To the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory
Forty years ago, in January 1945, the final stage of the Second World War began in Europe, which led to the crushing defeat of the most reactionary strike force of imperialism - Hitler's fascism. "Having inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy," says the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, " the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, defended the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland, defended the cause of October. They made a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies, to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery, to the salvation of world civilization, and fulfilled their patriotic and international duty with honor. This is their greatest service to humanity. " 1
At the final stage of the war, the main events, as before, unfolded on the Soviet - German front. It was here that the main forces of Nazi Germany were concentrated-185 divisions and 21 brigades (or more than 60% of all its troops), while the Western Allies were opposed by 108 divisions and brigades - 31 % 2 .
Events on the Soviet-German front continued to have a huge impact on the planning and course of the armed struggle on the western front. The relationship between the Soviet-German front and the events in the West in late 1944 and early 1945, when the Allied command had to take measures to repel the counteroffensive of the German - Fascist troops and plan the final operations of 1945, has always been the focus of historians ' attention.
In Soviet historiography, this problem is reflected in major works on the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II , 3 which, along with describing military operations on the Soviet-German front, also show their impact on events in the West. Special studies of Soviet historians 4 consider and
1 Kommunist, 1984, No. 9, p. 36.
2 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 10, Moscow, 1979, pp. 35-37.
3 The Second World War of 1939-1945. Moscow, 1958, pp. 660-663; History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Vol. 4. Moscow, 1962, pp. 515-553; History of the Second World War of 1939-1945. Vol. 9, Moscow, 1978, pp. 271-279; vol. 10, p. 234 - 261, 511-518; The Second World War. Brief history, Moscow, 1984, pp. 410-420, etc.
4 Zaitsev I. Ardennes (offensive of the German-fascist troops on the Western Front in December 1944-January 1945). - Military Historical Journal, 1965, N 10; Kulkov E. Ardennes operation and inventions of bourgeois falsifiers-Ibid., 1972, N 3; Rzheshevsky O. A. War and History. Bourgeois Historiography of the USA on the Second World War, Moscow, 1984, pp. 170-176.
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the course of the battles in the Ardennes is criticized by bourgeois falsifiers who tendentiously cover the events in the Ardennes and Vosges (December 1944-January 1945).
The battle of the Bulge is also discussed in many works of bourgeois authors devoted both to the Second World War as a whole, 5 and specifically to this issue .6 In them, the fighting on the western front (December 1944-January 1945) is considered in isolation, as a rule, without any connection with events on the Soviet-German front, and an attempt is made to exaggerate the role of the Ardennes battles, show their supposedly dominant influence on the final operations of 1945 in Europe, and belittle the role of the January offensive of the Soviet Army in 1945 G., and the Budapest operation is not mentioned at all.
This article attempts to present the situation that developed before the final battles of 1945 in Europe, in which the German-fascist command launched a counteroffensive on the western front; to show the impact of the Soviet offensive in the Budapest direction (December 1944), the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian operations on the Allied actions in the West. These aspects still require further research.
