The age of colonialism1 It is over, but oil-producing countries today are the objects of neocolonial expansion, which is caused by the growing need of industrialized countries for hydrocarbon fuels. This may be evidenced by the US policy in Iraq.

Keywords: modern Iraq, USA in Iraq, British colonial policy, coalition forces in Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, united Kurdish opposition, Chalabi, Talabani, Barzani, Allawi.

The fact that the US policy towards Iraq at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. The existence of the "colonial style" feature is confirmed in part by a comparative analysis with the British colonial policy in the Persian Gulf countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Great Britain justified its colonial activities by the need to" civilize " supposedly backward states and societies. At the very beginning of the period under review, the United States motivated its policy towards Iraq by the need to protect Kuwait from an aggressor country whose leadership does not respect human rights in domestic politics. Then, after a period of six months of occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, from January to February 1991, the multinational force (MNF) led by the United States carried out a successful operation that went down in history as the "Gulf War"2 and had as consequences international sanctions against Iraq [War in the Gulf..., 1991]. In the years that followed, the negative attitude of the United States towards Iraq was widely covered by the media. On international platforms, Washington began to actively accuse the Iraqi leadership, led by Saddam Hussein, of supporting terrorism, including in the person of Al Qaeda, and creating and storing weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998, the IAEA commission has been searching for these weapons [President's Bush..., 2001]. The official US position was that Iraq violates the main provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and is engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and therefore it is necessary to disarm Iraq by force. The United States and Britain had planned to vote in the Security Council on a resolution they had developed, but they refused to do so because Russia, China and France had indicated that they would veto any resolution containing an ultimatum allowing the use of force against Iraq. Ignoring this fact, the United States launched a military operation in the early morning hours of March 20, 2003.

1 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted at the initiative of the USSR on December 14, 1960, at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly.

2 Operation Desert Storm.

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Later, when WMD could not be found in Iraq, the emphasis was placed on the need for democratization. The latter thesis seems to be a new formulation of the old ideologeme about the need to" civilize " a backward society.

Regarding the search for weapons of mass destruction, as a reason for the invasion of Iraq, it is worth noting that the United States itself considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons even during Operation Desert Storm. Then, at the suggestion of Dick Cheney, Colin Powell developed a plan for its use [Mlechin, 2005, pp. 417-418]. At the same time, the Americans are armed with more than 7 thousand weapons. units of nuclear weapons [Utkin, 2007, p. 18]. This leads to the conclusion that sovereignty in the modern world is guaranteed not by international law and organizations designed to monitor its compliance, but by the presence of such weapons that exclude armed invasion and encroachment on sovereignty.

During the colonial era, the official rationale for British policy was a cover for its true interests-protecting the colonial administration in India and adding new territories, markets, and later oil concessions to this colony. It is difficult to accept that today the US rhetoric is not based on economic and geostrategic interests: the struggle for oil and influence in a region that has both Washington's allies - Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and the enemy of America and Israel - the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The next common feature is interference "in the affairs of the succession to the throne." Having gained a certain amount of power, Great Britain, with the help of intrigue and force, overthrew undesirable rulers and brought "suitable" ones to power. For example, in the 1870s, the British resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly, arrived in Manama, accompanied by the steamer Vigilant and two gunboats, and demanded that Muhammad Al-Khalifa abdicate in favor of his brother Isa Al-Khalifa for non-fulfillment of obligations to Great Britain and conflict with Qatar, although the latter, unlike the United States, did not agree with the United States. Bahrain was not a protectorate at that time (Bodyansky, 1962, pp. 75-76). And when this caused discontent among the population, the British authorities suppressed the uprising and put the son of their former unsuccessful protege on the throne [Bodyansky, 1962, pp. 76-78].

In 1888, after the death of Sultan Turki in Muscat, Great Britain did not allow the accession of his son Fahd to the throne. A British protégé, Faisal, became the Sultan (Bondarevsky, 1968, pp. 157-158).

