Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science. Dmitry's University

Pozharsky; Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 2010, 457 p.

A. V. BOLDYREV

A. M. Fomin set himself the task of identifying the role of the Eastern question in the development of Anglo-French relations in 1918-1923 and thus showing its influence on the formation of a new international order. The author is not an Orientalist, but such a statement of the problem is certainly of interest from an Oriental point of view, since it allows us to take a fresh look at the role of the Middle East in the post-war settlement issues, to identify its independent, and in certain cases decisive role in the events in Europe after the First World War.

A. M. Fomin is well acquainted with the historiography that preceded his work, which deals with the Middle East problem in the politics of France and Great Britain in the first quarter of the 20th century. This is evidenced by the extensive review of Russian, English - and French-language historiography given by him in the introduction. At the same time, the author should pay attention to N. G. Kireev's book "History of Turkey" (Moscow, 2007), which is not included in the historiographic section of the monograph, since it deals with many issues raised in the peer-reviewed study.

In his work, A. M. Fomin tried to highlight those aspects of the problem under study that are controversial or poorly studied in the history of international relations in the Middle East after the First World War: the issues of dividing Anglo-French influence in Syria, the problems of Palestine, the policy of the great powers towards national minorities of the former Ottoman Empire, the diplomatic history of the Turkey, the issue of the Black Sea Straits. These aspects are analyzed in detail by the author in each of the five chapters of the monograph.

From the very beginning of his research, A. M. Fomin does not limit himself to studying Anglo-French relations in the Middle East. He analyzes in detail the goals and objectives that were pursued by the elites of the multinational Ottoman state on the eve and during the First World War: the Arabs, Christians of Lebanon, the Armenian and Greek populations of Turkey. The author focuses on the strategy of British diplomacy in the Middle East during this period.

It is aimed at securing formal sovereignty in the occupied territories by providing the leaders of the Arab anti-Turkish movement with guarantees of formal sovereignty. The latter contradicted the earlier Anglo-French agreements on the territorial division of the Ottoman Empire (Sykes-Picot agreements), and therefore undermined the unity of the Entente. Thus, the influence of the problem of the Middle East on the state of affairs in the Anglo-French coalition is shown, which allows us to better understand the origins of the creation of a system of mandatory territories in the former Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire after the war.

A. M. Fomin examines in detail the problem of the Middle East division at the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-1919. He showed that the principle of creating mandatory states proposed by Great Britain was based on the declaration of the US President V. Putin. Wilson on the self-determination of peoples. This allowed Britain and France to justify their territorial claims in the Middle East with the need to create the best conditions for the development of the occupied territories. While assessing the form of the mandate-the creation of Arab states controlled by Great Britain and France within the former Ottoman provinces - the author emphasizes that this took place without taking into account the opinion of the local Arab population. As a rule, this policy was typical for Great Britain and France in the Middle East. This is well shown in the monograph on the example of the rivalry between England and France for the right of mandate over Syria. The latter was resolved through bilateral negotiations between the victorious Powers. As A. Fomin notes, " at a certain point, Faisal as the Syrian ruler was no longer needed by the British, who were preparing new trump cards for the diplomatic game with France. And they simply put him in front of a fait accompli (the transfer of Syria under the French mandate-A. B.)" (p. 177).

In this regard, it seems fair to conclude that the discussions of the European delegates at the Paris Peace Conference on the fate of the former Ottoman Empire were largely speculative in nature, not taking into account the possible resistance of the Turkish population to decisions imposed from outside. As a rule, only the fact of the military presence of the Powers in the region was taken into account. It is characteristic that the beginning of the national liberation movement in Anatolia remained, in fact, unnoticed by the leading Entente powers, who were engaged in dividing the Syrian "inheritance".