The military-political situation before the final stage of World War II in Europe was determined primarily by the grandiose military and labor successes of the Soviet Union in 1944 and the intensification of military operations of the Allied armies. The significance of the historic victories won by the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944 cannot be overemphasized. As a result of successive strikes, the front of the German-Fascist troops was crushed from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, and the main enemy strategic groups were defeated. The losses suffered by the Wehrmacht were irreparable. Only during the summer-autumn offensive of the Soviet Army were destroyed and captured 96 divisions and 24 brigades of the enemy. The Wehrmacht lost 1.6 million people (including irretrievable losses from June to December amounted to more than 860 thousand people), 6.7 thousand tanks, 28 thousand guns and mortars, more than 12 thousand aircraft .7
The main military and political outcome of 1944 was the almost complete liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union and most European countries. 600,000 square kilometers of Soviet territory were cleared of the invaders. Only the northwestern part of the Latvian SSR remained in the hands of the invaders. Having cleared the territory of its country from the invaders, the Soviet Army, with the participation of the forces of the national liberation movement and regular troops of a number of countries, liberated the territory of European states with a total area of about 800 thousand square kilometers .8
Together with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Polish, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Romanian troops and the French aviation regiment Normandie - Niemen fought for the liberation of their countries from the fascist invaders. The regular people's armed forces and partisans made a worthy contribution to the defeat of the Nazi occupiers-
5 Eisenhower D. D. Crusade in Europe. N. Y. 1948; Pоgue F. C. The Supreme Command. Office of the Chief of Military History. Washington. 1954; Westphal S., etc. The Fatal Decisions. N. Y. 1956; Erman J. Grand Strategy. October 1944-August 1945. Lnd. 1956; MacDonald Ch. The Mighty Endeavor. American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II. N.Y. 1969; Liddel Hart B. History of the Second World War. Lnd. 1970 (all these works are translated into Russian).
6 Тоland J. Battle. The Story of the Bulge. N. Y. 1959; MacDonald Ch. Siegfried Line Campaign. Washington. 1963; Cole H. The Ardenns: Battle of the Bulge. Washington. 1965.
7 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 9, p. 531; History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Vol. 4, p. 500.
8 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].
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military formations and detachments of Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and other countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe.
Under the influence of the crushing blows of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the Allied armies also intensified military operations in 1944. In early June, the second front in Europe was opened. As a result of the landing on the coast of Northern France and the unfolding offensive, Anglo-American troops, with the assistance of the Resistance movement, especially the French, liberated France, Belgium, Luxembourg, many parts of the Netherlands, most of Italy and reached the borders of Germany.
Caught in the grip of two fronts, Nazi Germany found itself in complete foreign policy isolation. Under the joint attacks of the Soviet Armed Forces, the troops of the United States, Great Britain and France, the fascist bloc in Europe collapsed: Italy, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were withdrawn from the war on the side. Germany and declared war on it. The end of World War II was approaching.
The anti-fascist coalition continued to expand and deepen, and the military alliance of the leading states, which before the final campaign in Europe had a huge military and economic potential that surpassed the military economy of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, became stronger.
The Soviet Union came closer to the final year of the war than ever before, strong and united. The victories won by the Armed Forces, the liberation of Soviet territory, the implementation of the liberation mission, the steady rise of industry, transport, agriculture, and the development of science and technology were achieved thanks to the selfless work of the Soviet people and the enormous organizational and ideological activity of the Communist Party, which mobilized all the spiritual and material resources of the country for the final defeat of the enemy.
The rapid and steady growth of the socialist economy, especially heavy industry and machine-building, allowed the Soviet war economy to achieve decisive superiority over the economy of fascist Germany. The military industry of the USSR in 1944 produced 33.2 thousand combat aircraft, about 29 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (of which more than 21.8 thousand medium and heavy), more than 56 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger, 7.1 thousand mortars .9 At the same time, in Nazi Germany during this period, 32.9 thousand combat aircraft, 17.1 thousand medium and heavy tanks, 61.1 thousand guns of 75 mm caliber and above 10 were produced . The necessary conditions were created not only for the final defeat of the enemy, but also for the transition to peaceful economic construction.
By the final battles of 1945, the Soviet Union came up with a huge military and economic potential and powerful Armed Forces equipped with new and modernized military equipment and weapons, significantly superior to the Wehrmacht: in men-1.8 times, in artillery-1.9 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns-1.5 times, in combat aircraft - more than more than 3.6 times 11 .
The Soviet Union attracted the world's attention. The outstanding victories of its Armed Forces in 1944 raised the international prestige of the Soviet state even higher as the main force of the anti-Hitler coalition, whose active foreign policy led to the further strengthening of the coalition of anti-Hitler states, who-
9 Ibid., p. 394.
10 Ibid., p. 449 ..
11 Ibid., vol. 10, p. 38. The ratio of forces is given for the troops who were in active armies (excluding the Navy and air defense forces of the country).
