Continuing the discussion "Civilizations in the XXI century", opened by the articles of A. V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, the author supports the definition of civilization as a phenomenon primarily mental, as a stage of historical development of the human psyche. The development of the modern world, society, and economy requires the development of a general theory of social development and, within its framework, theories of reform and modernization.

Key words: civilization, definition, development, theory, reforms, modernization.

The articles that opened the discussion " Civilizations in the XXI century "[Akimov, 2013; Yakovlev, 2013] raised a number of philosophical, methodological and theoretical questions, each of which involves a multi-volume study, and some of them have a long history of scientific and political discussions and hundreds of volumes of publications. These are: (1) definition of civilization, (2) limits to the growth of civilization (as opposed to economic growth?), (3) scenarios of interaction between civilizations during the XXI century, (4) methodology for analyzing long-term prospects for world development, (5) understanding world development as a phenomenon, (6) reforms as a management tool development. My comments relate exclusively to certain theoretical aspects that are affected by the discussion of problems that are close to my scientific interests, and are not an attempt to" review " its original articles.

Definition of civilization: referring to the authority of A. Toynbee, who could not or did not want to give such a definition, the authors follow an intuitive understanding of the phenomenon. European, Orthodox, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, African, and Latin American civilizations are called. There are no clear, especially objectified, criteria; their place is taken by perception, starting from" self-evident", in fact, external signs.

But if the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian cultures are marked by a number of common criteria for each of them-geography, common language, territory, confessions, cultural and historical structure, and evolution-and therefore are easily and conveniently identified with their respective countries and peoples, then the rest of them are at least puzzled.

Orthodox civilization is defined by the criterion of religion, which is outwardly absent in most of the listed cases. What is Orthodox - Greek, Ethiopian, Armenian, Ukrainian? And aren't all of them, with the exception of the Ethiopian one, European? What is this last one? Taking into account geography and religion, this is Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, not counting the mass of small sects that consider themselves Christians. All of them at some point in history selflessly cut each other, sincerely - and from the standpoint of any faith rightly-confident that anyone who does not share their beliefs is a heretic.

However, isn't it possible to apply different criteria to European civilization and distinguish two continental Christian cultures, on the one hand-the continental Catholic and the continental Orthodox, and on the other - the Oceanic — Protestant? I do not insist on this approach; but it seems to me, at least, to have a right to exist. Then everything is clear with the first two, and the third would unite Britain, North America, Australia and New Zealand into a single civilization - which has its own logic ¹.

¹ The civilizational community of these countries and regions is based on the common language and, consequently, mentality; as well as on the history of the formation of these countries and peoples. For a brilliant analysis of these factors, see [Churchill, 2012].

The Islamic civilization is also distinguished by confessional characteristics. But Islam has its own long-standing and acutely hostile trends (the same Shiites and Sunnis, although the problem is not limited to them). And this is one civilization? Then why is the Orthodox Church separated from the European or, more precisely, the Euro-Christian church? What about Russia, where Islam has been living together with Orthodoxy for several centuries — irreconcilably at odds with the same Orthodoxy in Ethiopia? Or is Russia not a civilization (this is a question, not a grudge for Russia)?

What is Latin American civilization-is it the descendants of the Aztecs and Mayans, or is it a bizarre mixture of Catholicism and local Native American beliefs? If this civilization is recognized on confessional and geographical grounds, then why is the North American civilization not considered by the same criteria? In my opinion, it is correct that it does not go, because the latter is an Oceanic - Protestant civilization, which got rid of the Indians as a significant socio-cultural factor and thus opened up the prospects for taking off; but still?

Finally, the African civilization... If we count it among the civilizations of the ancient world, which somehow miraculously survived to the XXI century, this approach has its own reason. But is it possible to consider modern Africa as a single civilization, even if it is limited only to countries and peoples south of the Sahara? What do they have in common as a civilization, other than geography, and even then relative? And why is it that when we talk about European, African, and Latin American civilizations made up of the sum of countries and peoples, we don't talk about Asian civilizations? Why don't we select Australian or Siberian regions based on geography?

