Collection of articles. Ed. by I. A. Mustakimov, A. G. Sitdikov; nauch. edited by I. V. Zaitsev and D. A. Mustafin. art. V. V. Trepavlov. Kazan: Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2009. 428 p. ("Bibliotheca tatarica")

The reviewed collection is a translation of articles published in different years (mainly in the 1960s-1980s) by an international group of specialists (including Turkish, Romanian, etc.) who worked in France under the supervision of Professor Alexander Bennigsen (1913 - 1988). These scholars (and their modern French followers) were the first to develop materials from the Istanbul archives concerning the international relations of the 16th and 18th centuries in Eastern Europe and, in this connection, the history of the Turkic peoples of this region. The source base used by them is still little introduced into scientific use, and therefore it is currently interesting and new for both specialists and the general reader.

For the Russian edition, their works were prepared by Kazan and Moscow colleagues working on similar topics and also beginning to master the Ottoman sources. The foreword by V. V. Trepavlov and the comments by I. A. Mustakimov, I. V. Zaitsev and D. A. Mustafina not only introduce the book, but also show the degree of modern knowledge of the topics raised in them, new literature that appeared after the writing of the published articles. The footnotes not only explain dates, names, terms, and similar reports from Russian-language sources, but also clarify translations and interpretations of published Ottoman texts, which undoubtedly increases the scientific value of this publication.

I would like to emphasize, however,that the publishers of translations of these French-language articles did not give their publication the correct name. It is not about the whole of Eastern Europe, but only about its Turkic peoples and their state associations, without touching on other ethnohistorical aspects of the region. The content of the book more accurately reflects the title that V. V. Trepavlov gave to his introductory article to it - "The Turkic peoples of Eurasia and the Ottoman Empire in the XVI century" (pp. 7-34).

A special interest of the peer-reviewed publication is given by the fact that it not only contains research articles, but also introduces readers to the texts of sources on which the authors ' conclusions are based, and provides facsimiles of Ottoman documents with a translation into Russian.

The articles and materials that the authors rely on are little known to Russian readers and even researchers of similar problems. In Soviet times, the journal that published many French articles on this subject, Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique (CMRS), was a bibliographic rarity and was kept in special libraries.

The development of historical science in the USSR, as is known, had its own ideological specifics, in particular, it concerned the study of national histories of the Turkic peoples. There was a gap between two branches of scientific knowledge-Turkology (i.e., the history and culture of the Turkic peoples living in the territories of the Russian Empire and the USSR) and Turkology (in this particular case, Ottoman studies - the history of the Ottoman Empire). Specialists who tried to bridge this gap were often accused of pan-Turkism, with all the subsequent organizational conclusions, and even reprisals. That is why Turkish-Turkish relations were hardly studied, and the Ottoman sources remained unknown for a long time. Current economic situation

In France, the scientific school of A. Bennigsen proved to be a monopolist in the development of the Ottoman-Turkic problems of Eastern Europe.

At one time, Turkey worked seriously in this direction. Inaljik and A. N. Kurat, but the former very quickly switched to general Ottoman issues, and the latter passed away early. Published in Turkey, his work on the Ottoman campaign near Astrakhan (1569), unfortunately, turned out to be a bibliographic rarity, little known to European scientists. French experts cite only an article by A. N. Kurat, published in The Slavonic and East European Review (XI, 94, December 1961), with a brief summary of the author's conclusions, while the book itself does not mention the author's conclusions. [Kurat, 1966], which is a serious study and contains texts of Ottoman sources on the problem, remained out of their attention. A blind reference to this work is available only in the article by J. Weinstein 1992 (p. 185). Meanwhile, it was A. N. Kurat, in my opinion, who first expressed the idea, then convincingly developed by the school of A. Bennigsen (see the articles of A. Bennigsen, T. Gokbilgin, J. Weinstein, A. Bennigsen and M. Berindey in the reviewed collection), that the Ottoman campaign of 1569 was carried out by the Ottoman Empire. It is more connected with the problems of relations between the Turkic countries of Eurasia and the Turkish-Iranian confrontation than with the mythical struggle for the Horde inheritance, which was persistently asserted in Soviet historiography.