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the growing military cooperation of the leading powers-the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. By 1945, 41 states maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR, while at the beginning of the war - only 25.
The outstanding victories of the Soviet Army, the significant growth and strengthening of the military and economic power of the Soviet Union in 1944 were the basis that facilitated the successful conduct of operations and battles in 1945, which ultimately led to the defeat of Nazi Germany, to the victorious end of the war in Europe.
The USSR's partners in the anti - Hitler coalition, the United States and Britain, also continued to increase their economic potential and military power. The main part (in the United States, for example, two-thirds) of the industry of these countries was used for the production of weapons. The highest level of economy and military production was observed in the United States. At the same time, due to an acute shortage of raw materials, labor, and significant financial difficulties, production of basic industrial products, including military products, began to decline in England .12 In general, the level of production achieved by the economies of the United States and England made it possible to provide their armed forces with weapons, military equipment, ammunition and other means of warfare in sufficient quantities. Before the final campaign of the war in Europe, the Western Allies, especially the United States, had a huge military and economic potential and armed forces, which provided them, using the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, with increased opportunities to carry out major offensive operations.
In the field of foreign policy, the United States proceeded from the need to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, the struggle over relations with the USSR significantly intensified in the American ruling circles, and steps were taken to prevent the growth of its influence .13 All this was used by Nazi Germany in attempts to split the actions of anti-fascist states.
The successes achieved by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1944, especially the growing offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces and the landing of American-British troops in Western Europe, further aggravated the political and economic crisis in Germany. The loss of almost all of its allies, the narrowing or complete termination of foreign policy ties with neutral countries led to a sharp reduction in the material base of the German fascist army, and a decline in military production. However, by exerting all its forces, making maximum use of human resources, raw materials of the still occupied countries and territories, and carrying out total militarization, Nazi Germany was still able to provide the Wehrmacht with the necessary amount of weapons, military equipment and ammunition. 14
To increase the size of the armed forces, the Hitlerite leadership undertook one "total mobilization" of human resources after another. The army was also replenished by skilled labor, even employed in the military industry. In exchange for the mobilized workers, German imperialism continued to exploit the labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war with even greater force, for which purpose concentration camps were created next to the largest enterprises. At the end of 1944, the total number of foreigners employed in the Soviet Union was
12 For more information, see: J. Erman. Big strategy. October 1944-August 1945, Moscow, 1958, pp. 31-37 (translated from English).
13 For more information, see: Borisov A. Y. The USSR and the USA: Allies during the War. 1941-1945. Moscow, 1983, pp. 167-175.
14 German industry during the War of 1939-1945, Moscow, 1956, pp. 127, 128, 129; Muller-Gillebrand B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945, vol. 3, Moscow, 1976, pp. 232-235 (translated from German).
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almost 9 million people, including 6 million civilian workers, 2 million prisoners of war, and 0.5 million prisoners of concentration camps15 .
By carrying out emergency measures, the Hitlerite leadership managed to find reserves for replenishing the army with significant forces. From the beginning of September to mid-December 1944, a total of about 40 divisions of varying strength and combat capability were reorganized and re-formed .16 Trying to somehow raise the morale of the population, as well as in order to reduce the number of units involved in the protection and defense of German territory, the fascist clique put forward the idea of creating a Volkssturm 17 . With the last of its strength, Nazi Germany tried to delay the inevitable catastrophe. For the final battles of 1945, it managed to prepare significant armed forces that still retained combat capability and could conduct defense, and in some areas launch counterattacks. But Fascist Germany could no longer resist for a long time.
Political goals and strategic plans for the future conduct of the war were built by the opposing sides based on the results of the armed struggle in 1944 and economic opportunities. Planning for the final campaign of 1945, the political and military leadership of the countries of the opposing coalitions began in the fall of 1944.
