Libmonster ID: RS-593
Author(s) of the publication: K. B. VINOGRADOV

A narrow, winding road connected Mostar, the main town of Herzegovina, to Nevesinje. On July 5, 1875, a Turkish caravan moving along it was shelled by a small rebel detachment near Bishiny Mountain1 . Four days later, near Nevesinje, the first battle broke out between the Haiduks and two Turkish battalions. Soon, the entire Southern and then Western Herzegovina was engulfed in flames of the uprising... In battles with regular troops, the advantage was almost invariably on the side of the rebels. On July 28, in the battle of Dabra, they defeated and put to flight a large detachment of the Sultan's army.

Special Port commissioners who visited Nevesinje and tried to persuade the "rebels" to lay down their arms reported the failure of their efforts on July 16. Only with the help of force can you "end this case," they believed. Grand Vizier Essad fully accepted this point of view .2 The Turkish authorities initially tried to play down the scale of the "unrest" in Herzegovina; they assured diplomats that "calm" was about to be restored .3 The uprising "tried to portray a very innocent misunderstanding of a purely local nature," the St. Petersburg weekly noted, but it "flares up more and more every day and takes on serious dimensions." 4 In August, "riots" also began in Bosnia, on August 13 there were clashes with Turkish police near Prijedor and Kostajnica, and a week later almost all of Northern Bosnia took up arms .5
The events in Herzegovina at first did not attract much attention in the European press and diplomacy. It would seem that there was nothing new here - even in the 60s of the XIX century. the inhabitants of this suburb of the Ottoman Empire repeatedly rose up to fight. In addition, since the end of 1874, relations between Turkey and Montenegro have again become complicated (and previously tense). There were many border disputes between these states. Clashes in the Podgorica area "make up, as it were, the daily existence of the population," said Charge d'affaires of Russia in Turkey A. I. Nelidov6 . Many families who were persecuted by the local authorities fled to the territory of the latter from Herzegovina. Perhaps the return of some of these refugees, which took place after lengthy negotiations in the early summer of 1875, was the reason for the "mutiny"? It will take two or three weeks, and the forces of "order" will triumph?! "Public opinion in Europe is so used to the popular uprisings in Turkey that it is almost indifferent to them, "Nedelya noted. "Somewhere out there, in some Slavic or Greek backwater, Christians took up knives and squeaked, slaughtered as many Turks as they could, then took a bloody revenge themselves, and everything calmed down again." Enlightened Europe, the weekly added, ignores the tragedy in the Balkans, where every year "several thousand people are exterminated, guilty only of wanting to be free on their own land"7 .

Arrogant and ignorant assessments of the course and possible consequences of the liberation struggle that was unfolding in South-Eastern Europe were still featured in the bourgeois press for a long time. At the same time, the most sober observers became obra-

1 All dates in the text and footnotes are given in the new style.

2 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 27, ll. 187, 199.

3 Ta, Moscow, l. 246.

4 " Week:", 8. VIII. 1875, p. 975.

5 M. Ekmecic. Ustanak u Bosni 1875 - 1878. Sarajevo. I960, Gl. I-II.

6 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 27, l. 140.

7 "The Week", 1. VIII. 1875, pp. 943-944.

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Pay attention to the real causes of the" explosion " in Herzegovina and Bosnia and the scale of the movement. For several weeks, a young journalist, later the famous scholar A. Evans, traveled through the revolt-ridden vilayet. He had a deep sympathy for the enslaved working people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the unbearable oppression of landlords, severe land famine, taxes and oppression of the Turkish authorities that caused a mass movement to expel the enslavers, Evans believed .8 W. Stillman, a British reporter for The Times, also testified that " the uprising broke out because the whole country was ripe for it."9 Summarizing the information received, the Russian Consul in Dubrovnik A. S. Ionin and the Russian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary E. P. Novikov emphasized the differences between this uprising and the previous ones - first of all, it was generated by an exceptional depth of internal contradictions. In Herzegovina, "Catholics everywhere hold together with Orthodox Christians", and in many localities "Muslim villagers" join the "insurgents" .10
The scale of the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia was actually explained by the fact that the most severe national and social oppression that prevailed here gave rise to a powerful rebuff from the broad masses of the destitute peasantry and farmhands. The actions of the central and local Turkish administration accelerated the course of events. A significant role was played by the gradual enslavement of Turkey itself by European banks. The Sultan's government had to pay dearly for 14 loans received since 1854 in Paris and London. Most of these loans were granted under the guarantee of customs duties and internal taxes. Thus, Western banks and bondholders found themselves increasingly linked to the regime of exploitation and looting that prevailed in Turkey .11 The authorities did not go for any tax cuts, in particular "tithes", even despite the poor harvest that befell Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1874. Moreover, levies from the population increase during this period, as well as arbitrariness on the part of the judicial and police authorities and tax collectors.

The uprising in Bosnia, writes the Yugoslav researcher M. Ekmecic, "began as an agrarian revolution." 12 The situation was similar in Herzegovina. It is no coincidence that the insurgents ' demands are dominated from the very beginning by points of an economic nature .13 It is no accident that the peasants in some localities put forward slogans for the division of the landlords ' land. Of course, the rebels enthusiastically began to defend the demands for self-government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the elimination of the entire hated apparatus of the Sultan's administration.

Already in the summer of 1875, Constantinople began to receive information about the fermentation in Bulgaria14; the Greeks in Crete rose up again to fight, because the promises made to them during the uprising of the 60s of the XIX century were not fulfilled. There was also unrest in many other vilayets of the European and Asian parts of the vast Ottoman Empire. Turkey is on the edge of an abyss, Bosnian Governor Dervish Pasha told Evans .15 It was clear that the crisis that Turkey was experiencing would undoubtedly be taken advantage of by neighboring countries-Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Greece. Sober-minded politicians in Constantinople realized that the policy of great powers, including the traditional "patroness" of the Sultan, Great Britain, did not promise anything pleasant to the dilapidated empire.

The 60s-70s of the XIX century were a period of rapid capitalist development and the" development " of a number of markets and territories rich in raw materials by the large European bourgeoisie. In the underdeveloped countries of the Mediterranean, the economic dominance of

8 A. J. Evans. Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September 1875. L. 1876.

9 D. Mackenzie. The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875 - 1878. Ithaca. 1967, p. 30, N 1.

10 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 112, ll. 439, 449. Facts of joint actions of poor people of different beliefs against " feudal landowners "were also cited by A. Evans (see Otechestvennye Zapiski, 1876, No. 8, p.283).