The preparation and conclusion of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 are well studied in Russian and foreign historiography. Nevertheless, the advantage of A. M. Fomin's monograph is that he showed that the imposition of a suicidal treaty by Britain for Turkey was the beginning of a serious separation of the foreign policy courses of Great Britain and France in the Eastern Question due to the difference in their interests in the Middle East. The author is right to draw attention to the fact that both sides pursued the goal of maximizing the colonial increment at the expense of the Ottoman possessions, differing only in the methods of control over them. As a result, France sought not to completely disintegrate Turkey, but to create a stable Turkish state capable of solving the problem of Ottoman debt in the future, which contradicted the interests of England, which, in order to ensure the communications of its sprawling colonial empire, was interested in controlling Istanbul and the Black Sea Straits, and therefore in maximally weakening Turkey.

In view of this, we should agree with the author that the capture of Smyrna (Izmir) by Greece, the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Sevres, in fact, were an uneven distribution of zones of influence in the former Ottoman Empire in favor of Great Britain. Unlike England, France, which from the very beginning doubted the possibility of implementing this treaty, was able (although not immediately) to properly assess the liberation movement unfolding in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. In the author's opinion, the Treaty of Sevres in the future contributed to the internal split of the Entente, since it was clear that in the event of serious complications in the implementation of the provisions of this document, France would inevitably go for their unilateral revision.

I would also like to note that when analyzing the policy of the great powers in Asia Minor in 1919-1920, A. M. Fomin showed a good knowledge of the internal political situation in Anatolia at that time. However, in my opinion, he somewhat exaggerated the unity of the members of the Ottoman Parliament during the adoption of the National Vow in January 1920. While I generally agree with the author that it was the Kemalist faction that provided a solid majority in the adoption of this fateful document for Turkey, I note that some nationalist deputies showed serious hesitation

on this issue. To a large extent, the fluctuations were overcome after the pressure exerted on the moderate part of the Anatolian faction by the executive body of the patriotic Forces of Turkey-the Representative Committee headed by M. Kemal [Kireev, 2007, pp. 126-127].

When assessing the reasons for the collapse of the Sevres Treaty, A. M. Fomin proceeds primarily from the initial non-viability of this document, since "it was clear that no Turk, at least in some way tied to his country, would vote for such a treaty" (p.265). It was this fact that determined in the future the whole complex of problems associated with the realization by England and France of their interests in the Eastern question. The author convincingly showed that before the conclusion of the Treaty of Sevres, recognized by the victorious powers, signed by the Turkish delegation in Sevres, but not ratified by the Ottoman Parliament, the Middle East policy of France, interested in supporting England on the Syrian issue, depended largely on the position of its British ally, but after Sevres the situation changed. The almost impossible peace conditions that Great Britain tried to impose on the Turkish government, and the first defeats suffered by the French army in a clash with the Kemalists (the Battle of Marash in Cilicia, in January-February 1920), convinced French diplomacy of the need to develop its own policy towards Turkey.

It is necessary to agree with the author of the monograph that the different attitude of the two countries to the Treaty of Sevres was the beginning of the formation of an independent course of France in relation to the Eastern question after the First World War. It was aimed primarily at securing France's economic preferences in Turkey in exchange for territorial concessions to Ankara (France's evacuation from Cilicia). As a result, this led from actual to formal recognition by France of the new Turkish government in Ankara, which was expressed in the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish treaty in October 1921.France canceled its signature to the Treaty of Sevres.

The analysis of the policy of Great Britain in the Eastern question after the conclusion of the Treaty of Sevres, given in the monograph, showed that England, unlike France, did not have a developed program of action on the Turkish question during these years and, even recognizing the inevitability of revising the Treaty of Sevres, proceeded from the need to implement its provisions as much as possible. This was largely due to the adventurous course of the mastermind of British policy in the Middle East, British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George, which he pursued despite the obvious failure of the Greek intervention in Turkey in 1921-1922. According to A. Fomin, the main reason for this was the desire of Great Britain to retain control over Istanbul and the Straits, which gave it the opportunity to turn the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions into open sea zones.