Having received nothing from A. Toynbee, the researcher uses the "list of civilizations proposed by S. Huntington for the analysis of modern international relations" [Akimov, 2013, p. 6]. The list is an accounting category, not a content category. Nor does S. Huntington define civilization as a phenomenon. The list was necessary for him to avoid the topic of the role of states in predicting future "clashes" in a politically correct way. Actually, he did not investigate civilizations, but also used the generally accepted "self-evidence".

The absence of a definition of civilization as a phenomenon, however controversial, and the substitution of external features for the definition of cultures, peoples, and countries means that all attempts to assess the future of civilizations themselves, the limits of their growth, scenarios for their interaction, and so on are hanging in the air. There is no clearly defined subject of analysis - in principle, there can be no scientifically reliable results of the analysis itself. Please do not take offense to the authors - I am writing about the problem.

If you criticize , then offer it. For obvious reasons, it is not possible to offer and justify your definition of civilization here. But what makes it different from the culture? Some kind of culture as a trinity of skills, symbols and meanings exists everywhere and always-from Australopithecines to international terrorists of the XXI century (figure of speech, no more). A civilization has skills, symbols, and meanings - all of which are no different from a culture. A civilization is based on the trinity of territory, population, and economy-and this does not differ from a country or a set of countries. Civilizations do not exist in isolation from an ethnic group, a person - and here it is inseparable from the people. Civilization necessarily fits into political and administrative forms - this makes it at least externally related to the state. What, then, is the specificity of civilization as a phenomenon?

It seems that a civilization is a culture that systematically reflects on itself, on its place in the world and history, on the meaning of life in the forms that are characteristic of this culture. Systemically, this means that such thoughts are not inherent in individual individuals, but in a given culture over a historically significant period of time. And these thoughts-even if they are purely fictions - do not disappear without a trace, but somehow remain in history as milestones of world development. Positive, reaching, or negative, results-

important milestones. Developing the material, but most importantly - spiritual, cognitive spheres of being, the apparatus (brain), structure and methods of thinking.

If so, then civilization is primarily (and I am convinced that it is exclusively) spiritual and psychological. Apparently, the definition of civilization should be sought in the bosom of historical psychology and the sciences of public consciousness, in the field and spheres of virtualities, and not on the basis of traditional and, as we have seen, little-giving criteria. Especially if these criteria are purely materialistic. And if real civilizations, unlike many cultures, invariably leave their mark on the history of mankind, then most likely a new civilization is a certain qualitative stage in the historical development of the human psyche as a phenomenon.

Limits to the growth of civilization. Growth has become something like the main fetish of our time. There are two main reasons for the need for growth in the modern world. Of course, growth is a quantitative prerequisite for development (although not all growth entails development; it can be accompanied by degradation or even stimulate it; and development in some cases and for some not always short time is possible without growth). The second and main reason is that economic growth is an indispensable condition for the effectiveness of modern methods and means of regulating the capitalist economy. Therefore, it is hardly correct to identify it with development, to consider economic growth and the growth of civilization as almost synonymous.

The objection is purely statistical: if the economic growth of the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian civilizations is easily identified with the growth of the economies of the respective countries, and the growth of the African or Latin American civilization can be represented as an average regional indicator, then what about the growth of the"Orthodox civilization"? How does the economic growth of Orthodox Russia integrate or at least correlate with the growth of Greece and Ethiopia? In addition to the controversial concept of "economic growth of civilization", all modern statistics - national and international-are "sharpened" by states. It is not by chance that in the analysis of resource, demographic, and economic prospects, the authors are forced to use country indicators, the relevance of which in relation to civilization needs to be proved.²

But the main objections relate to the theory and methodology of the problem. How is the economic growth of a country related to the growth of civilization, even in cases where these two phenomena de facto coincide (India, China, Japan)? In what forms is the quality of growth taken into account - and is it taken into account at all?³. Resource availability of a civilization relative to the dynamics of its demographic indicators is certainly an important indicator. However, why did the civilizations of the past die - from a lack of resources, a relative excess of population, or from some other reason? Of course, a civilization can die from a variety of natural causes or under the blows of a superior enemy; but if it is a civilization, it knows how to cope with a shortage of resources - war, trade, ingenuity - within the limits of what is available.