11 B. H. Sumner. Russia and the Balkans 1870 - 1880. Oxford. 1937, pp. 100 - 101.

12 M. Ekmecic. Op. cit., str. 365.

13 See V. N. Kondratiev. Russian diplomatic documents on agrarian relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (60s-70s of the XIX century), Moscow, 1971, p. 142.

14 This was reported, for example, by an official subordinate to the Russian ambassador from Ruschuk, I. P. Krylov, in August 1875 (AVPR, f. Politotdel, 2, ll. 113, 143).

15 Otechestvennye Zapiski, 1876, No. 8, p. 282.

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This is what England wants. It accounted for almost half of Turkey's trade turnover. British products also penetrate the Lower Danube area. But the volume of land transportation also increased; railways were quickly built. It was necessary to link European roads with Turkish ones. And if the Austrian bourgeoisie was not interested in "wild", "poor" Bosnia (the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy, Count D. Andrasi, also considered Bosnia and Herzegovina "poor countries", which in the event of annexation would only "absorb significant resources" 16), then very active factions of Viennese, as well as German financiers, merchants and industrialists they hoped to make an economic breakthrough to the Aegean Sea and the Bosphorus soon. The aristocrats who had monopolized Habsburg diplomacy were now forced to reckon with M. Hirsch and similar businessmen. In this connection, in the spring of 1875, Andrassy told the Russian ambassador: "The only interest of the monarchy is to open an exit to the East for its commerce by connecting the Austrian and Turkish roads." To ensure this railway expansion, the Ambassador in Constantinople, Zici, then obtained a special audience with Abdul Azis .17
In economic competition with the West in the Middle East, tsarist Russia clearly lagged behind. Among the diplomats, this was constantly pointed out by the Ambassador to Turkey N. P. Ignatiev. After all, "the economic influence of England", he noted, entails "and political, anti-Russian in its orientation" 18 . In February 1875, Ignatiev sent a special letter to the Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Trade, calling for the development of relations with Turkey. The letter prompted the creation of a special commission, the report of which was read in the "Society" in June 1875.

The capitalists of Europe are already looking into the vast expanses of the Sultan's Asian possessions - a struggle was raging over railway concessions in Asia Minor and Syria. In the summer of 1875, the Port decided to conduct a survey of the Izmit-Angora highway. In diplomatic reports, Baghdad also appeared as the final destination of the future road. One of the English versions planned the construction of a route from Alexandretta to Baghdad. But, as Nelidov telegraphed to St. Petersburg, the construction of the Izmit - Angora - Baghdad 20 line is more likely .

Thus, the significant differences between the Eastern question of the 70s and the 40-50s of the XIX century were obvious. The" guardianship " of Western powers over Turkey hastened its decline. Not only the straits or European vilayets, but also a number of territories in Asia up to the Persian Gulf become objects of attention of colonialists. The Suez Canal, whose economic viability and strategic importance were already indisputable by 1875, became a symbol of these changes. However, the expansion of the sphere of European expansion did not mean a decline in the share of the Balkans or the Straits zone in world politics. At the beginning of the Middle East crisis, Disraeli bought shares in the Suez Company, but he also said in 1876: "The key to India is Constantinople, not Egypt and the Suez Canal." 21
Another important factor that made the crisis particularly acute was the growing contradictions between the great Powers. Thus, Anglo-Russian conflicts related to the Middle East were aggravated by the expansion of both Great Britain and Tsarist Russia in Central Asia. Statesmen of both powers declared their intentions to settle all disputes. In May 1875, Disraeli and E. Derby spoke in favor of a "good agreement" with Russia. And Alexander II spoke of a desire to "cultivate a relationship of trust" with London. However, all this remained only statements, especially since, as P. Shuvalov reported from London, British diplomacy was going to use the differences between St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna to its advantage .22
16 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 113,. l. 116.

17 Ibid., d. 112, l. 279; f. Main Archive, V, A 2, d. 547, l. 15.

18 See N. S. Kinyapin. Foreign policy of Russia in the second half of the 19th century, Moscow, 1974, p. 141.

19 "Week".. 22. VIII. 1875, pp. 1031-1033.

20 AVPR, f. Politotdel, 2, l. 58; f. Chancellery, 27, l. 275.

21 G. Buckle. The Life of Benjamin Disraeli. Vol. VI. L. 1920, p. 34.

22 "Slavonic and East European Review". Vol. III. 1924, pp. 424-426, 431; AVPR F. Chancellery, d. 89, l. 292.

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Deep divisions existed in the "union of the three emperors"as well. Until the summer of 1875, Austro-German relations were quite tense. Diplomatic circles did not rule out the possibility of provocation and even an attack by Germany on the dualistic monarchy .23 But Bismarck chose to follow the path of exacerbating the Franco-German crisis. However, in May 1875, it suffered a serious setback as a result of Russian intervention, reinforced at the last moment by the pro-French declaration of Derby. The "humiliation" he had endured haunted Bismarck. In conversations with the Russian Ambassador P. P. Ubri, he constantly returned to this, as he assured, undeserved affront. "After all, the question of war never arose," the Chancellor exclaimed hotly and accused A.M. Gorchakov of trying to" create a halo for himself " at the expense of Germany. "If I were a vindictive man,"he added," I would remember that day forever. " 24 In May 1876, Ubri again noted Bismarck's dissatisfaction with newspaper articles that recalled the role played by Russia a year earlier .25 Events showed that Bismarck really did not forgive Gorchakov for his energetic support of France.

Of course, the reason for the deterioration of Russian-German relations should not be sought in personal quarrels. The real reasons, as S. D. Skazkin showed, were the breakdown of the economic mechanism of the traditional" friendship " of the Hohenzollerns and Romanovs .26 At the same time, military and political contradictions (including the problem of hegemony in the Middle East) became increasingly important. Berlin's leaders are taking a closer look at what is happening in South-Eastern Europe than ever before as they re-examine the stalled state course. Is it possible to use the accumulated combustible materials here? The shots fired in the mountains of Herzegovina came in handy for Bismarck.

Shortly after the spring "military alert," Novikov wrote from Vienna: "We have entered a period of calm."27 . Statesmen flocked to the "waters" or to their estates. Gorchakov spent almost half a year in Wewe (Switzerland), Bismarck retired for a long time in Warzin (in Pomerania). Ignatiev, whose "seditious activities" were much fantasized about in the European press, went to Germany for medical treatment on the eve of the Herzegovina uprising.