Thus, the monograph shows the role of the Black Sea Straits as a key link in solving the Eastern issue. The monograph also shows that the divergence of the Allied policy towards Turkey meant the beginning of the end of the Entente not only in the Middle East, but also in European affairs, since the cardinal contradictions in the East did not allow England and France to pursue a coordinated policy on the German question. The actual collapse of the Entente was marked by the Chanak crisis of 1922, when Great Britain, abandoned by France and Italy, was on the verge of disaster with the prospect of losing its hard-won positions in the Middle East. At the same time, the events of the Chanak crisis almost caused a new round of military confrontation between East and West.

The author also investigated the influence of the Turkish issue on the policy of the great Powers in relation to the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, partly recognizing after several defeats suffered by Greece in the war with Turkey, the Ankara government, British diplomacy and in relation to the leaders of the Arab liberation movement were forced to switch to a more flexible policy based on the balance of power. This contributed to the emergence of Arab States such as Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the future.

The undoubted advantage of the monograph is the study of Soviet-Turkish relations as an important and integral part of the Eastern question. At the same time, in my opinion, the author is not quite right, noting that Moscow considered the former leader of the Young Turks Enver Pasha as a real alternative to M. Kemal until Enver Pasha left for Central Asia and began his anti-Soviet activities in this region. Let me remind you that Enver Pasha arrived in Bukhara in mid-1921, and in November 1920 the RSFSR opened its permanent mission in Ankara [Kireev, 2007, pp. 138-139]. On March 16, 1921, the Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship and brotherhood was signed, i.e. Moscow's final decision on targeting Ankara was accepted-

that was before the breakup with Enver Pasha. At the same time, it should be taken into account that Enver Pasha's figure itself was not very convenient for Moscow due to the negative attitude of M. Kemal and the Turkish Communists towards him [Kireev, 2007, pp. 138-139]. This led to Enver Pasha's quick departure for Berlin and the temporary end of his cooperation with the Soviet government. The author of the monograph also exaggerated the negative impact of the Franco-Turkish treaty of 1921 on the development of Soviet-Turkish relations. The Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood was of strategic importance for Ankara due to the geographical location of the two countries and the fact that the recognition of the RSFSR by Turkey was unconditional and did not contain any additional conditions, unlike the Franco-Turkish treaty. This is what influenced M. Kemal's rejection of the military alliance proposed by France in exchange for the rejection of Soviet-Turkish cooperation [Miller, 1948, pp. 120-121]. However, the main aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations in this period were correctly described by A. M. Fomin.

Considering the policy of the great powers at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-1923, the author shows the influence of the Eastern question on Anglo-French relations at the final stage of the ten-year period of wars and internal troubles in the Middle East. Investigating this problem, he comes to the conclusion that the common position of the closest allies on a number of key issues of the Middle East settlement was absent. Unity of views was observed only in relation to the regime of the Black Sea Straits, which England and France managed to impose on Turkey. The new Straits Convention made them de facto dependent on the British Navy, which later led to numerous initiatives by the Turkish government to review the decisions signed in Lausanne. In this regard, the author should emphasize that the desire of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne Conference to achieve maximum restrictions on military transit through the Straits objectively corresponded to the interests of the Black Sea states, primarily Turkey itself. I would also like to point out that when speaking about the cooling of Soviet-Turkish relations after Ankara adopted the English wording of the Straits Convention, the author exaggerates the degree of Great Britain's influence on Turkey's foreign policy. Ankara's dissatisfaction with the new regime of the Straits was evident immediately after the Lausanne conference, as evidenced by the talks of Turkish Foreign Minister Sh. Russian Ambassador to Ankara Ya. Z. Surits on the problem of the Straits in 1923, which showed the negative attitude of both countries to the document signed in Lausanne [Russia..., 1999, p. 395]. This predetermined a fairly strong Soviet-Turkish relationship during the 1920s and 1930s.