From the 1960s to the present, the French School of Turkology has occupied a leading position in the study of international relations in the Turkic world of the XVI-XVII centuries, and at the same time relies in its research on newly introduced Ottoman documents. French researchers do not ignore the achievements of Russian scholars on this issue, both foreign (judging by the footnotes of appreciation in a number of articles in the collection, they maintain close contacts with the famous American expert on Russian history E. Keenan-see, for example, pp. 78, 81, etc.), and Russian, using their source finds, quoting them and sometimes even debating with them.

Already in the first article, which begins the collection, Sh. Lemercier-Kelkecze gives a general overview of the relevant materials from the" Muhimme Defteri", i.e., from the unique collection of copies of all documents originating from the Imperial government bodies stored in the Ottoman Archive under the Office of the Prime Minister (Bajvekalet). As the author noted, the collection consists of 263 volumes. For the XVI-early XVII century (this is 80 volumes) it covers almost all the affairs of the empire, in particular military, administrative matters, and diplomatic relations. 1,264 copies of documents directly or indirectly related to Muscovy, Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia were found. At the same time, it is emphasized that some part of the documents may have been overlooked by researchers (see p.37), i.e. the work on identifying sources is not yet complete. It is noted that none of the Russian or Soviet historians had access to these registers and there was not a single attempt on their part to assess the importance of the "Muhimme Defteri" records. The publishers of the Kazan collection note that since 1993, Turkish archivists have published 8 volumes of this collection. Copies of some documents related to the history of the Middle and Lower Volga region in the second half of the XVI century were transferred by the General Directorate of State Archives of the Republic of Turkey to the Archive Department of the Republic of Tatarstan.

In addition to materials from the Basvekalet archive, French turkologists also worked with separate documents from the Topkapi Palace Museum and the archive of this museum.

In most of the articles in the collection (works by A. Bennigsen, S. Lemercier-Kelkezh, E. Karrer d'Ankos, E. Bennigsen, J. Weinstein, M. Berindey) describes in detail the attempts made by the rulers of Central Asia to revive the former ties of their region with Europe and the Mediterranean, which previously went along the north of the Caspian and Black Sea regions. In these attempts, they vainly pinned their hopes on the help of the Ottoman Empire and tried in every possible way to draw its attention to these territories.

It is known that since the eighth century, after the Arab conquests, the trade route connecting India with North-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean was actively functioning. Transit trade enriched the cities and oases of Turkestan.

Helen Karrer d'Ankos recalls a time when, after the carnage and destruction of the conquest period, Mongol rulers established their power over a vast territory and actively encouraged trade exchanges between the Western world, China, and India. For Central Asia, this time has become a period of prosperity, but, says the French researcher, "it is not a time of great prosperity."-

to them the prosperity of this region was due to its position, and not to trade" (p. 118), i.e., not to its own contribution to the trade that went through their territory, but to the fact that it provided security, trade warehouses, caravanserais, maintenance of wells, etc.

The crisis that hit the entire world in the middle of the 14th century seriously affected the development of the Central Asian countries. The Mongol empire collapsed, and Italian merchants stopped traveling to China and India. Trade routes through Iran have become unsafe. The struggle between Genoa and Venice for Tana intensified, which in the early XIV century. it turned out to be the main terminal of the transit route from Asia to the Mediterranean. However, later the invasion of Timur (1395) and repeated raids of local Tatar rulers led to the fact that the Tana (Azov) also began to move from international intermediary trade only to serving the local economy of its nearest agricultural semi-nomadic periphery and slave trade. The " big " trade is gradually moving from the Black Sea region towards North Africa, Egypt, and then the New World (for details, see [Karpov, 1999, pp. 220-237]).