While official diplomacy for a long time turned a blind eye to the bloody events that took place in the Yugoslav mountains, public circles in a number of countries responded to the appeals for help made by the rebels, who were being squeezed by the superior forces of the Turks. "Volunteers from Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, as well as from Russia and the Slavic provinces of Austria rushed to their aid," 28 writes the Yugoslav historian M. Stojanovic. Among the volunteers of the "first draft" we see Russian revolutionaries-emigrants M. P. Sazhin and S. M. Stepnyak-Kravchinsky, several former Garibaldians and other advanced people. The movement of solidarity with the Sultan's rebellious subjects was also expressed in raising funds for them, supplying weapons, food and medicine to numerous refugees who found themselves in extremely difficult conditions in Dalmatia, Montenegro and Croatia.

After the uprising spread to Bosnia, politicians and diplomats had to think twice. On August 22, 1875, A. G. Jomini stated: "Thus, the Eastern question suddenly appeared before Europe as completely and definitely as in any other epoch." 29 Jomini was not a visionary. Baron Jomini, an insignificant windbag and inveterate reactionary, gained Gorchakov's confidence and became necessary to him in drawing up various circulars and statements. He had no opinion of his own and always went with the flow. Jomini " became famous for his "ability" to write dozens of dispatches that were more or less brilliant in form. #

23 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 112. ll. 300-303, 317.

24 Ibid., 19, ll. 418-420.

25 "Russia and the Fast 1876 - 1880... as Seen through the Letters of A. G. Joumini to N. K. Giers". Ed. by Ch. and B. Jelavicb. Leiden. 1959, p. 8.

26 See S. D. Skazkin. The end of the Austro-Russian-German Union, Moscow, 1928.

27 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 112, l. 338.

28 M. D. Stojanovic. The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875 - 1878. Cambridge. 1939, p. 15.

29 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 89, ll. 245, 246.

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their content seemed completely indifferent to him , " recalls E. M. Feoktistov. "Not only was he not a 'Russian' diplomat, but I believe that it was impossible to deliberately seek out a person less suitable for diplomacy in general. " 30 It was Jomini who then found himself in a key post in St. Petersburg. This was advantageous to Andrassy, who first of all tried to limit the freedom of maneuver of the St. Petersburg cabinet and together with it prevent Serbia, Montenegro, and the peoples of South-Eastern Europe from forming a united front against the Ottoman Empire. Andras, writes the English historian Fr. Bridge, believed that the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia was organized by "international revolutionary committees"31 . One can hardly agree with this opinion.

But it is indisputable that Vienna feared a revolutionary democratic tide in the Balkans. Thus, in neighboring Serbia, the regime of Prince Milan, who cared only about his own personal interests (the establishment of the Obrenovich dynasty, a profitable marriage, etc.), was under threat .Austro-Hungarian diplomacy cleverly used the unscrupulousness of the Serbian ruler, especially after the appearance of his "rival" Peter Karageorgievich among the Bosnian rebels. 32 But while Milan went to Vienna to arrange his matrimonial affairs, the situation in Serbia became more complicated - one could expect that the movement would get out of the prince's control. After the "government of action" came to power, the new Foreign Minister (and long-time enemy of Milan) J. Ristic, in an instruction to the Serbian representative in Vienna, stressed that the Serbian government cannot remain indifferent to the struggle of its tribesmen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 33 Many journalists considered the imminent entry of Serbia, and probably Montenegro, into the war to be indisputable .34 Clinging to power, Milan itself pretended to fully share the sentiments of "its own people", and made it clear to foreign powers that otherwise it could only abdicate .35
Under these circumstances, Andrassy began to intimidate Jomini with the prospect of decisive shifts in favor of democracy in Serbia (he called the liberals of the Ristic group the "revolutionary party") and other Balkan countries. 36 The ambassador in Vienna, Novikov, a faceless conservative who had fallen under Andrassy's influence, played along with the minister. Ionin, a diplomat who knew Novikov well, described him as an "energetic person" who "doesn't care about anything."37 . The bogey of the "revolutionary uroza" took effect in St. Petersburg. Golos, which is close to official circles, published an inspired note. The Herzegovina uprising, it said, was "unfortunately turning into a revolutionary movement that repels Christian governments... The appearance of Garibaldians, communalists, socialists, and representatives of various revolutionary factions in the theater of insurrection threatens serious danger to order and public peace."38
Jomini did not skimp on threats to the" revolutionary-socialist element " in Serbia, and Alexander II's unfriendly statements about Serbian liberals are also known .39 At the same time, the reactionary press of a number of countries called for preventing the establishment of a "people's State" in Serbia. Russian diplomacy participated in several demarches in Belgrade, carried out in September and early October together with Austria-Hungary, and then other states. Supported by the European reaction, Milan broke up the "ministry of Action"and declared that there would be no war, since the powers are against it, and the country is not ready. After this "coup", the question of Montenegro's entry into the war also disappeared for a while.

30 E. M. Feoktistov. Behind the Scenes of Politics and Literature, L. 1929, p. 69.

31 F. Brindge. From Sadowa to Sarajevo. L. 1972, p. 73.

32 "Државни архив државног секретариата иностраних послова. Beograd, 1875. VI. F-I, P / 5-II; VII, F-I, P/5-II.

33 Ibid., 1875, VI. F-I, P / 5-II.

34 See Nedelya, 11. IX. 1875, pp. 1135-1136. The American historian D. Mackenzie believes that the "cabinet of action" did not intend to immediately start a war (D. Mackenzie. Op. cit., p. 60).

35 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 12, l. 4.

36 D. Mackenzie. Op. rit., pp. 48 - 49.

37 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 4361/1, l 47. 35 "Golos", 24. IX. 1875.

39 См. M. D. Stojanovic. Op. cit., p. 22; D. Harris. A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875 - 1878. The First Year. Stanford. 1936, p. 116.

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Even the timid Jomini did not see the revolutionary threat from this state. To Vienna's displeasure, he offered to point out to Turkey the inadmissibility of the concentration of troops on its borders. By the end of October, it became clear that the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro will officially remain neutral in the near future. And the governments of Romania and Greece observed ,in the words of the Russian weekly, "only coldness and cautious abstinence." 40
Thus, Andrassy's tactics in these matters led to a certain success. But he was aware that pressure and rebukes alone would not ensure the influence of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, " to preserve the sympathies of Christians,.. to make it obvious to them that they can only expect the final decision of their fate from us. " 41 From his point of view, the straightforward recipes of the militarists, who had long aimed at the speedy annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were also not suitable. At the Crown Council in Vienna on January 29, 1875, the majority of responsible figures supported annexation; then, with reservations, these plans were supported by Andrassy .42 After the outbreak of the uprising, the Governor of Dalmatia, General G. Rodich, in a special memorandum proposed to force preparations for the invasion .43 Franz Josef sympathized with such plans. ("We must not allow these provinces to fall to anyone other than us," 44 he explained.) Andrassy faced difficult problems related to the escalated struggle for power.