As for the influence of the Eastern question on other aspects of Anglo-French relations in the Middle East, the author of the monograph notes that at the Lausanne Conference, France was forced to abandon its main demand for Ankara - the inclusion in the text of the peace treaty of a clause on the payment of the Ottoman Debt by Turkey (the existence of the Administration of the Ottoman debt was indirectly recognized in Article 56 of the draft of the future of the agreement). This was done under pressure from the United Kingdom and was the result of an Anglo-Turkish compromise regarding the new regime of the Straits and the future fate of oil-rich Mosul (Iraq). In this regard, at the Lausanne conference, France was forced to admit its failure in Turkish policy, since its calculations for Ankara's "gratitude" were not justified. Britain, on the other hand, managed to partially restore its position in Turkey, which was undermined during the Canak crisis. This further contributed to the strengthening of English influence in Turkey in the 1920s and especially in the 1930s. Thus, using the example of the Lausanne conference, the author of the monograph once again showed that Anglo-French cooperation in the Middle East was limited and made sense only when the interests of the allies on a particular issue coincided.

In addition to the twists and turns associated with the problem of the Ottoman inheritance in relations between England and France, A. M. Fomin examines the dependence of the policy of the great powers on the states and peoples of the Middle East region. In the monograph, this is shown by the example of Turkey proper, Syria, and the population of Palestine. In particular, he examines this issue in detail on the example of Turkey, because of the key role of this country in the post-war settlement in the Middle East. It is shown that the Turkish delegation, in exchange for concessions to England regarding the regime of the Black Sea Straits and Mosul, managed to implement the program of the National Pledge almost in full (liquidation of the Treaty of Sevres, cancellation of capitulations and reparations, prolongation of the Ottoman debt with the prospect of revising the form of its payment). All this made it possible for Turkey to eliminate in the future the elements of inequality that remained in Lausanne-

this agreement. Thus, the author showed an inverse relationship between the policies of the great powers in the Middle East, in which the countries of this region could have a real impact on the policies of Great Britain and France, in accordance with the existing situation and using the contradictions within the European coalition.

In conclusion, A. M. Fomin's monograph is an interesting fundamental study that examines the influence of the Eastern question not only on Anglo-French relations after the First World War, but also on the entire process of the formation of the Versailles-Washington system in 1918-1923. In other words, it shows the role of the Middle East in creating a new world order between the two world wars. In this sense, the unresolved problem of the Eastern question was, in the author's words, a "gaping door" in the Entente peace treaty system. As shown in the monograph, this was largely determined by the different approaches of Great Britain and France to solving this problem. If for England, given the size of the British colonial Empire, the Middle East largely determined policy on the European continent, then for France the Eastern question was of secondary importance compared to European affairs. This not only predetermined the well-known dependence of France on the policy of Great Britain in the Middle East region, but also, as shown in the monograph, caused a fundamental divergence between the two countries on the Turkish issue, which in this sense had a direct impact on relations between the two countries in Europe.

The author's contribution is a detailed study of Soviet-Turkish relations (the "Russian question"). as an integral part of the Eastern Question. The article examines the influence of national movements in the Middle East on the foreign policy of great powers, examines not only the direct, but also the indirect influence of Great Britain and France on the state of affairs in the Middle East region with the help of their allies. In this regard, it is of interest to study the relations of Great Britain and France with Greece and Turkey within the framework of the "partner-client" system. Using the example of Turkey, it is demonstrated that the dominance of Britain and France in the Middle East was not absolute and depended to a certain extent on the position of the states of the region themselves. Finally, the monograph shows that the formation of a new system of international relations in Europe and the Middle East occurred simultaneously and objectively led to the gradual disintegration of the Entente due to the difference in the interests of Great Britain and France in the Middle East region. Thus, the role of the Eastern question in the collapse of the largest military-political bloc of the early XX century is revealed.