"The Stone Age did not end because the stones ran out" (Yu. Latynina). If civilization is a historical stage in the development of the psyche as a phenomenon, then the tasks of the stage are fulfilled and the potential of civilization is exhausted, if and when it no longer shows incentives and the ability to move further in this development. Causes of occurrence psychologists-

² The economic-resource-demographic part of the forecast is completely closed to states (I, not being an expert, do not undertake to evaluate this part) and has nothing to do with the phenomenon of civilization in general and the civilizations under consideration in particular. So, is the man-made crisis of 2013 in Cyprus a problem of European civilization, Orthodox or some other? Does it have any connection with civilization at all, and if so, with which one and why?

³ Oil production and exports contribute to the size and pace of economic growth. But in the Russian Federation , this is a "raw needle", a factor of degradation of the economy (and with it the country, society, and culture) and in Norway or Saudi Arabia, the qualitative effect of this factor is completely different (although fundamentally different in these two countries).

the theoretical limits of the development of a given civilization (and not civilization as a phenomenon) require a separate discussion.

Scenarios of interaction between civilizations. The "clash of civilizations" hypothesis proposed by Huntington gave rise to a persistent image of civilization as a kind of almost mechanical formation. Some share the idea of a clash, others argue about its possible forms (armed or peaceful), and still others do not accept the very idea of a clash, preferring to talk about interaction, interpenetration, or even "convergence of civilizations" [Akimov, 2013, pp. 11-12, 19].

The communication disunity of the world, which existed until very recently and has not yet been completely overcome, has not allowed any variant of the convergence of civilizations to develop historically. It is not clear what such convergence might consist of. We do not know any cases of" convergence of religions " even within one branch of the latter-on the contrary, new trends arise over time, each of which claims autonomy. Apparently, for similar reasons, there is no convergence of ideologies. Discussions about convergence of economic models that have been going on since the 1960s are still speculative. What content, in the light of this experience, could the convergence of civilizations be filled with, if it turned out to be possible?

If we agree with the hypothesis that each subsequent civilization is a new stage in the historical development of the human psyche as a phenomenon, then the historical and modern multiplicity of civilizations is natural: they reflect both the multi-stage path traveled and the structural and functional complexity of the phenomenon of the psyche. Emotions, rational-pragmatic principles, and finally, logical thinking and science evolved both by themselves and in a very close relationship, causing by the beginning of the XXI century the mental, spiritual and intellectual diversity of the known world. The experience and achievements of earlier civilizations were borrowed, transformed or denied by subsequent civilizations, invariably giving their own specific development effect. In this context, wouldn't the convergence of civilizations threaten to slow down the development of the human psyche for quite a long time (perhaps historically)?

In assessing the prospects of such a plan, it is especially important to methodologically and theoretically clearly distinguish between the phenomena of civilization, culture and people (population). As history proves, peoples are physiologically capable of mixing with each other in the presence of irresistible circumstances, causing new ethnic groups to come to life; of separating with the same consequences (for example, the British and Americans); or of dissolving without a trace into later ethnic groups. Physiology in this regard is the most mobile.

The culture is more complicated. Skills are determined by the conditions of activity and existence, but in ethnic terms they depend most likely only on temperament (cf. driving a car in Germany and Spain). Symbols can bring different cultures closer together, making them more understandable and close to each other (Cyrillic in Eastern Europe, Latin in Western Europe), but they can create difficult barriers between cultures (alphabetic writing and hieroglyphics). Since language largely determines the mentality of an ethnic group, differences in symbols, supported by different socio-historical experience, can create insurmountable gaps in meaning - what goes without saying in the language of one culture can be incomprehensible or completely incomprehensible in the language of another.