At one time, Bismarck called Andrassy "cavalier" and "lazy". Perhaps too harsh a characterization. In the summer and autumn of 1875, the head of foreign policy of Austria-Hungary launched a vigorous activity. At the meetings of the Joint Council of Ministers, he went into the details of many issues, paying special attention to appropriations for the armed forces, 45 insistently sought to strengthen his position and tried to push back the generals who claimed to be in the first roles. A relative is required to strictly observe "neutrality", interne rebels crossing the border. The Government, Andrasi stressed, does not believe that the collapse of Turkish governance in Herzegovina is currently desirable. As long as the Turks remain masters of the situation here, it has no intention of occupying the Turkish vilayet .46
Andrassy drew on nationalist circles in Austria and Hungary that were concerned about the pan-Slavic solidarity movement. In August 1875, the Berlin National-Zeitung, summarizing the sentiments of these circles, noted their hostility to the "Slavic national element", as well as the fact that the Viennese press "preaches wild hatred of the Christian peoples of Turkey" and supports their oppressors. 47 Already in the summer, widespread support for the rebels from Dalmatia and Croatia was ended, and the Slavic units of the Habsburg army were removed from the border. Austria-Hungary even allowed the transit of Turkish troops and weapons through the port of Klek on the Dalmatian coast48 . This route by sea proved to be a serious help for the Turkish military authorities. Ignatiev believed that such an important concession to Andrassy was also connected with Vienna's economic claims, its attempts to " use complications to get practical benefits from Turkey - the railway, the clearing of Iron Gates, etc."

Rodic did not abandon his efforts to shake Andrassy's position and again called for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, neutralizing Montenegro and Serbia with territorial handouts .49 On August 27, in a message to the emperor, the minister drew attention to the general's shortsightedness. Montenegro "at our own expense" will turn into a "Piedmont", the " union of the three emperors "will be undermined, and" public opinion in Europe " will be restored against Austria - Hungary. At best, Andrassy predicted,

40 "Week", 10. X. 1875, p. 1263.

41 M. Ekmecic. Op. cit., str. 124.

42 M. D. Stojanovic. Op. cit., pp. 30 - 34.

43 E. Wertheimer. Graf Julius Andrassy. Bd. II. Stuttgart. 1913, S. 266 - 267.

44 D. Mackenzie. Op. cit., p. 39.

45 Magyar Orszagos Leveltar. Budapest, Filmtar, 1024.

46 D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 71.

47 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 19, l. 101.

48 Ibid., d. 27, ll. 368, 369.

49 F. Bridge. Op. cit., Documents, Doc. N 5, pp. 393 - 394.

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we will achieve a costly occupation, and then we will have to " get out under European pressure." Rodich is clearly mistaken - he sees Serbia and Montenegro as an obstacle to the capture of Bosnia, while it is concluded "in Russia and the rest of Europe"50 . Despite the assistance of the St. Petersburg cabinet in "containing" Serbia and Montenegro, Andrassy was nervous, not without reason expecting that Russia would sooner or later put forward proposals on the eastern issue that would go against his plans.

The first symptom of this was some steps taken by Russian diplomacy in connection with the so-called mission of consuls in Herzegovina. The official goal of the mission was to clarify the situation and eventually influence the insurgents and the Port in order to stop the bloodshed. Vienna's negotiations with St. Petersburg on this issue began in late July and early August. One of Jomini's most cloying messages to Novikov suggested that Vienna might be the most appropriate center of diplomatic activity. In particular, because in this way the tsar would like to prove his trust in Count Andrashin . However, it was precisely Alexander II who in this case did not take into account the clearly expressed desire of Andrassy, who was going to limit himself to certain steps of the three powers (including Germany). After the personal intervention of the tsar, France, Italy and England were involved in the planned measures. But the revived "European concert" could undermine the claims of Austria-Hungary to a "special role" in deciding the fate of South-Eastern Europe?! In the Balkans, it is necessary "to assert our influence as a great power and as the most interested neighbor in all respects," 52 Andrassy wrote.

France and Italy immediately agreed to participate in all other Powers ' actions in the Middle East. But the position they took was not of serious importance. The leaders of France and Russia agreed that "the East is a particularly suitable ground" for strengthening friendly relations between the two powers .53 However, the interest of French financiers in the" stability " of Turkey created the prerequisites for a blockade with England. Italian diplomacy tried to get involved in the so-called settlement, considering it useful for establishing the" great power " of the country. Many responsible people in Rome were satisfied that Italy was "invited to raise its voice," the Russian charge d'affaires reported .54
However, much more important could be the cooperation of Great Britain. At the beginning of the Middle East crisis, some observers noted a certain change in English social and political circles compared to the period of the Crimean War. The number of "Turkophiles" has significantly decreased 55 . The influential "The Times" on August 23, 1875, even spoke out in favor of granting self-government to Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible. "Here are speeches that have hardly ever escaped the lips of the City of London,"56 commented a Berlin newspaper. Events have shown that these new trends have not been properly disseminated. British diplomacy continued to be guided by traditional motives: Russia should not be allowed to strengthen its position in the Middle East (in the reports of the Ambassador to Turkey H. E. Elliot, his colleague Ignatiev appeared in the role of a certain vice-sultan); it is necessary to prevent the formation of viable Slavic states - they will inevitably gravitate towards Russia; the situation should be used to.

Disraeli treated the liberation struggle of the southern Slavs with disdain and hostility. He objected to Bosnian self-government ("Irish autonomy would be less absurd"57 ); Derby stressed that he favored the status quo

50 Ibid.

51 D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 74.

52 Ibid., p. 71.

53 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 88, l. 179; d. 89, l. 13.

54 Ibid., d. 92, l. 254.

55 See W. G. Wirthwein. Britain and the Balkan Crisis 1875 - 1878. N. Y. 1935, Chap. I.

56 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 19, l. 103.

57 R. W. Seton-Watson. Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. L. 1935, p. 22.

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in the Ottoman Empire and "help" the Turks. After receiving the appropriate instructions, Elliot obtained an audience with the Sultan and recommended a vigorous suppression of the rebellion .58 The ambassador forwarded to London reports from the Consul in Sarajevo, W. Holmes, who claimed that "the so-called insurrection in Bosnia would be more correctly defined as an invasion of gangs openly formed in Austria, Croatia ,and Serbia" and that "the riot was undoubtedly organized by Serbian agitators." 59 Holmes spent 15 years in Bosnia, where he had previously reported a regime of "corruption, bigotry" and blatant discrimination against Christians. Now, in view of the likely publication of his dispatches, he was writing completely different versions: about the" equality " of Christians and Muslims before the law, about the justice that prevails here. 60 Later, when meeting Ignatiev, Holmes did not hide the fact that in his 1875 relations he did not always correctly reflect the true state of affairs .61 The absurd claims of Holmes and Elliot were translated into official statements by representatives of the British cabinet and had an impact on the public.