Thus, in his monograph, the author analyzed the problem of the "Ottoman legacy" in Anglo-French relations and the related relations of the great powers in the Middle East, as well as the degree of influence of the Middle East factor on the state of affairs in post-war Europe, which not only makes the monograph an interesting study of international relations in the early modern period, but also gives It has an Oriental character and puts it on a par with other studies of the Oriental direction, devoted to the study of the formation of the system of international relations in the Middle East. Due to the importance that the Middle East has recently acquired in world politics, A. M. Fomin's research is particularly relevant. It shows the origins of the formation of the modern political system of the Middle East region, the causes of conflicts and contradictions between states in the Middle East, and problems in relations between European countries and the peoples of the Middle East. I would like the author to continue his research on the problems of the Middle East in the politics of the great Powers up to the Second World War. This would be a logical continuation of the author's study of the Lausanne period and would show the role and influence of the Middle East on international relations in the interwar period. The latter is particularly relevant in connection with the problems experienced by the modern Middle East in the last decades of modern history.

list of literature

Kireev N. G. Istoriya Turkii [History of Turkey]. XX century. Moscow, 2007.

Miller A. F. Ocherki sovremennoi istorii Turkii [Essays on the modern history of Turkey].

Russia and the Black Sea Straits (XVIII-XX centuries). Moscow, 1999.

D. L. SHEVELEV

The work of A. M. Fomin was received with interest by specialists, since studies of Middle Eastern problems in the first quarter of the XX century appear infrequently in Russia. The publication of such a monograph means that Russian historiography is finally returning to the problems of the formation of modern international relations in the Middle East.

The monograph gives a general description of the Anglo-French contradictions in the Middle East, reveals the factors that influenced the formation of the Middle East policy of the great powers. A. M. Fomin draws attention to the decision-making process of the allies, notes the degree of influence on this process of " pressure groups "in London and Paris, paying attention to the French"Syrian party". He introduces the term "Sykes-Picot line" (p. 80 et seq.) and emphasizes the English origin of the mandate system (p. 90). The author is guided in the publications of sources and introduces some already published documents, in particular from the collection " Records of Syria. 1918-1973", published in 2005.

However, some references to the documents given in this paper are not indisputable. Thus, the author claims that the report of the King-Crane Commission is not available in printed form and that is why he preferred the version available on the Internet (p. 13), although this report was published in 1938 by J. Antonius [Antonius, 1969, p. 433-458], and the work of Antonius itself became a classic in the United States. in the arsenal of a researcher of Middle Eastern problems. For some reason, A. M. Fomin quotes Hogarth's 1918 message from the work of Zayn N. Zayn "The struggle for Arab independence. Western diplomacy and the rise and fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria", published in 1960 in Beirut, while there is an official publication of the Hogarth message (Cmd. 5974, 1939).

Some of the manipulations with the sources made in the work remain unclear. A. M. Fomin prefers his own translations of English and French documents, and this is gratifying. Thus, he makes a translation of the joint Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918. Referring to the already available translation made by me, A. M. Fomin points out that the translation given in the publication "The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-1916 and the question of Palestine" was "verified and corrected from the French original". At the same time, it is completely unclear why A. M. Fomin "checked" my translation with the English official publication and "corrected" it, if he made his own translation from the French text of this document, because it would be more logical to compare the English and French texts of the declaration and compare them.

The author of the monograph seemed unconvincing in some arguments and inattentive to individual details. Thus, he claims that the Arab Bureau was created in 1915 to search for allies among the Arabs (p. 45). However, this is not the case. The Arab Bureau was established in March 1916. The purpose of this service was to formulate policy regarding the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and its tasks included collecting and analyzing current information that was received by the bureau, and coordinating the actions of all departments involved in Arab affairs (for more information about the Arab Bureau, see [Westrate, 1992])..