Finally, if we have moved from one historical type of psyche to another (not necessarily "higher" or" lower": perhaps "sideways", "richer", etc.), then is this considered a convergence of cultures and / or civilizations, or just the development of new emotions, experience, and knowledge?

It is legitimate to state that the social ecology of the planet in the context of globalization is somewhat leveled by the totality of these characteristics, but in many respects it is becoming more diverse. In my opinion, there is a reason to expect not convergence, but rather,

on the contrary, the multiplication of the number of civilizations that will have to interact with each other in the entire range of forms and means from cooperation to confrontation.

Understanding and methodology for analyzing long-term prospects for global development. The term "world development" has a double meaning in modern political theory and practice. In the understanding of international organizations and Euro-Atlantic political and economic thought, it means a combination of economic growth with an improvement in the quality of life and its socio-economic indicators. Such an understanding solves many applied problems and has the right to exist, including in science.

It has, however, several explicit and implicit limitations that are important from the point of view of the topic under consideration. It is tied to States, and through them-to international regions, not to civilizations. Its components can and do show improvements or degradation - according to circumstances - in countries and regions that are never directly associated with any civilization. The time frame of change recorded in this understanding (from one year to 10-30 years) is too short to draw conclusions about civilization (no matter how the latter is understood).

But most importantly, this understanding of world development is an integral and important ideological and political part of the existing world order, which decisively supports the possibility and permissibility of changes only within the framework of the current world system (market, democracy, capitalism). The transition from one civilization to another in the past has always been accompanied by essential changes (not always for the better). in the basics of social life. When a new transition is brewing, such an understanding of world development risks not noticing it or may even actively counteract it.

A different understanding originates in Marxism. There is a world development - an ascent from the simple to the complex, a consistent change in socio-economic formations, the development of the individual in dialectical unity with the development of society. With all the advantages and disadvantages of the Marxist view of world development, it is (at least in its classical form) completely divorced from civilizations. Marxist thought began to turn to the recognition of the legitimacy and expediency of combining formational and civilizational approaches in the analysis of society; but in practice, such a combination is not yet very successful. Marxism thinks in historical terms-which is optimal for analyzing the historical evolution of countries and civilizations, but unacceptable for politicians whose horizons in a democracy are limited to two or four electoral cycles, and it is difficult to match the analysis of current international statistics.

In the context of world development, the evolution of civilizations is not limited, apparently, to the correct, but too simple and general formula "becoming-flourishing-decline-death", applicable in general to all living things. The anatomy and physiology of civilizations should in principle be common to all of them-just as they are common to humans. Various scenarios of possible evolution of civilizations, considered in the article by A.V. Akimov, are more like alternative options for filling the life of an individual. But what "anatomy" and "physiology" could be considered as evidence of the health and prospects of civilization, of its potential ability to remain so?

In science at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the development of a complex system is not represented as a linear vector or even a spiral trajectory, but rather as a tree, whose numerous branches, growing at some stage from a common trunk, never connect with each other in the future. At the same time, in the course of development, someone always drops out not only from the struggle, but also from history, from life. If civilization is a stage in the historical development of the psyche, then the analogy with the branches of a tree is legitimate, but it raises many "politically incorrect" questions. In particular, the problem of leadership is removed: it is possible in a real society, but it is meaningless in the historical time scale and in the crown-like scheme of evolutionary trajectories.