At the end of October, at a meeting of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the issue of the final operations of the Great Patriotic War was considered 18 . The goals set at the final stage of the war in Europe were decisive. Together with the Allies, it was necessary to complete the defeat of the war machine of fascist Germany, liberate the peoples of Europe still enslaved by fascism, help them restore national independence and sovereignty of their countries, and force Hitler's Germany to unconditional surrender.
It was planned to conduct major offensive operations simultaneously in all strategic directions. The primary task was to defeat enemy groups in East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria. It was supposed to reach the border from the mouth of the Vistula to Vienna. After that, it was planned to capture Berlin, liberate Prague, unite with the Allies and victoriously end the war in Europe. The main efforts were focused on the Warsaw-Berlin, central direction. Approximate readiness for the start of the winter offensive was determined by 15-20 January 19 .
After the end of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the enemy had a fairly strong grouping in the central direction. The Stavka decided to divert part of its forces from this direction to the flanks of the Soviet-German front, i.e., to "stretch the enemy's central grouping." 20 For this purpose, the Soviet troops in October 1944 began fighting on the territory of East Prussia, continued to advance-
15 Drobish K., Eichholtz D. The use of forced labor by foreign workers in Germany during World War II. Report at the XIII International Congress of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1970, p. 13.
16 Erman J. Uk. soch., p. 18.
17 Militia formations in Nazi Germany during World War II; formed in the fall of 1944. For more information, see: Muller-Gillebrand B. Uk. op.; Germany in the Second World War (1939-1945). Moscow, 1971 (translated from German).
18 See Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and Reflections, 3rd ed. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1979, p. 246.
19 For more information on planning and preparing operations for the final campaign of the war in Europe, see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 10, pp. 42-47; Zhukov G. K. Uk. soch. Vol. 2, pp. 249-251.
20 See: Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam: Collected Papers, Moscow, 1971, p. 104.
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the events in Courland and Budapest, 21 which also had a significant impact on the planning and progress of the Ardennes operation .22
In the autumn of 1944, the American and British commanders were preparing to conduct offensive operations for the invasion of Germany. Their planning, as well as the course of military operations, was greatly influenced by the victories of the Soviet Army. In the summer of 1944, because of its crushing blows, the Hitlerite command was not only unable to withdraw its formations from the Soviet-German front, but was forced to send its main reserves and material resources primarily to the East. Even after the opening of the second front in Europe, the Fascist command sent 59 divisions and 13 brigades from the West against the Soviet Armed Forces .23 To a large extent, this allowed the Anglo-American forces to reach the "Siegfried Line" during the summer offensive .24 However, attempts to break through it on the move were not crowned with success, and in the future the battles on the entire front from Switzerland to the mouth of the Rhine took on a protracted character, although the enemy's defense was carried out with limited forces. On this occasion, the former Hitler General B. Muller-Hillebrand wrote:: "In contrast to the Eastern theater of Operations, the situation in the West, which seemed hopeless, was improved, since the enemy's armies trampled there, despite the huge material advantage, and were limited to conducting slow-motion methodical actions." 25
It should also be noted that the "trampling on the spot" took place at a time when the Allied forces were constantly growing. If in October 1944, the American, British-Canadian and French troops had about 56 divisions, then in mid-December-63 divisions, including 16 armored 26 . There were about 10 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns in them. By this time, the German-Fascist forces on the western front numbered 73 divisions (including 11 tank divisions) and 3 brigades. But in terms of the number of personnel and weapons, they were significantly inferior to the Allied ones. According to the Anglo - American command, all the German-Fascist formations corresponded in their combat power to the 39 allied divisions of 27 .