It is interesting that the author of the work" War with Continuation " believes that it was the Arab Bureau that established contacts with the Great Sharif of Mecca, Hussein (p.45). But the British had made contact with Mecca as early as 1914, thanks to H. G. Kitchener, who had served as Governor-General of Egypt and the Sudan before the war, and to one of Lord H. Kitchener's secretaries in Cairo, R. H. Kitchener. Stores. Moreover, the well-known Soviet researcher M. S. Lazarev attributes the first contacts of the British with the Hijaz to 1913 or even 1912 [Lazarev, 1960, p. 58]. All this is described in detail by M. S. Lazarev ,E. Kedourie (1976), and the author of this review.

A. M. Fomin calls R. Wingate an employee of the Arab Bureau without proof (p. 60), which does not correspond to reality and logic: the Governor-General of Sudan and the commander of the military operation in Hijaz could not have been an employee of the service that supplied him with information.

The author of the monograph persistently gives Hogarth the initials "D. G." (pp. 94, 136), while the famous British scientist and colonial figure was called David George. However, there are enough such mistakes and controversial points in the book, and it is not necessary to list them. It is much more interesting to focus on how the peer-reviewed work has become a landmark for the Russian research literature.

Not so long ago, the author of these lines, following English researchers, identified two directions in the historiography of the Middle East in the first quarter of the XX century - "traditional" and "revised". These historiographical lines differ in their assessments of the most important events,

which influenced the formation of the modern Middle East (or, as some authors write, the Middle East subsystem of international relations). Such events include, for example, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In addition, a notable distinguishing feature of the two historiographical trends is the adherence to emotional cliches used by historians and politicians in relation to those events, or a departure from such cliches [Correspondence..., 2008, p. 3 et seq.].

A. M. Fomin seems to belong to the number of followers of the traditional line in historiography. He repeats the statements typical of Russian historians ' descriptions of political and socio-economic changes in Turkey in the first quarter of the twentieth century . He treats the Kemalists with due reverence and condemns the great powers for neglecting the interests of the population of the Middle East, and also tends to exaggerate the influence of Arab nationalism during the First World War and the post-war period. settlements in the region.

In fact, reproducing the same cliches that "traditional" historiography adheres to, A. M. Fomin believes that the Arabs trusted the British (p. 48), and, perhaps, deliberately does not say that Hussein knew about the main provisions of the Sykes-Picot agreement before the Bolsheviks published the secret treaties (p. 52, 60).. However, both M. Sykes and F. Georges-Picot brought to Hussein's attention the terms of the Anglo-French agreements on the division of Asia Minor in May 1917. This is described in detail by E. Keduri and noted by the author of the review. However, A. M. Fomin tries not to notice those theses that contradict his constructions.

A. M. Fomin calls the British Foreign Minister E. Gray "the real architect of the system of secret agreements" during the First World War (p. 44), reproducing another cliche of "traditional" historiography. However, this was not quite the case, at least in relation to the agreements affecting the Arab territories. Here, E. Gray relied on Lord G. Kitchener for everything, which was brilliantly proved in 1976 by E. Keduri. This thesis of the English scientist was supplemented with some arguments by me in the introductory essay to the publication "The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-1916 and the question of Palestine" [Correspondence..., 2008]. For some reason, A. M. Fomin pretended that there were no arguments contradicting his position.