The United States also considers itself entitled to decide who should lead Iraq. So they overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. The minutes of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on September 28, 1999 explicitly state that" if the United States is seriously interested in establishing stability in the region and disarming Iraq, first of all it is necessary to overthrow Saddam " [Facing Saddams..., 2000, p. 2]. This was also stated by President Bush himself [Bush's Speech..., 2003]. In addition, prior to the overthrow and execution of Hussein, active activities were conducted to support the opposition. Back on January 21, 1999, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced the creation of the post of coordinator of the Iraqi opposition, for which $ 97 million was allocated. [Military campaign..., 1999]. The military operation in Iraq began on the morning of March 20, 2003 with the entry of coalition troops (the United States and Great Britain) into the territory of Iraq. It was codenamed "Iraqi Freedom"3. Sometimes it is mistakenly called "Shock and Awe"4. By May 2004, the active phase of the operation was over: Saddam Hussein's regime had fallen.

At first, the US administration expected Ahmad Chalabi, a native of Iraq, who was educated in the United States and collaborated with the US intelligence services, to become the head of Iraq. [Utkin, 2007, p. 153, 175]. With the support of the Americans, he entered the Vre-

3 "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (OIF).

4 "Shock and Awe". This name refers to a military doctrine developed in 1996 and applied in Iraq.

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The Interim Council of Iraq, established in July 2003, along with Barzani, Talabani and Allawi (all members of the Interim Council were personally approved by Bremer, the head of the Interim Coalition Administration), and headed the Ministry of Finance. However, Chalabi soon began to criticize the actions of the Interim Coalition Administration. Thus, on April 23, 2004, when Bremer announced the easing of de-Baathization5 and the return of teachers to work, Chalabi said that the latter was tantamount to the return of Nazism to Germany [Utkin, 2007, pp. 295-296]. Moreover, he recanted his cooperation with the US administration, saying: "What was said yesterday is not important. The important thing is that Saddam is not here, and the Americans are in Baghdad" [Utkin, 2007, p. 282]. And on May 3, 2004, it was reported in the press that Chalabi informed representatives of the Iranian special services that American intelligence had deciphered the Iranian code and was reading Iranian secret correspondence. Thus, he has shown himself to be an unreliable ally of the United States and an unsuitable candidate for the post of a pro-American president of Iraq. In this regard, his candidacy was rejected.

The post of Prime Minister of Iraq in 2004-2005 was held by Ayad Allawi, whose candidacy was personally approved by Bush. The very next day after his appointment, he was visited by the US Presidential Envoy to Iraq, P. Bremer, and Generals Abizaid and Sanchez to edit his letter to the UN and discuss the status of Iraq. For a long time after that, Ayad Allawi met daily with P. Bremer, who advised him on the management of Iraq. Thus, with the help of American specialists, the country's budget for 2004-2005 was compiled [Utkin, 2007, p. 300].

The president of Iraq, to whom sovereignty was officially transferred, was Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who collaborated with the American special services even before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein [Utkin, 2007, p. 76, 129].

Back in 1996, the US administration tried to create a united Kurdish opposition in Iraq. But then the attempt failed due to clashes between the Barzani and Talabani forces that occurred in August [Republic of Iraq..., 2002, p. 88]. But in 1998, the US administration managed to achieve reconciliation and cooperation between Talabani and Barzani in order to control the situation in Northern Iraq [Republic of Iraq..., 2002, p. 89].

During the colonial era, Great Britain redrawn the map of the East at its own discretion, defining the borders between some states and creating others. In 1922, the British authorities demarcated the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, defining a neutral zone between them [Yergin, 2001, p. 289], and in 1934 - a part of the border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar [Anthony, 1975, p.125-126]. The British administration also decided to create a Federation of the United Arab Emirates, capable of ensuring independent development in the desired direction of the metropolis [Mikhin, 1981, p. 65-66]. Subsequently, this idea resulted in the creation of the UAE in 1971 (Rupert, 1959, p. 97).

Similarly, the US administration, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, considered the possibility of federalizing Iraq or even dividing it into an independent Kurdistan, which affects the interests of Turkey and Iran. This issue was particularly acute in the run-up to the 2004 US presidential election, which was held against the backdrop of a surge in resistance to the Mahdi Army6. Federalism was then seen as an opportunity to keep the Kurds as allies of the United States, giving them a part of the coveted autonomy, and at the same time - to attract Shiites to their side.

In 2006, when the American public was increasingly demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the US administration was considering a proposal by Senator Joseph Biden, then a member of the International Affairs Committee (now Vice President of the United States), and former head of this Committee, Leslie Gelb, to divide Iraq into three regions that would have their own borders.

5 The policy of mass expulsion of former members of the ruling Baath Party (Saddam Hussein was its leader) from the authorities and security forces.

6 is a Shi'ite armed paramilitary group created by Iraqi radical Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in June 2003.