Reforms as a development management tool. The statement of this problem is an undoubted achievement of A. I. Yakovlev in the discussion that has unfolded. The history of the most developed civilization to date - the English-speaking one-in my opinion, clearly indicates that the path to success was paved precisely by the ability of this and previous civilizations to reform, its, I would even say, reformatory genius from Ancient Rome through the Magna Carta to the ideology of Euro-Atlanticism in the 1970s and 1990s. ⁴

Having a modest, but still relevant, attitude to Perestroika in 1986-1991, I would like to note that one of the main reasons for its collapse was the lack of a theory of reforms and a clear understanding of what exactly is being reformed (or should be reformed) and in what direction. In today's complex societies and economies, reform cannot remain the intuitive process that it was historically, performing the function of belated and therefore not always successful correction of accumulated imbalances and contradictions of development. We need clear ideas about the goals, strategies, and horizons, as well as the inevitable costs and likely risks of reforms over the next 15-30 years.

Ideally, all this requires a theory of the object and, preferably, the subject of reforms, as well as the theory and technology of reforms as a special process of socio-historical creativity of a person. Developing an object theory requires, first of all, a non-ideologized, possibly more objective view of society and its problems. Theory of the subject - awareness of goals and risks, as well as possible alternatives to reforms. Finally, the theory of the actual reform process presupposes a preliminary correlation between each other (according to the criteria of content and duration) categories of development, reform and modernization.

The article considers reform in the context of mechanisms of "transition of the social system from one state to another" [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 20] as a way of such transition, alternative to the revolution or capable of producing some mixed forms with the latter [Yakovlev, 2013, p.21]. At the same time, the reform within the system differs from the reform of the system itself [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 23], as well as "modernization through reform" [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 25]. This is where the problem of defining the categories used arises.

Reform is understood as " a complex process of rebuilding society on a new basis... without forcibly changing the political culture of society, without breaking with Tradition "[Yakovlev, 2013, p. 24]. But is the former possible at all without affecting the latter? What were the transformations of Peter I, the abolition of serfdom, and the abdication of Nicholas II in Russia-reforms, modernization, or revolutions? What was Perestroika? Did all these changes not affect in any way the Traditions recognized at the time of their beginning?

Apparently, it is advisable to take as the starting point not the crisis of the system, which in practice is difficult to give timely adequate diagnosis, ⁵ but the development process as a continuous, historically long (more than 30 years) sequence of reforms and modernizations that develop during this period into a peaceful, nonviolent evolutionary change of society, i.e., in the actual process of its development. Then reform-

⁴ In the 2000s, the ability of the United States to maintain its "global leadership" became more and more dependent not so much on its ability to continue to be the first in the main areas of life of the modern world, but on the financial and military-economic containment of the pace and quality of development of real and potential competitors - the EU countries, Japan, China, Russia, and other BRICS countries.

⁵ So, the work of A. Amalrik "Will the USSR survive until 1984?" it appeared in samizdat in the mid-1970s, for which the author received a cc in 1977 for seven years (thus the work was actually recognized as worthy of the most serious attention). But officially, the crisis of the Soviet system and the threat of the country's collapse were not mentioned in the USSR until 1990.

⁶ The so-called absolute modulus of duration, equal to the average active life of one generation, within which a person is able to plan his life and can maintain motivation to implement the planned personal plans.

reform and modernization will vary in scope and depth of impact on society, the economy, and / or their individual areas, as well as in duration. Reforms are broader and deeper, lasting up to 25-30 years (so that the current person sees their results after all and does not lose interest in them). Modernization - more specifically and in a narrower sense, lasting up to about 15 years (for the same reasons). Reforms lasting up to 100 years [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 27] would completely kill any motivation, political and practical support for them: Perestroika here would end in 2086, and if the changes are counted from 1993, then in 2093 - who of the initiators and initial support forces will survive, not to mention how they can change in a century external and internal conditions of reforms ⁷.

One cannot but agree that the reform process opens up opportunities for modernization that will not necessarily be used [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 22]. Here, apparently, there is a fundamental substantive difference between reforms and modernization: the former are always focused on creating political and administrative-legal conditions for the desired changes, while the latter uses (or does not use) the created conditions for various practical and applied purposes. Therefore," modernization through reform " is impossible: it must go about its business, and attempts to confuse the two phenomena and concepts usually mean unwillingness, unwillingness and / or inability to carry out either.