The author of the monograph seems to underestimate the role of the Zionist movement on the eve of the First World War, which also brings him closer to representatives of "traditional" historiography. He confidently asserts that in the Sykes-Picot agreement "there is not even a hint of Zionist involvement in the future fate of Palestine" (pp. 53-54). In this case, A. M. Fomin incorrectly reproduces the provisions of this agreement, since one of the conditions for Russia's accession to the Anglo-French agreements on the division of the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire was that the Russian government "will not raise any fundamental objections to the settlement of Jewish colonists [in Palestine]" [Secret Memo..., 1926, p. 37 - 38]. He believes that the British and French "preferred to ignore" the Zionist movement (p. 54). However, let me remind you that it was the British who proposed to the Zionist movement in 1903 the "Ugandan project" - a plan for the settlement of Jews in the territory of the British colony in East Africa, which caused fierce disputes within the Zionist organization. ¹

At the same time, with the appearance of the reviewed work, some theses that were previously based on Russian historiography are noticeably changed. A. M. Fomin claims that the Sykes-Picot agreement was a "development of the program" developed by the British in negotiations with Hussein in 1915-1916 (p.52). This contradicts the position on which Russian historiography was based earlier: the British, dividing the Asian possessions of the Ottoman Empire with the French, crossed out the agreements concluded earlier with Hussein. Thus, the author of the monograph considers the provisions of the Anglo-French agreement of 1916 to be a development of the provisions of the Anglo-Arab agreements of 1915-1916. And this thesis changes the existing ideas of Russian historiography.

Some changes are also noticeable in the consideration of the Balfour declaration, although A. M. Fomin follows the opinion that has long been established in "traditional" historiography, naming the reasons

¹ There is no detailed description of the "East African project"in Russian historiography. Its details can be found in publications of that time, for example: "Voskhod" (1903, N34); " Russian Wealth "(1903, N9, ed. 2, pp. 161-168).

the appearance of this document. So, in his opinion, the reasons for the appearance of the declaration on November 2, 1917, should be considered the desire to attract the United States to the side of the Entente, as well as the desire to keep Russia from withdrawing from the war after the February Revolution. However, these statements, which are common in historiography, are highly controversial. It is worth recalling that the United States entered the war against the Central Powers in April 1917, and the declaration was published in November 1917. The influence of Zionism on the Jewish masses in Russia was extremely limited, and on the Russian political elite was completely negligible. The author of the monograph rightly points out the desire of the British to neutralize the French in Palestine, which also served as one of the reasons for the British consent to the creation of a Jewish national home (p.55). Back in 1967, this was emphasized by the Israeli researcher M. Berta.

A. M. Fomin also notes that France was the first of the great powers to favor Zionism, which is expressed in a memorandum of June 4, 1917, signed by the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Claude Juncker. Cambon emphasized France's "sympathies" for the "revival" of the Jewish nation in Palestine (p. 55).

Thus, the appearance of the work of A. M. Fomin means that Russian historiography has once again returned to the consideration of Middle Eastern problems in the first third of the XX century. Gradually, there are changes in the provisions on which the conclusions of Russian authors were previously based: the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 was no longer considered as a violation of the agreements with Hussein of 1915-1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 is no longer the only document that should be emphasized when describing the history of the Zionist movement during the First World War.

The show of Anglo-French rivalry for the "Ottoman inheritance" generally took place. Only, in my opinion, the author was not always convincing. And details, apparently, should be treated more carefully, even those that may seem insignificant to someone, such as names, dates, geographical names, facts. From them, as a result, then the historical puzzle is compiled, which even with one wrong link will never come together...

list of literature

Lazarev M. S. The Collapse of Turkish domination in the Arab East (1914-1918). Moscow, 1960.

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-1916: Documents and Materials / Preface, introductory article, author's translation doc. and a comment. D. L. Sheveleva, Moscow, 2008.

Secret memo of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov on zones in Asia Minor and Arabia, addressed to the British and French Ambassadors. Klyuchnikov Yu. V., Sabanin A.V. Mezhdunarodnaya politika sovremennogo vremeni v kontragovakh, notakh i declaratsiyakh [International Politics of Modern Times in Treaties, Notes and Declarations], Part 2: From the Imperialist War to Lifting the Blockade on Soviet Russia, Moscow, 1926.

Kedourie E. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon - Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914 - 1939. Cambridge etc., 1976.

Westrate B. The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916 - 1920. Pennsylvania, 1992.

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