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significant autonomy: Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish. In each region, according to this proposal, it was supposed to create its own constitution and police. The central government in Baghdad was supposed to be given the authority to regulate the oil industry and shape the state's foreign policy [Utkin, 2007, p. 341]. This project could be presented as granting the right to self-determination, and, consequently, the victory of democracy.

As for the oil of the Persian Gulf, the struggle for it the United States began in the era of colonialism. However, oil concessions were granted mainly to British companies on the rights of metropolitan companies. But even then, American companies such as Gulf Oil 7 in Kuwait and Sokal (Standard of California)appeared in the Persian Gulf arena8 in Bahrain, which allowed the United States to "get a taste" of Middle Eastern oil.

Here it is worth noting that, according to eyewitness accounts, during military operations in Iraq, the US armed forces protected the oil industry, while medical institutions, museums and other industries were looted and destroyed [Loiko, 2003, p.214]. Contracts for its restoration "by the right of the strong" were received mainly by American companies. For example, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), a subsidiary of the Halliburton Group headed by then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, was one of the first contractors to receive an order worth $ 4.8 million. Steevdoring Services of America has been granted permission to restore the port of Umm Qasr.

The analogies described above make it possible to state that during the period under review, the US policy in Iraq shows signs of colonialism. This policy was implemented with the consent of the United Nations (designed to ensure compliance with international law), which was made possible by loopholes in the international law system, as well as the skill and resources of the United States in using these systems. However, the US administration has not always been guided by the norms of international law and the position of the international community and the UN when making certain decisions.

It seems that for several years before the introduction of troops into Iraq, until 2003, the UN Special Commission acted in Iraq in the interests of the American administration. Its leaders and inspectors provoked the Iraqi leadership to show aggression, provided the Security Council with distorted information, which led to the adoption of new resolutions condemning Iraq's "unwillingness" to cooperate with the Special Commission, and gave the United States an excuse to escalate the situation around this country, prolong its economic blockade and even resort to military action.

On December 19, 1998, the former head of the Investigative Committee, S. Ritter, accused the US administration and personally the head of the Special Commission, R. Butler, of choosing objects for conducting inspections not to detect WMD, but out of a desire to provoke Saddam Hussein to react sharply and create conditions for the invasion of Iraq [Primakov, 1999, p.332]. S. Ritter himself resigned as head of the Investigative Committee on August 26, 1998 in protest against the fact that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright tried to disrupt the work of the inspectors [Republic of Iraq..., 2002, p. 88].

The fact that the work of the UN Special Commission in Iraq was pressured by the US administration is also evidenced by the following statement of its head, R. Butler. In response to the question of E. M. Primakov about why, without evidence of the presence of WMD

7 In 1927 it acquired the Arab concessions of Eastern and General, in 1928 it became part of the Anglo-French Tsrkish Oil Company group [Yergin, 2001, p.284-286], and in 1933 it became part of the Kuwait Oil Company [Yergin, 2001, p. 300].

8 Established a branch in Bahrain, Bahrain Petroleum Company, to develop the concession [Neft of Russia, 2000].

9 Contract for extinguishing burning oil fields.

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In Iraq, the Commission does not move from inspections to monitoring, he replied: "Everything depends on whether you reach an agreement with the United States" [Primakov, 1999, p. 311].

Who would benefit from implementing such a policy?

The United States itself has benefited from military action in Iraq for several reasons. First, conducting expensive military operations brought profit to the US military-industrial complex and large American capital. Thus, the US policy towards Iraq was largely determined by the fact that the ruling al-Sabah family in Kuwait promised the US administration contracts for the post-war reconstruction of the country. Of the 951 reconstruction contracts, more than 500 were signed with American companies, 20% with British companies, and 10% with companies from France and Saudi Arabia [Republic of Iraq..., 2002, p.74].

Second, the external enemy has always served as a distraction from internal problems. For example, Bush Jr. needed the Iraq War in 2003 to boost his ratings, which had declined as a result of his economic policies.

And, finally, third, the US policy in Iraq opened the way for American companies to access the Iraqi oil fields.