The scattered attempts made by the Allied command to break through the Western Rampart were unsuccessful. It was forced to stop the troops and begin preparations for subsequent offensive operations. Such actions of the Allied forces were unexpected for the German command, which was preparing to repel the breakthrough of the Western Wall by the American-British armies. However, the Allied forces, having superior forces and means over the enemy, went on the defensive in front of the"Siegfried Line". Their active combat missions
21 For more information, see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 9, pp. 195-205; vol. 10, pp. 44-45.
The 22nd Ardennes Operation of the German-Fascist forces (December 16, 1944-January 28, 1945) was the last offensive of the Wehrmacht in the West. The Germans gave it the code name "Watch on the Rhine".
23 Podvig naroda [Feat of the people], Moscow, 1981, p. 108.
24 The Western Rampart ("Siegfried Line") is a system of long - term fortifications built in 1935 - 1939 along the western borders of Germany from the Netherlands to Switzerland (from Cleves to Basel). Its length is about 500 km, and the average depth is 35-75 kilometers. By the time the Anglo-American troops approached it in 1944, it was equipped with new structures and reinforced with mine-explosive barriers. Although the troops defending the rampart were few in number, poorly prepared and lacked the necessary reserves, the breakthrough of the fortifications by the American-British troops lasted from September 1944 to March 1945 (see Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, Moscow 1977, p. 463).
25 Muller-Gillebrand B. Uk. op., p. 221.
26 Erman J. Uk. soch., p. 43; Bradley O. Zapiski soldata [Notes of a Soldier], Moscow, 1957, p. 484 (translated from English).
27 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. Vol. 9, pp. 272, 273.
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the actions could lead to the transfer of German-Fascist formations to the western front from other fronts, and first of all from the Soviet-German one, and this was not part of the plans of the American-British command. This policy was in the hands of the Hitlerite cliché and led to the idea of organizing a decisive counteroffensive.
In September 1944, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of England, as well as the military leaders of these countries and the Allied High Command met to discuss plans for operations to invade Germany .28 Immediately after the meeting, F. Roosevelt and Churchill informed Stalin of their plans and intentions. The goal of the Allied offensive was to advance rapidly, defeat the German armed forces, and penetrate "into the heart of Germany." Moreover, in their opinion, "the best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the West is to strike at the Ruhr and Saar... The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern one, and we absolutely need to open the northern ports, in particular Rotterdam and Antwerp, before the onset of bad weather. Therefore, our main efforts will be focused on the left flank. " 29 In addition, plans were being prepared for an operation to capture the Istrian peninsula in order to get ahead of the Soviet troops in reaching the Balkans and Vienna.
Although the Second Quebec Conference defined the objectives of the further offensive, it was not possible to develop a unified plan. Its coordination was delayed until December 1944, when it was decided to go on the offensive at the end of the month. However, the counter-offensive of the German-Fascist troops in the Ardennes confused the plans of the Allies. The final plans for 1945 were developed by the US-British command only by January 20.
Fascist Germany, squeezed from the east, south-east, south and west, tried to find a way out of the critical situation. The Hitler clique, hoping for a split in the coalition of anti-fascist states, took all measures to prolong the war, looking for ways to conclude a separate peace with the United States and Britain. Everything was done in order to transfer as many troops as possible to the East and close the gaps there that had formed as a result of the rapid advance of the Soviet Army. To do this, some of Hitler's generals even suggested opening the western front. However, Hitler and his closest advisers considered it advisable to continue military operations on all fronts, and a major offensive operation was planned on the western front. According to Hitler's calculations, as a result of a successful outcome of the operation, "the plans of the Allies will be upset for a long time, and the enemy will have to make a fundamental revision of its policy." 30 Former Hitler General K. Tippelskirch recalled: the German-Fascist leadership, counting on a successful offensive in the West, expected that serious political differences would arise between Roosevelt and Churchill, "fundamental changes" in the situation would occur, " after which the most serious psychological consequences in their own country, as well as in the whole world, would not be slow to affect." 31 .
It was in these conditions that the Hitlerite leadership made an attempt to reverse the course of events on the western front. It decided about-
The 28th Conference (the Second Quebec Conference) was held on September 11-16, 1944 in the Canadian city of Quebec.