Obviously, nonviolent development management is possible only through politics and law-that is, through reforms, and here the author's statement of the problem is perfectly accurate. Modernization (another difference with reforms) does not govern development, but fills it with specific economic, social, and other content; therefore, the terms "modernization" and "reform" cannot be synonymous in any way.

The state as a subject of reform. The idea that reform "can only be carried out by the state" [Yakovlev, 2013, p.21] is a dangerous illusion. The state as a phenomenon appears today in two qualities. It is a virtual reality formed by the unity of institutions, norms and rules. It is clear that without a person, this virtual reality not only has no goals, motives, and other things, but simply cannot act. In practical terms, the state is a bureaucracy that fills virtuality and gives it effectiveness. Which one is the big question: hundreds of volumes have already been written about the destructiveness of modern bureaucracy. It is the bureaucracy that is now a force that can effectively and for a long time resist objective diagnostics of the state of the country, society, and economy; hinder the development and adoption of programs and measures for modernization or reform; and successfully sabotage such measures carried out by the country's political leadership. ⁸

Reforms are conceived and implemented by specific people and groups whose position in power or in the immediate vicinity of power gives them such an opportunity. Their desire for nonviolent reform (if any) it requires the legitimacy of both the planned reforms and all actions to implement them. Such legitimacy is ensured by relying on the virtuality of the state (institutions, law, mechanisms and procedures), but is often achieved in a tough political and legal struggle against the state bureaucracy and its interests. Therefore, the state is at best an instrument of reform; its subjectivity in relation to the latter is bifurcated: part of the bureaucracy can support reforms (and in different ways: some "in principle").-

⁷ Stalin's reforms of 1928-1941 (the methods and price of which are known) prepared the country for World War II in less than 15 years. The extension of these reforms to 2028 would mean that the USSR would be consolidated in the category of the "third", if not the"fourth world". The modernizations of Khrushchev (1956-1961) and Kosygin Ustinov (1965-1975) each created in less than a decade the USSR whose remnants still feed Russia and maintain its status in the world.

⁸ The bureaucracy can be an instrument of power in the course of modernization [Yakovlev, 2013, p. 251, but only under the condition of continuous and effective political and legal pressure of the authorities on them.

pe", others practically). Usually, a large part of the bureaucracy resists reforms, any changes in general, or waits for "whose will take" at the political top. Practice shows that the bureaucracy is more likely to support changes and reforms initiated from the right, from the conservative side, than from the political center and / or forces standing slightly to the left of the center. And the bureaucracy will never support the left, which it sees at best as a means of neutralizing all other reformers.

An interesting paradox arises. Conservative reforms are possible and not uncommon in practice. However, they change the social system in the direction of consolidating, strengthening, and developing its former qualities - the very ones that have already caused the need for modernization or reform. Like any socio-political technology, reforms are not necessarily a blessing in themselves; they are a tool that can make things worse and even lead to disaster. Moreover, violence has more than just physical forms. It can be bloodless - economic, cultural, or political - psychological, or otherwise, but it is no less destructive. The non-peaceful (in extreme cases - revolutionary) path of transformation usually turns out to be a "negation of negation" and leads to the reproduction in a new ideological, political, and legal guise of a system of the previous type, but significantly more rigid, "protected" from those forces, factors, and methods of action that made the attempt to overthrow its predecessor possible and successful. Such an outcome is especially likely in cases where the" models " of reforms and even revolutions are transferred to a civilizational basis that is sharply different from the one where such "models" originated and gave their first results historically.

list of literature

Akimov A.V. Methodology for analyzing long-term prospects of world development // East (Oriens). 2013. № 2.

Churchill W. History of English-speaking peoples. In 4 tt. Yekaterinburg: GONZO Publ., 2012.

Yakovlev A. I. Reforms as a development management tool // East (Oriens). 2013. № 2.

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