In addition to the United States, the policy pursued by them was beneficial to some forces in Iraq itself. So the Kurds began to cooperate with the Americans almost from the very beginning of the period under review and were the main support of the CIA in the country. Even during the uprising that began on March 18, 1991, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, appealed to the American administration for help [Mlechin, 2005, p.251]. Then the Americans did not immediately intervene, limiting themselves to providing humanitarian assistance. Only after the Iraqi forces used chemical weapons to suppress the uprising, Operation Consolation began on April 7, 1991 [Mlechin, 2005, p. 252]. The Americans identified a" security zone " that Iraqi troops were forbidden to enter. North of the 36th parallel, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 688, a "free area" was created under the care of the American armed forces [Mlechin, 2005, p.252].

It is worth noting here that the US administration decided not to support the 1991 Shiite uprising, fearing that it would lead to the collapse of Iraq and the strengthening of not only Shiite Iran, but also the positions of Shiites in all Arab countries (for example, in Saudi Arabia, which is friendly to the United States) [Mlechin, 2005, p.341].

The US colonial policy in Iraq at the turn of the century was not profitable for Russian companies for various reasons, and until the last moment Saddam Hussein assumed that Russia would not allow war to protect its economic interests. "France and Russia," he said, " have invested billions of dollars in trade and other contracts with Iraq, and they will stand up for Iraq on the issue of sanctions. They will use their right of veto in any case" [Saddam's Dellusions...].

America failed to turn Iraq into a"protectorate." Apparently, this is due to the fact that the country's population initially perceived Americans as aggressors, despite the short-term euphoria from the overthrow of the tyrant. The United States too much neglected local realities and mentality.

In addition, the US administration was clearly not prepared for the scale of armed resistance in Iraq and its transformation into a hotbed of terrorism and Islamism. For example, Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser in the Bush administration, wrote after the 2003 military operation in Iraq: "Bush Jr. believed that Saddam was running a modern, efficient state. Remove it - and the state will earn much better. No one saw clearly that it would remain chaos to govern" [Utkin, 2007, p. 330]. This was confirmed by the inability of the coalition forces to provide security in post-war Iraq, as evidenced by the reluctance of civilian specialists to enter the country, even taking into account the creation of special bonus programs. An illustrative case is with

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Negroponte, who, as the US ambassador to Iraq, arrived in the country on June 28, 2004, and six months later, during which, like his predecessor Bremer, he preferred not to leave the "green zone", asked for a recall to Washington [Utkin, 2007, p.319].

All US initiatives are viewed with suspicion in Iraq. It is worth noting here that the British came to their Persian Gulf protectorates through negotiations and unequal treaties, and the Americans came to Iraq with weapons in their hands.

The era of "open" colonialism is over, but the struggle for spheres of influence continues to this day. In light of this, a State claiming hegemony is an example for other States. If it builds its foreign policy in such an aggressive way, based on the "right of the strong", the same should be expected from other subjects of international politics, which threatens the entire existing system of international law.

list of literature

Bodyansky V. L. Bahrain (on the history of the Persian Gulf). Moscow, 1962.

Bondarevsky G. L. English Policy and International Relations in the Persian Gulf basin, Moscow, 1968.

Military Company against Iraq // School of Holistic Analysis. 1999. N 5.

Yergin D. Mining. World History of Struggle for Oil, Moscow, 2001.

Loiko S. E. Shok i trepet [Shock and awe]. The War in Iraq, Moscow, 2003.

Mikhin V. L. Emirates of the Persian Gulf and the policy of British colonialism. From Protectorate to Independence, Moscow, 1981.

Mlschin L. Putin, Bush and the war in Iraq. Moscow, 2005.

Russian oil. 2000. N 4.

Primakov E. M. Years in Big Politics, Moscow, 1999.

The Republic of Iraq in the system of international relations (80 - ies of the XX century-the beginning of the XXI century). Moscow, 2002.

Utkin A. I. The Truth about Iraq or the Battle in Mesopotamia, Moscow, 2007.

Anthony J.D. Arab Stale of the Lower Gulf: people, politics, petroleum. Washington, 1975.

Bush's Speech on Iraq: "Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave" // New York Times, 18 March, 2003.

Facing Saddam's Iraq. Disarray in the international community. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate. 106 Congress. 1st Session. Sept. 28, 1999. Washington, 2000.

President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress // New York Times, 21 Sept. 2001.

Rupert H. The Persian Gulf States. Washington, 1959.

Saddam's Delusions: The View from The Inside // Foreign Affairs. May/June 2006.

War in the Gulf: U.S. Statements; Transcripts of Statements by Bush and Fitzwater on Unconditional Pullout // New York Times, 23 Febr. 1991.

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