29 Soviet-American relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Doc. and m-ly. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. 1944-1945. M. 1984, p. 208.
30 Westphal West etc. Fatal Decisions, Moscow, 1958, p. 265 (translated from English).
31 Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War, Moscow, 1956, p. 495. (translated from German).
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by waging a counteroffensive in the West, push the ruling circles of the United States and England to conclude a separate deal. The Ardennes, one of the most vulnerable areas of defense of the Anglo - American troops, was chosen as the counteroffensive area. It was covered by small forces - only four divisions defended the 115-kilometer section.
According to the plan of the operation, the main blow was delivered from the Ardennes region in the general direction of Antwerp. Thus, the entire grouping of the Anglo-American armies in the Aachen area was cut off from the American and French forces operating in France south of the Ardennes. This task took seven days to complete. A directive of the Wehrmacht High Command, signed by Hitler on 10 November 1944, stated:" The aim of the operation is to achieve, by destroying enemy forces north of the Antwerp - Brussels - Luxembourg line, a decisive turn in the course of the war in the West and thereby possibly the war as a whole. " 32
Although bourgeois historiography ignores the relationship between the situation on the Soviet-German front in the autumn of 1944 and the planning and progress of the Ardennes operation, this fact cannot be ignored. At that time, the Soviet Army was leading a successful offensive in the Arctic, the Baltic States, in the Budapest direction, and transferred the fighting to East Prussia. That is why the German-Fascist command was not able to transfer units and formations from East to West, and the groups concentrated for a breakthrough in the Ardennes were insufficient in their composition to achieve the planned goals. Patching up the gaps that were constantly forming on the eastern front as a result of Soviet strikes led to a lack of reserves in the German high Command, which ultimately ruled out the possibility of creating additional forces to develop success in the Ardennes operation. Therefore, the Hitlerite command intended to transfer additional forces to the Ardennes already during the offensive. But events, especially on the Soviet-German front, have shown that the Nazis do not have such an opportunity. Not only were there not enough reserves, but also fuel for tanks 33, the replenishment of which was planned to be carried out at the expense of trophies.
The German counteroffensive began early in the morning of December 16, 1944, in non-flying weather, which made it impossible for the Allies to deliver a massive blow to the Nazi troops .34 The offensive of the enemy was a surprise for the Americans, as a result of which there was little resistance to the advancing enemy. Moreover, neither the command of armies and groups, nor the Allied high Command, assumed the possibility of a Hitlerite strike in the Ardennes region in mid-December. Montgomery, then commander of the 21st Army Group, declared on December 16, the day the German counteroffensive began, that " the enemy... unable to undertake major offensive operations. " 35 "The surprise of the strike and the lack of communication soon caused such confusion everywhere that for several hours the highest headquarters did not know about the scope of the enemy's actions." 36-
32 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Frankfurt a / M. 1965 (hereinafter-KTB / OKW). Bd. 4, S. 395.
33 Tank troops had only 140-160 km of fuel, i.e. only half the depth of the planned operation (History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 9, p. 273).
34 For more information on the course of military operations in the Ardennes and Vosges, see: ibid., pp. 271-276; vol. 10, pp. 234-243; Zaitsev I. Uk. soch., pp. 48-62.
35 Cit. by: Liddell Garth B. The Second World War, Moscow, 1976, p. 599 (translated from English).
36 Pogue F. The Supreme Command, Moscow, 1959, p. 392 (translated from English).
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For example, the commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, D. Eisenhower, learned about the German offensive only on the evening of 37 .
Although the German-Fascist troops failed to fully complete their tasks in the first days of the operation, the surprise achieved allowed them to quickly break through the defenses and advance to a depth of more than 90 km by December 25. The Allied forces lost their initiative and barely held back the onslaught of the Nazis. However, in the future, the American and British commands managed to mobilize forces and organize a repulse to the enemy. By the end of December, the counteroffensive of the Nazis was stopped. Already on December 28, Hitler was forced to admit that the offensive had failed.