Derby was highly skeptical of the consuls ' mission, but his deputy, Lord Tenterden, in a memorandum dated August 21, advised "joining the consular mediation project", because, as he wrote, otherwise "the powers will do without us" .62 In the end, England did "join in", but this step was devalued, however, by the following caveat: the decision taken, following the request of the Porte itself, does not mean a change in the course of the London cabinet .63 Even the initiators of sending consuls, who developed "identical instructions" for them, were pessimistic about the chances of success of the mission. "The weakest part of our business is the lack of any guarantee of its success," 64 Novikov gloomily admitted. The special position that Britain continued to take emphasized the ostentatious nature of all "mediation". Elliot instructed Holmes to avoid even the "appearance of unified action" with other consuls, and to instill in the" insurgents "the" hopelessness " of resisting the legitimate authorities .65
In September, the consuls of the six powers arrived in Mostar at the same time as the Turkish Extraordinary Commissioner, Serwer Pasha. The latter engaged in "pacification" in his own way, combining threats with promises in proclamations. Divided into two groups, the consuls traveled to the mountains, where they met with the rebel leaders. The Herzegovina patriots refused to discuss the offer of surrender, their leaders handed in their demands and expressed their willingness to negotiate with the Server only in the presence of the consuls themselves .66 Representatives of the powers were able to personally witness the atrocities committed by the Turkish punishers. A curious incident that took place on September 19-20 near Nevesinje: the Turkish commander suddenly attacked a rebel detachment, in the area of which negotiations with the consuls were just taking place .67
By the end of September, it was clear that the consuls ' mission, while not yet formally annulled, had failed. Andrassy was indifferent to this - he was concerned about other concerns and affairs. If Alexander II's decision to restore the "European concert" was the first unpleasant symptom of Russia's transition to self-reliance-

58 "Parliamentary Papers, 1876", Turkey N 2, Doc. 13; AVPR, F. Chancellery, d. 27, ll. 295-299; d. 20, l. 258.

59 R. W. Seton-Watson. Op. cit., p. 29.

60 "Parliamentary Papers, 1877", Turkey N 16, Doc. NN 20, 21; R. W. Seton- Watson. Op. cit., p. 29.

61 AVPR, f. Main archive, V, A 2. d. 549, ll. 180, 181.

62 D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 88, n. 121.

63 "Parliamentary Papers, 1876", Turkey N 2, Doc. N 16.

64 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 112, l. 500.

65 "Parliamentary Papers, 1876", Turkey N 2, Doc. N 20.

66 In particular, the rebels demanded the creation of an international commission to determine the necessary reforms (see V. N. Kondratiev. Op. ed., pp. 149-151).

67 AVPR, f. Politotdel, 2, l. 261; "Nedelya", 31. X. 1875. This episode is analyzed in detail by D. Harris, who notes not only the disloyalty of the Turkish military authorities, but also does not exclude the possibility of collusion with them by the British consul. Based on archival research, he found that the publication of Holmes ' reports in 1876 omitted the most colorful details (D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 93, p. 124).

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In the end of August, Gorchakov's proposal sounded like a thunderclap to him. The Russian Chancellor, meeting in Switzerland with an Austrian diplomat, recommended that Bosnia and Herzegovina seek self-government in the spirit of the de facto independence that Romania and Serbia have already won .68 Gorchakov's clever plan threw Andrashi into disarray. "Sheer nonsense," he described it in a letter to Franz Josef dated August 30. The Minister saw the main danger in the fact that the independence of Bosnia will inflame other peoples of the Balkan peninsula. "Everything that is supposed to hold a stable state will then be set in motion." 69 Later, in a conversation with Novikov, Andrassy said that Bulgaria would follow Bosnia, and in general, "an example of such success would act as an incentive throughout the East." Everything that is proposed to be consolidated would be "shaken to the ground" 70 .

Thus, the statesmanship of the Habsburg minister was strictly conservative; the whole process of the collapse of the Turkish Empire went exactly the way he opposed. However, the short-sighted Novikov also opposed the idea of autonomy. However, in the first place, he put forward arguments of a different order: the leading circles of Austria-Hungary "against such Slavic accumulations, which, formed on its flanks, would have an attractive and decomposing effect on the homogeneous provinces of Transleithania." The ambassador advised that the proposal for autonomy should be presented to the Austrians later, "under the pressure of events." Let it be an "absolute necessity" and not an "academic discussion"71 .

Jomini, who had been sluggish in his defense of the autonomy project, was quite happy with this approach. Gorchakov did not abandon this plan. But in the autumn of 1875, the Chancellor was apparently in no hurry, limiting himself (to Andrassy's delight) to a preliminary probe. During these months, the Russian leadership (as well as in public circles) was divided. Alexander II stayed in Livadia, where Ignatiev and Novikov sent lengthy messages directly to him. From St. Petersburg, Jomini sent garrulous reports to the tsar and instructions to local diplomats, but gave up on difficulties. He put off some urgent cases, waiting for notes from the Crimea. The baron also looked back at the Tsarevich, who was flirting with the Slavophiles. Among the prominent Russian diplomats, only the ambitious and determined Ignatiev showed irrepressible activity. While serving in Constantinople for many years, he helped strengthen Russian influence in Turkey (to the detriment of British), and in the Balkans he hindered the maneuvers of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy.

The uprising in Herzegovina did not fit well with Ignatiev's plans, who believed "that the time for the liberation of Christians has not yet come, but a real movement... it did not contain the makings of success. " 72 It is too early for Russia to deal with the whole eastern issue, the Russian Ambassador explained . However, after quickly getting his bearings, he decided to take action. Maybe it was his "finest hour"?

The crisis that began in the Balkans exposed all the old sores of the Ottoman Empire. A variety of opposition movements-supporters of European-style reforms, Muslim fanatics who sought a "religious revival" and the destruction of the" Giaours", a militaristic clique - undermined the foundations of the existing order, created a threat to the autocracy and security of the Sultan. Rivalry in the ruling circles has also escalated. After several shuffles, Mahmud Nedim became Grand Vizier, but his position was very precarious. Mahmoud, who was previously known as a supporter of the "pro-Russian" orientation, now sees in the support of Russia almost the only chance to gain a foothold in power. Abdul Azis is also inclined to rely on Ignatiev's help.