Knowing these previous events, we can look at the events of the XVI century in a different way. Of course, the rulers of the Central Asian states would like to restore trade at least along the northern route of the Great Silk Road and tried to resort to the help of the Ottoman Empire in this, but this was no longer in their power. The geopolitical situation has changed, and along with it, international trade routes. Trade in this region has ceased to play a major role in the politics of states. Gradually, the trade of the Ottoman Empire with the Nogais, who had previously supplied it with horses and other livestock, faded away. As traced by A. Bennigsen and J. Weinstein (p. 340-364), Moscow became a new trading counterparty of Nogai trade already in the 1520s. Even the Emir of Bukhara, Abdullah II, the most active advocate for Ottoman intervention in solving the problems of southeastern Europe, at the end of the XVI century. entered "the path of reorientation of its external relations and rapprochement with Muscovy." His attempts to direct trade along the fading Caspian-Black Sea route and to allow the flow of pilgrims to Mecca (previously going through Iranian territory) along the same route were actually reduced to several insignificant episodes. Relations with the Sultan as caliph became "only formal" (pp. 137-139). The Ottomans ' own trade with the north (including the Muscovite state) went through Poland and Moldavia, bypassing the Black Sea region (this is evidenced by the data given in the articles of A. Bennigsen, S. Lemercier-Kelkezh-p. 314-340 and M. Berindey-p. 376-386).

French researchers have introduced the most interesting material into scientific circulation and draw the conclusion most clearly formulated by E. Carrer d'ancos: "since 1588, The Ottoman Empire turns its face to Europe and ceases to be interested in Central Asia." The "era of unity of the Turkic-Islamic world" has ended (pp. 138-139). Understanding the causes of this phenomenon seems to require additional reflection. The statement of the appearance of a "double barrier of Shiite in the south and Russian in Astrakhan" (p.138) is only an external picture of the events taking place in the region, the essence of which is not revealed by this. Moreover, the Sunni-Shiite enmity and the Iranian-Ottoman wars in the sixteenth century rather contributed to the fact that the "Turkic unity" was still somehow preserved. The Uzbek Sheibanids, for all their failures in the fight against the Safavids, were the only possible allies of the Ottomans in the wars with Iran, and the northern lands of the Black Sea region, Ciscaucasia and Dagestan were considered by them during these wars as the shortest routes for sending Ottoman troops from the Crimea and the northern Balkans to the Ottoman-Iranian front of military operations in Transcaucasia. Hence the Ottoman invasion of Astrakhan, the desire to dig a canal between the Don and the Volga, and the predominance of navvies over warriors in the army that moved to Astrakhan in 1569.

A. Bennigsen in his article about the campaign notes: "Strangely enough, the Astrakhan campaign did not have a direct impact on relations between Moscow and the Ottoman Empire. On October 19, 1569, the Boyar Duma, headed by Tsar Ivan, decided to send Ambassador Ivan Novosiltsev to Istanbul to congratulate Sultan Selim II on his accession to the throne... One gets the impression that the Ottoman Empire, in turn, accepted the defeat of 1569, because during the reception of Novosiltsev by the Grand Vizier, the Turks did not protest against the Russian presence in Astrakhan and were content only to demand that all merchants and pilgrims of Central Asia be allowed free passage through the Lower Volga region" (pp. 160-161). Specific materials of sources about the campaign of 1569, its consequences and the gradual abandonment of the Ottomans from the northern direction of their expansion are given in the articles of T. Gokbilgin, J. Weinstein, A. Bennigsen and M. Berindey, S. Lemercier-Kelkezh, A. Bennigsen and S. Lemercier-Kelkezh.

The Turkic world of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Golden Horde was represented by the Crimean, Kazan, Astrakhan Khanates and the Nogai Horde, which occupied territories between the Azov and Aral Seas. After the defeat of the Great Horde by the Crimeans (1502), its uluses were moved closer to the Crimea, and the so-called Wild Field was formed to the south of the Moscow Principality. There was no territorial contact between the Ottoman possessions (including its vassal, the Crimean Khanate) and Muscovy. According to the documents identified by French researchers, until the middle of the 16th century the Ottomans were not interested in the Lower Volga region, knowing nothing about this region (pp. 92-93). There is no sign of any concern on the part of the Ottoman authorities in 1552, when the "Muscovite danger" loomed over the Kazan Khanate (p. 102). This information contradicts the picture that was drawn for this time according to Russian sources. Moscow clearly feared Ottoman intervention. Emphasizing these differences, French authors explain it by saying that the Moscow Principality received its information about what was happening in the Turkic world, primarily from the Nogai Horde, whose beys tried in every possible way to emphasize their supposedly close ties with the Ottoman Khudavendigyar (ruler )and thereby elevate themselves in the eyes of Moscow (see the article by A. Bennigsen and Sh. Lemercier-Kielkezh, pp. 86-115). It is this information that still serves as the basis for deep-rooted statements in Russian historiography about the interest and even leadership role of the Ottoman Empire in the struggle of the Turkic khanates for the Horde inheritance.

