it is we who can become another bridge between the two states " [Matsuzato. Interview with Dzyba..., 18.09.2009] ¹⁷.

¹⁶ The Diyanet has the right to provide assistance to foreign Muslims only after they themselves ask for it (this is how it deflects possible accusations of pursuing its own international strategy) and after the secular government of this country agrees [Matsuzato. Interview with Hermez..., 29.03.2007]. The latter is easily explained, since then Diyanet employees usually visit the sponsored country with lectures, finance the construction of mosques in them, and advise local Muslims on missionary issues. Otherwise, such activities would be interpreted as an attempt on the confessional independence of another State.

¹⁷ " 25 million Muslims in Russia" is at least a twofold exaggeration of the real picture, but similar figures are often heard in public speeches by leaders of Russian Muslims.

One of the unresolved problems of the Muslim community of Abkhazia is the construction of mosques. Diyanet, the Russian Council of Muftis and Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov promise to finance the construction of a Cathedral Mosque in Sukhum. But the government of the republic allocates a site on the outskirts of the city for this purpose, which the DOOM of RA does not want to agree with, claiming a place in the center.

Turkey's attention to the Muslim community of Abkhazia has caused public concern in Russia. Immediately after the Diyanet Waqf Foundation started providing financial assistance to Abkhazia, and Dziba visited Turkey to discuss the above-mentioned project of training young Muslims, Russian media reported that Diyanet and DUM RA had agreed that Turkey would send Abkhazian-speaking imams to Abkhazia [Amelina, 2010], i.e., it intended to act there for the same purpose. the same scheme as in the Crimea. It may have been deliberate misinformation. As long as Russia remains the only neighbor of Abkhazia that has recognized its independence, many Russian politicians and media believe that Russia has a monopoly on Abkhazia. But such a scenario is unacceptable for Abkhazia itself, which needs to play both Russian and Turkish cards at once to preserve its independence.

conclusion

Risse-Kappen concluded that "the weaker the state is internally and externally and the less effective international organizations are, the less relevant are transnational actors" (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 310-311). This conclusion is based on an understanding of the history of successful nation-building in Western Europe, the United States, and East Asia. However, a study of the situation in Abkhazia revealed a different picture. Transnational actors can also operate very successfully where the system of interstate relations has not yet been built. They are able to challenge States even in the most important issue for them-the recognition or non-recognition of the statehood of some of them. While the international community persistently tried to ignore Russia's recognition of Abkhazia, describing Moscow's actions as violating the law, the Turkish Diyanet recognized that this step by Russia created a new legal situation, and got down to business.

All this does not mean that relations between the State and a transnational actor have zero effectiveness. Transnational actors are gradually eroding the principles of inter-State relations, but in doing so they are filling in areas not covered by inter-State institutions such as the UN, OSCE and the European Union: the problem of human rights in unrecognized states, the question of their very survival, because more than once "undeclared wars" pose a direct threat to their existence.¹⁸ In this case, Risse-Kappen rightly points to the "power of persuasion of established principles and values" as the most effective resource of transnational actors [Risse-Kappen, 1995, p.309]. The AAC and Diyanet could afford not to be afraid of Georgia (which is backed by NATO), because they were convinced of the moral validity of their policy.

The situation around Abkhazian Armenians and Muslims developed according to similar scenarios.

¹⁸ This refers, among other things, to the strange inaction of the UN Security Council in the early days of the Abkhazian (1992) and second South Ossetian (2008) wars, when hundreds of civilians were killed. It should not be forgotten that until the 2008 war, both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian Governments worked closely with the UN and OSCE missions. Stanislav Gobozov, leader of the South Ossetian Fatherland Party (which was in opposition to President Kokoity's administration), claims that the OSCE mission did everything possible to weaken the defense capability of South Ossetia, while pretending not to notice the gathering of "about 40" Georgian artillery batteries towards Tskhinvali. After August 2008, the Ossetians rightly demanded that all international organizations, with the exception of the Red Cross, leave South Ossetia [Matsuzato. Interview with Gobozov..., 29.12.2010].