68 D. Harris. Op. rit., p. 144; S. A. Nikitin. Essays on the history of the Southern Slavs and Russian-Balkan relations in the 50s-70s of the XIX century. Moscow, 1970, p. 174.

69 F. Bridge. Op. cit., p. 74.

70 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 113, ll. 38, 39.

71 Ibid., d. 112, ll. 558-562. Transleitania is the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary.

72 Ibid., 27, p. 381.

73 Ibid., f. Main archive, V, A 2, d. 547, l. 82.

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All these features of the situation were intended to be taken advantage of by the Russian ambassador, who immediately after returning from vacation to Constantinople acted as a benevolent adviser, and in Elliot's opinion, even "the main, if not the only, protector of the empire." 74 Ignatiev scored several spectacular victories 75 . He managed to weaken the influence of extremists who were thinking of attacking Serbia and Montenegro. On the Serbian borders, the Turks have concentrated a strong group of troops. More than once they raided the borders of the neighboring principality. Elliot approved of these provocations, and in a conversation with the Serbian attorney K. Magazinovich even threatened to throw 150 thousand Turks on Belgrade. Ignatiev obtained assurances from the vizier about the partial withdrawal of troops from the border 76 . The Russian ambassador sought to wrest the initiative from Andrassy, whose plans he regarded with extreme suspicion. He argued that it would be much more expedient to negotiate in Constantinople rather than in Vienna. The ambassadors of Austria-Hungary and Germany then began to meet frequently at Ignatiev's to discuss urgent issues and determine recommendations. Alexander II, followed by Jomini, approved of this "idea of a conference in Constantinople." 77
With Ignatiev's knowledge, the Sultan's irade was prepared and published on October 2, promising reforms throughout the Ottoman Empire. Ignatiev regarded this as his personal victory - he managed to steal the wind from the sails of Andrassy's ship! According to Huenigen, the Russian diplomat wanted to give the Porte time "to develop and implement its reform program without hindrance." 78 But, of course, Ignatiev understood that without a "push", the Turkish authorities would begin to sabotage their own promises as usual (the irade of 1875 reproduced a number of points of the hatt-i-humayun of 1856, which remained on paper). In order to satisfy at least partially the wishes of the southern Slavs, as well as the Russian Slavophiles, in the near future, he began to persistently advocate the transfer to Montenegro - perhaps through the mediation of the tsar - of several southern districts of Herzegovina.

These days, Abdul Azis and Mahmoud are in conversations with the Russian ambassador and the dragoman of the embassy, M. They suggest reviving the "good old days" of the Unkiar Iskelessi treaty, under which the sultan was granted guarantees from his enemies, and Russia-certain privileges in Turkey .79 The establishment of "special relations" between the two powers corresponded to Ignatiev's plans. Attaching the utmost importance to direct influence over the tsar, he left for Livadia on October 19. But I was too late.

Back in September, realizing where he was facing the most trouble, Andrassy took emergency countermeasures. Urgent requests were sent to St. Petersburg to preserve Vienna as an "effective center of general accord." 80 It is in the Austrian capital that constructive plans are born, designed to ensure peace, please the "paradise", and prove the mutually beneficial alliance of the Habsburgs and Romanovs. As a matter of urgency, the assistant ministers prepared draft reforms that the powers could recommend to Turkey. (This was a rather modest program of administrative and social transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 81) Armed with them, Andrashi visited the Russian Embassy and had a long conversation with Novikov, convincing him to immediately contact the tsar .82
74 D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 132, p. 3.

75 In the monograph on Ignatiev (G. Hunigen. Nicolaj Pavlovic Ignat'ev und die russische Balkanpolitik 1875-1878. Gottingen. 1968). G. Huenigen, rightly dismissing the stereotypical characteristics of this diplomat, somewhat overestimates his foresight and ingenuity. We must not forget that Ignatiev tried in vain to" regulate " the liberation movement of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

76 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 27, ll. 420, 421, 459-461; f. ' Politotdel, d 2 ll. 278-280, 388.

77 Ibid., f. Chancellery, d. 89, l. 268.

78 G. Hunigen. Op. cit., S. 45.

79 "Notes of Count N. P. Ignatiev". "Historical Bulletin", 1914, February, pp. 454-456.

80 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 89, ll. 290, 295.

81 Ibid., d. 113, ll. 43-52.

82 On October 13, Novikov drew up several messages addressed to Alexander II and immediately sent them to the Crimea with the embassy's advisers S. S. Tatishchev (ibid., pp. 2-30, 57-63).

page 136

As a courtier Novikov was on top. He perfectly took into account the indecision and sentimentality of Alexander II, and most importantly - his desire to preserve the common front of the three monarchies. The ambassador referred to Franz Josef (not Andrassy) as the initiator of his appeal to Livadia. He wasn't exactly praising Andrassy's plan, but he assured him that it was well-intentioned. Perhaps Andrassy even follows Russian diplomacy - he himself would "prefer not to interfere" in Constantinople. Still, if his project is rejected, Austria-Hungary alone can "raise its voice", and "the sympathies of the population of the East can go over to its side." In conclusion, Novikov stressed that it is necessary to maintain the agreement of the three powers. The tsar's mark predetermined his subsequent decisions: "This is what I consider most important." 83
When Ignatiev arrived in Livadia, he tried in vain to persuade the tsar to accept the idea of colluding with the sultan. The letter of resignation, which was rejected, did not help either. On his return to Constantinople, Ignatiev had an audience with the sultan, who again sought support from tsarism. The ambassador once again appealed to St. Petersburg with a proposal to meet Turkey halfway, but in response was instructed to avoid "isolated actions". It was a "tub of cold water," Ignatiev recalled, but I "continued to expose the duplicity of Austro-Hungarian politics." 84 In a correspondence duel with Andrassy, the ambassador only managed to persuade Alexander II to postpone accepting the Austrian proposals. After a cumbersome correspondence between Livadia and St. Petersburg, Jomini sent a reply to Vienna on October 31 and his own drafts of an "identical dispatch" from the three Turkish powers and "confidential instructions" to the ambassadors on the Bosphorus .85 Jomini reproduced Ignatiev's criticism of the Austro-Hungarian plan - "the disparity between the desired goal and the means to achieve it." But here we also find typical examples of evasiveness and inventing new compromises. For example, Jomini writes about the desirability of "fusing Andrassy's ideas with the method suggested by Ignatiev" 86 .