In reality, the Ottomans perceived the Black Sea steppes, as they were called in the Islamic world - Desht-i Kipchak, as something remote, not connected with their own foreign policy interests. "Knowledge of all matters concerning these regions", as stated in the Sultan's decree (hyukm) of February 1552, is possessed only by the Crimean khan, and since "sending a report to our Threshold of Happiness" about affairs in this remote area and waiting for an answer requires a lot of time, the khan is allowed to independently solve problems of the border and relations with Russia. neighbors, and " then report on accepted ones... merah" (see the text of this hyukma).: pp. 102-103). In another order of the khan from the same year 1552, it was clarified: "You were entrusted with all questions concerning ... how the affairs of Astrakhan, Nogai, and ... .. [a space is left]. Act in the best and fastest possible way in terms of taking measures", but do not withdraw troops from the areas of Ozyu (Ochakov) and Akkerman (Bilhorod Dniester), "the affairs of these lands are the most important" (p. 105). So, what was happening on the north-eastern borders was then of little interest to the Ottoman imperial authorities, although the Khan was instructed that "the enemies of the faith should not know victory" and the possessions of the Ottoman Empire should be " protected and protected from despicable infidels." As V. V. Trepavlov rightly noted, " religious rhetoric... indignation at the capture of Kazan and Astrakhan by the" infidels "and their creation of obstacles to pilgrimage are invariably present in all messages to the Tatars, but these were only" emotional statements that were not translated into real political actions" (p.10).

Meanwhile, the south of Eastern Europe was undergoing major changes not only in political terms. These changes were based on changes in the natural and climatic sphere: the nomad zone was shrinking, the Wild Field was disappearing, the zone of agricultural culture was growing, nomadic communities were moving, and trade relations were gaining a new focus. It was beyond the power of the most powerful rulers to reverse these changes. All this forces us to take a fresh look at the role of Russia in this region. Its acquisition of Astrakhan was a consequence of the changes that had taken place in this region by the sixteenth century, and not the cause of them, as is sometimes stated in a number of articles in the French collection.

Most important for the Russian authorities in Astrakhan were the control of the Volga River crossing and customs duties, which did not interfere with trade, but organized it, made it safer from robbery by nomadic and semi-nomadic residents of the Astrakhan district (p.24). In the new conditions, after the Great Geographical Discoveries, the caravan trade could survive only by changing partners, turning to the north-east of Europe. Russia gave her this opportunity.

So, I would like to emphasize once again that neither trade (including northern furs, as E. Bennigsen, A. Bennigsen, S. Lemercier-Kelkezhe, J. Weinstein, M. Berindey write in their articles), nor relations with Central Asia, nor confrontation with the Safavids could have persuaded the Ottoman Empire to turn its expansionist policy to the West. north-east. This situation was well shown by French experts, but Russian historiography is still poorly taken into account.

And another question that has long been discussed in our literature: what is the nature of the vassal relations in which the Crimean Khanate was part of the Ottoman Empire? A certain freedom of foreign policy actions granted by the Ottoman authorities to their vassals sometimes deceived not only researchers, but also contemporaries. Thus, in the 17th century, the status of an Ottoman vassal was considered attractive by many Ukrainian Cossack leaders. They were attracted by the freedom of the rulers to solve internal problems, imperial protection from external encroachments, and the ability to carry out certain foreign policy actions themselves. The limits of permissiveness that the Ottoman imperial structures set for their vassals remained unnoticed, using such traditions of the region as hostage-taking, twinning, atalismism (i.e., sending the children of aristocratic families to be raised in other families, clans, etc.), as well as supporting inter-tribal and inter-clan rivalries, frequent changes of rulers, whose relatives always stayed with them. the Sultan's court and were ready to take the reins of power. The result of all this was social instability in the vassal units, which slowed down the course of internal development, did not allow them to resist the center, and in foreign policy actions contradict the general imperial political orientation.