1. External patrons (AAC, Diyanet and Russian Council of Muftis) they could not remain indifferent to the plight of their co-religionists in unrecognized states, but they hesitated for a long time before challenging the norms of interstate relations.

2. The turning point was the events leading up to the August 2008 war, when the Armenian Apostolic Church appointed a spiritual mentor for Abkhazian Armenians, and the Russian Council of Muftis began to fulfill its obligations under the agreement with Abkhazian Muslims in 2005.

3. The August War intensified this process. Diyanet began to provide assistance to Abkhazian Muslims, and both Diyanet and the Armenian Apostolic Church began to perceive Georgia as a "third" (i.e., an outsider) party that had no right to interfere in their assistance to their co-religionists.

4. All this has led to an increase in contradictions between the listed religious organizations and secular states, which still did not dare to encroach on the norms of interstate relations. However, it is quite possible that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Armenia have perceived the growing duality of their states ' foreign policies as in principle a favorable ground for promoting their national interests.

5. It is characteristic that violations of the rights of minorities in Georgia (restriction of the religious autonomy of Armenians, as well as the forced Christianization of Adjarian Muslims) We have further strengthened the Armenian Apostolic Church and Diyanet in their determination to help Armenians and Muslims in Abkhazia. This is yet another example of how transnational actors can force states to respect human rights, in our case, by proving the truth of the aphorism firsthand.: "A man who lives in a glass house should not throw stones at his neighbor."

While the secular authorities of Armenia and Turkey were indulging in reflection and hesitation, the Armenian Apostolic Church and Diyanet actually challenged the interstate system. The Russian state followed the same path, declaring recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but this was not followed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which insists on the ownership of the respective territories under the jurisdiction of the GOC. Thus, both sides - both States and transnational actors-continue to adhere to their own logic, and there is no agreement between them.

list of literature

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Amelina Ya. "Islamization" of Abkhazia: an exaggerated sensation // Chegemskaya pravda. 24.02.2010.

Hieromonk Dorofey (Dbar). A brief outline of the history of the Abkhazian Orthodox Church. Novy Afon Publ., 2006.

Krylov A. B. Sotsial'nyi portret neznannogo gosudarstva [Social portrait of the unrecognized state].

Matsuzato K. Interview with Timur Dziba, Managing Director of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Abkhazia. 23.08.2006. Sukhum.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Mehmet Germez, Vice-President of the Diyanet of Turkey. 29.03.2007. Ankara.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Hovsepyan. 17.09.2009. Gagra.

Matsuzato K. Interview with O. Taran (Gulikn), the spiritual leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Abkhazia. 21.09.2009. Gagra.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Hajik Minasyan, Chairman of the Gagra Armenian Community. 21.09.2009. Gagra.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Talikh Khvatysh, Deputy of the Parliament of Abkhazia, Turkish citizen and member of the Turkish Parliament in 1999-2002 23.09.2009. Sukhum.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Timur Dziba, Vice-Mufti of the RA Mufti Council. 18.09.2009. Sukhum.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Tatiana Logina, a nurse at the Social and Medical Center of the parish of the Roman Catholic Church of St. Caetan. 30.12.2009. Slobozia-Rashkov village, Kamensky district, Transnistria.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Omer Farouk Savouran, a Diyanet employee who worked as an imam in Crimea in 2006-2008 16.03.2010. Ankara.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Mehmet Germez, Vice-President of the Diyanet of Turkey. 22.03.2010. Ankara.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Fr. Alexander (Vasyutin), an employee of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. 18.08.2010. Moscow

Matsuzato K. Interview with B. N. Pastukhov, Senior Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1992-1998.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Bishop Hovakim (Manukyan), Head of the Inter-Church Relations Department of the Armenian Catholicosate. 28.08.2010. Etchmiadzin.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Archbishop Pargev (Martirosyan) of the Artsakh Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, 30.08.2010. Stepanakert.

Matsuzato K. Interview with Stanislav Gobozov, one of the leaders of the Fatherland Party, Dean of the Faculty of Engineering and Economics of the University of South Ossetia. 29.12.2010. Tskhinval.

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