Late September and October were probably the periods of greatest disharmony in the Russian leadership. Gorchakov, for example, at the beginning of October considered it useful to concentrate the negotiations in Constantinople, but Jomini had already capitulated: let Vienna remain the center of agreement of the cabinets87 . Several times the baron changed his position in connection with the Tsarevich's dissatisfaction with the "passivity" of the government and similar criticism of Slavophiles and liberals. So, in mid-October, he recommended to keep cool, and through the "Journal de St. Petersburg" spoke out against "energetic intercession" for the Slavs. On October 24, Jomini considers it necessary to "correct the matter" urgently, sending the tsar two draft articles for the "Government Bulletin", which gave a completely different interpretation of events. 88 The version approved by Alexander II stated that Turkish subjects had the right to doubt the Sultan's Irad. Their confidence "has been shaken to the point that it will be difficult for the Porte to restore it suddenly, without the friendly assistance of European cabinets." The Turkish authorities were encouraged to provide "tangible evidence of their firm and unwavering determination to fulfil exactly their current solemn obligations" .89
The fluctuations in St. Petersburg did not escape Andrassy's attention. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary received very significant information in this regard. Some of the tsarist diplomats and officials, including Zhomini and Novikov (the latter was often motivated by personal hostility to Ignatiev 90), were taken into account for careless comments or too frank chatter of some tsarist diplomats and officials. In November, convinced that the Russian leadership would not break off relations with Vienna, Andrassy renewed his proposals to put forward a reform project .91 He won the support of German diplomacy. So, already in October in Berlin, they spoke about-

83 Ibid., l. 61.

84 Ibid., d. 89, l. 326; "Historical Bulletin", 1914, February, p. 460.

85 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 89, ll. 303 - 311, 312 - 316, 317 - 321.

86 Ibid., pp. 307, 308.

87 Ibid., l. 295; G. Hunigen. Op. cit., s. 61.

88 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 37, ll. 238, 260.

89 "Government Bulletin", 29. X. 1875.

90 G. Hunigen. Op. cit., S. 49, 52.

91 "Liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke". T. I. M. 1961, N 66.

page 137

in response to the demarches in Constantinople proposed by Ignatiev. In December, the German press reported that Bismarck vigorously supported the "reform" plans of Andrashin before Gorchakov . The Habsburg politician was now able to take what he called "Ignatiev's intrigues" more calmly. On December 12, 1875, a firman was published in Constantinople, with the help of which the Porte tried to deprive Austria-Hungary of legal grounds for intervention. In firman, some earlier promises made by the Sultan were specified. There was, for example, a guarantee of religious freedom (which Andrassy was also going to insist on). But Andrassy was determined to see it through...

It should not be assumed that the" settlement " of the Eastern crisis then became a monopoly of Austrian and Russian diplomacy. Elliot was still active on the Bosphorus. He helped consolidate the forces of Mahmud's opponents and hoped to take revenge in the near future for the failures that befell him during the duel with Ignatiev. Since the end of November, the attention of business and public circles in London has shifted to the new facility. Disraeli's purchase of a substantial stake in the Suez Canal Company, made without the approval of Parliament or a good half of the Cabinet, caused an explosion of enthusiasm in the British bourgeois press. It became clear that England had made a serious bid for complicity in the division of Turkish heritage. France's belated attempts to regain its position in Egypt were unsuccessful. At the beginning of 1876 Ignatiev came to the conclusion that "England assumed the role of arbiter in the Suez Canal issue." He also pointed to the rapid financial enslavement of Egypt by Britain .93
German officials have consistently pointed out that" in the East " Germany has no claims of its own. In the Middle East, Bismarck's replacement, B. E. Bulow, said, "we have no direct interests," while Die Post, which was close to the government, explained: "At the moment, Germany cannot directly win anything there." 94 Even before the crisis, however, this disinterest was relatively low. The strengthened German-Turkish economic ties are also having a growing impact in the political sphere; Berlin's first military-political contacts with Constantinople are emerging. Ignatiev watched their progress with concern. He pointed out the supply of Krupp guns to Turkey, the appearance of Prussian instructors, and the pro-German orientation of the Minister of War, Hussein Avni. According to the Russian ambassador, Hussein stated in a special memorandum that " the Berlin cabinet is interested in having a strong Turkish army, capable of supporting the Turkish people.".. divert a significant force of Austrian or Russian troops." Ignatiev warned: "If Hussein's theory becomes stronger, very serious complications may arise." 95
From July 1875, the German press emphasized the importance of friendly relations with St. Petersburg; Bulow recalled the corresponding dictum of Bismarck: "The interests of Germany and Russia are parallel" 96. However, when developing concrete measures related to the events in the Balkans, German diplomacy, as already mentioned, increasingly supported Andrassy. In September, the British diplomat 0. Russell told the Russian ambassador: "Secret plans (of Germany in the East. - K. V.) are maturing in Vartsin's solitude", even Bulov is not aware of them 97 . (Bismarck was living at this time on his estate of Varzin.) At the end of November 1875, the Chancellor returned to Berlin. He apparently came to the conclusion that with the help of complications in the middle East will be possible to push Russia and England, and also use it conflict with Austria-Hungary, to the benefit of Germany. "Isn't it time for my excellent friend Gorchakov to put an end to the remnants of the Treaty of 1856?" said Bismarck to Ubri on January 4, 1876. He sketched out a rough section plan of Terry's row-

92 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 19, ll. 192, 193, 209; "National-Zeituhg", 2, 7. XII. 1875.

93 AVPR, f. Chancellery, d. 88, ll. 320, 323, 335; f. Main archive, V, A 2, d. 549, ll. 140, 192.

94 Ibid., f. Chancellery, d. 19, l. 58; d. 20, l. 271.

95 Ibid., f. Politotdel, 2. l. 253.

96 Ibid., f. Chancellery, 19, ll. 96-103.

97 Ibid., pp. 168, 169.

page 138

tory of the Ottoman Empire, agreed to persuade England to join the deal and even support Russia against England 98 .

As early as the autumn of 1875, diplomatic circles noticed the symptoms of the Anglo-German rapprochement. In the winter, Bismarck has already explicitly offered to coordinate the courses of the two countries. Disraeli, supported by Queen Victoria, called for an "agreement" with Germany. In February, the corresponding instruction was sent to Russell 99 .

Almost simultaneously with Bismarck, Gorchakov returned to the arena of active political life. In St. Petersburg, where he arrived at the beginning of December 1875, business was running, assistants gave mutually exclusive forecasts of the development of events. Middle Eastern complications disturbed Gorchakov's mental balance and habitual rhythm of life, Ignatiev's bold recipes did not inspire confidence. Intuitively, the Chancellor felt that Russia's political horizons were becoming increasingly bleak. Like Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin and Minister of Finance Reytern, he first of all tried to avoid any complications that could lead to war .100 Having considered the mentioned promises and hints of Bismarck, Gorchakov immediately understood their secret meaning. No! The Russian government would not allow itself to be lured by plans to conquer Constantinople and the Bosporus, he replied to Berlin 101 .