The features of Ottoman vassalage, which are clearly of a different nature than such relations were imagined in Europe, are still poorly understood. Hence the misunderstanding in the assessments, including the status of the Crimean Khanate. French historians have repeatedly used such expressions: "the Crimean khanate was a formidable power" (p. 68); " The Girei ruled as independent sovereigns "(p. 73), etc. Although it is noted that over time the Ottoman influence becomes more and more noticeable (p. 83), there are accusations against the classical work on the Crimean Khanate by V. D. Smirnov [Smirnov, 1887; 1889] of "Ottoman centrism", the essence of which, as they define, " is to see in the Crimean Khanate only the colonial-dependent territory of the Ottoman Empire" (p. 68). It seems [Oreshkova, 2005] that in this case there is a clear lack of understanding of a different, non-European culture of international relations, as well as V. D. Smirnov's views on it.

Eastern vassalage assumed other, non-colonial, forms of relations between the territories included in these state formations. The Crimean Khanate, having submitted to the Ottomans, was able to retain a significant part of state sovereignty. As the Turkish historian H. emphasizes. According to Inalcik, "the Crimean Khanate faced the threat of Sarai, which never and in no case wanted to recognize its existence, had no choice but to rely on the Ottoman Empire" (Inalcik, 1944, p. 210). Ottoman patronage meant for the Crimean Khanate the possibility of preserving certain forms of state isolation. At the same time, it should not be assumed that vassalage was only "formal", as V. V. Trepavlov characterizes it (p. 8). It was simply different, not European.

The dependence of the khanate on the Ottoman state is confirmed by the imperial authorities, the khans, and their entourage. This can be seen in the documents analyzed by French scientists. Thus, Mehmed II informs in one of his letters that the Crimean rulers "were honored to be included in the number of those who submit to our Threshold-the refuge of peace" (p. 74). Crimean nobles in their appeals to the Sultan constantly confirmed that their "country belongs to our Happy Padishah" (p. 63). This subordination and at the same time independence of the Ottoman vassals was well felt by the authorities of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which helped them to get along with their southern neighbors for a long time. This is shown in the documents studied by Zh. Weinstein (pp. 174-193). However, the very essence of Crimean vassalage still eludes European researchers.

The study of Ottoman sources and the development of materials from Turkish archives is now becoming a fashionable area of work for Russian historians studying the Middle Ages of Eastern Europe. The publication of French studies on this issue provides them with a model of how to work with Ottoman materials, while at the same time raising new issues that need additional research.

list of literature

Karpov S. P. Mid-14th Century Crisis: an underestimated Coup? // Byzantium between the West and the East. Experience of historical characteristics. St. Petersburg, 1999.

Oreshkova S. F. Some problems of the Crimean Tatar statehood. Application //

Smirnov V. D. Crimean Khanate under the rule of the Ottoman Porte in the XVIII century before its annexation to Russia. Vol. 2. Moscow, 2005.

Smirnov V. D. Crimean Khanate under the rule of the Ottoman Porte. St. Petersburg, 1887.

Smirnov V. D. Crimean Khanate under the rule of the Ottoman Porte in the XVIII century before its annexation to Russia. Odessa, 1889. 2nd ed. Vol. 1-2. Moscow, 2005.

Inalcik H. Yeni vesikalara gore Kirim Hanligimn osmanli tabligine girmesi ve ahidname meselesi // Belleten. Ankara, 1944.

Kurat A.N. Turkiye ve Idil boyu (1569 Astarhan seferi. Ten-ldil kanali ve XVI-XVII yuzyil osmanh-rus munasebetleri). Ankara, 1966.

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