Gorchakov was inclined to be as cautious as possible in the Balkans and maintain contacts with Vienna, to what he called a " marriage of convenience." He was confirmed in this opinion, having become acquainted with Bismarck's attempts to arouse Russian diplomacy's uncertainty about Andrassy's true intentions. "Are you sure about Andrassy? Does he have any second thoughts?" Bismarck asked Ubri. Even Andrassy's activity seemed suspicious to him. However, the German Chancellor was really still afraid of the specter of putting together some kind of Austro-Russian-French coalition .102 Gorchakov also had no illusions about the prospects for cooperation with Austria-Hungary. But he considered it necessary to maintain a semblance of friendship with her, especially in conditions when Berlin began to take such touching care of Russia's interests.

Having agreed to the "Andrassy plan", Russian diplomacy has from time to time stressed the need to agree on measures that should be outlined in case of its failure. Gorchakov recommended more consistently seeking real, rather than ephemeral, concessions from Turkey. Memoirists and historians have written a lot about the vanity, nobility, and lack of creative ideas of the elderly Russian chancellor. Indeed, in 1875, he lacked his former energy and insight. Zhomiki, A. F. Hamburger and others from his entourage, and sometimes even foreign diplomats, took advantage of the chancellor's weaknesses. Thus, the Austrian Ambassador A. Langenau not without success instilled in him that the next draft of Andrassy's demarche embodies the amendments proposed by St. Petersburg. As he read the document Gorchakov exclaimed with satisfaction: "This is my idea!.. It's coming from me! " etc .103. Increasingly, when dealing with cardinal issues, Gorchakov often found the ability to rise above petty and even prestigious considerations. If Andrashi, stubbornly proving the benefits of "his" plan, achieved a resounding personal success, which he needed in order to defeat rivals inside the country, then Gorchakov emphasized something else - it is not the form of concessions on the part of Turkey that is important, it is important that they be implemented! Andrassy was perplexed: I do not understand the reasons that allow Russia to provide the Port (and not the three powers!) the merit of making concessions to Christians?!104 .

To Andrassy's annoyance, Gorchakov managed to transform his program somewhat. In the opinion of the Russian Chancellor, the demarche in Constantinople should have been preceded by-

98 Ibid., pp. 537, 540-543; S. Goriainow. La question d'Orient a la veille du traite de Berlin (1870 - 1876). P. 1948, p. 66.

99 K. Bourne. The Foreign Policy of Victorian England. Oxford. 1970, Pt II Selected Documents, NN 98, 99.

100 See S. D. Skazkin. A. M. Gorchakov's diplomacy in the last years of his chancellorship. "Selected works on history", Moscow, 1973.

101 S. Goryainov. Bosphorus and Dardanelles. St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 288

102 AVPR, f. Chancellery, 19, ll. 536, 537; D. Harris. Op cit., pp 172 - 173

103 G. Hunigen. Op. cit., S. 285.

104 D. Harris. Op. cit., p. 163, n. 92; G. Hunigen. Op. cit., S. 284.

page 139

accept to all the great powers. On December 30, the relevant proposals were sent to Paris, London and Rome. The twists and turns of further negotiations are not of particular interest. I had to convince the British leaders again, although, as Derby admitted, the alleged "Andrassy note" is quite harmless .105 In the end, despite Elliot's protests, the British cabinet joined the other powers with reservations. It took a long time to discuss the procedure for the upcoming demarche. We found a compromise solution that would weaken the real effect of the note in advance. Having arranged for the Austrian Ambassador Zichy to become the main person during the planned ceremony, Andrassy simultaneously authorized various subterfuges that protected the "dignity of the sultan" from humiliation.

On January 31, 1876, Zici went to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rashid, and read him the text of the note of his Government; the latter, as agreed, asked him to leave a copy of the document. Then the ambassadors of other powers visited Rashid "in turn", advising the Porte to accept the Austrian plan 106 . On February 13, the sultan officially agreed to four of the five points of the Andrassy note. The note included the following requirements (for Herzegovina and Bosnia):: 1) freedom of religion, 2) elimination of the tax collection system, 3) use of tax revenues for the needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4) organization of a control commission to monitor the implementation of reforms, 5) improvement of the situation of the rural population. Turkey refused to accept the third point unconditionally.

Thus, it was as if the "concert of European powers" had been restored, which had unanimously advocated improving the fate of the Christian subjects of Turkey and had obtained appropriate assurances from her. But the leaders of European diplomacy themselves did not believe in success. Are the reforms promised by Turkey worth the paper on which they are written? Bismarck asked. Recalling the French proverb ("A woman changes often. The fool only believes her... In vain!"), the chancellor said: "But Turkey never changes, but you can't trust it anyway." 107 Already after the demarche, Zichi stated the obvious weakness of the entire plan, because the guarantees of its feasibility "can only be moral." 108 Skeptical (and in similar terms!) Alexander II, Gorchakov, Novikov, Italian Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta, and even Andrasi himself evaluated the prospects for "pacification".

European diplomacy tried to "solve" the Eastern question in the old-fashioned way, not noticing (or trying not to notice) that forces had matured in the Balkans and beyond that could no longer be contained by previous means. While the pens of the Viennese bureaucrats creaked as they drew up a plan for an "improved status quo," the patriots of Herzegovina and Bosnia continued their heroic struggle. During the winter, there were not many major clashes, but in the skirmishes that took place, the Turks could not use the existing advantage in weapons and people. Despite the increasing repression of punitive forces against women, the elderly and children, the rebels intended to achieve their goals. In March 1876, General Rodich, who was authorized to negotiate the cessation of military operations, "confessed in an intimate conversation that he did not believe in the possibility of reconciliation, that nothing could be done with one note from Count Andrassy," And "the situation is undoubtedly becoming more complicated,"109 the author of the note also admitted.

Proponents of preserving the old order still pretended that the doomed building of the Ottoman Empire could be restored with a light cosmetic repair. "The path of covering up gaping cracks" is the option that, according to Gorchakov, the powers have chosen. The year 1876 showed its complete unsuitability.

105 TsGAOR USSR, f. 678, d. 513, ll. 1, 2, 8-11.

106 AVPR, f. Main archive, V, A 2, d. 549, ll. 93-95, 103, 104.

107 Ibid., f. Chancellery, 19, ll. 426, 427, 452.

108 Ibid., f. Main archive, V, A 2, d. 549, l. 106.

109 Ibid., f. Chancellery, d. 4363/1. l. 41; d. 4363/2, l. 5.

page 140


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