The powerful offensive of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in the Budapest Operation (October 1944-February 1945), which continued in December, greatly contributed to the repulse of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes by the troops of the Western Allies .38 Almost simultaneously with the Ardennes operation, fierce battles for Budapest began (from December 20). Already on December 26, Soviet troops surrounded the 188-thousandth enemy group 39 in the area of the Hungarian capital, to unblock which the Wehrmacht command began to pull together forces, including formations that were in its reserve. Bourgeois historiography is silent about this, and it was precisely these reserves that the Nazis lacked to continue the offensive in the Ardennes.
The Nazis were also forced to withdraw some formations directly from the western front. So, already on December 27, an order was issued for the urgent transfer of two of the most combat-ready divisions from the West to the eastern front 40 . As a result, the offensive operation on the northern wing of the western front, scheduled for December 30, was not carried out - the Allies avoided another strike 41 . This once again convincingly proves that the tense situation for the German - Fascist troops in the East was one of the factors that contributed to the Allies in repelling a powerful enemy offensive. Although Hitler's High Command had reserve formations in the West, it was unable to use them in the Ardennes. This was prevented by Soviet strikes in the Budapest direction, as well as the fact that on the eastern front, the Hitler command expected even more powerful blows from the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944-1945. The existing reserves, according to Hitler's leadership, could be required for transfer to the East, where "the Russians will soon launch a gigantic offensive against East Prussia and Upper Silesia." 42
After the Ardennes region failed to achieve its goals, the Hitler leadership intended to do this by conducting several operations in other areas. One of them was planned in Alsace and on the Upper Rhine .43 It was supposed to be blows from heaven-
37 Liddell Garth B. UK. op., p. 599.
38 The successful conduct of this operation achieved important goals: Hungary, the last ally of Nazi Germany in Europe, was withdrawn from the war. Therefore, the Nazi leadership made efforts to preserve Hungary in order to use its potential and armed forces to their advantage. Important importance was attached to the retention of Budapest, since more than 50% of all industrial enterprises in Hungary were concentrated here and almost all of them worked to meet the needs of the Wehrmacht (see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 9, pp. 195-206; vol.10, pp. 167-176).
39 Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 200-201.
40 KTB/OKW. Bd. 4, S. 1359.
41 Kulkov E. Uk. soch., p. 99.
42 Cit. By: Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 9, p. 273.
43 Operation was codenamed "North Wind". As early as in the autumn of 1944, Hitler's command considered the question of a counteroffensive in Northern Alsace, but due to a lack of forces and resources, it abandoned it "in favor of the Ardennes operation" (see Pogue F. Uk. soch., p. 412).
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It is north of Strasbourg to encircle and destroy the weakened US 7th Army, and then resume the offensive on the Meuse 44 .
The Nazi offensive in Alsace began on the night of January 1, 1945. On the same day, about a thousand enemy aircraft launched powerful strikes on airfields of American-British troops located in Belgium and the Netherlands. "This was another unpleasant surprise for the Western allies." 45 As a result of the raid, 260 Allied aircraft were destroyed .46 Fierce fighting occurred and on the southern face of the Ardennes bulge, where us troops were subjected to strong pressure from the enemy.
The German capture of the Bulge of the Bulge of the Bulge of the Bulge of the Bulge of the Bulge of the Bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of the bulge of The Allied High Command was not only concerned about the current difficult situation, but was also at a loss. On the agenda was the question of leaving Alsace. Already on the first day of the enemy offensive, Eisenhower ordered the troops of the 6th Army Group to withdraw to the Vosges 47 . This was tantamount to abandoning Strasbourg. The head of the provisional Government of France, General Charles de Gaulle, expressed a strong protest about this. He stated gen. Eisenhower was told that leaving Alsace and parts of Lorraine "would be a major mistake from both a military and state point of view" 48 and that if the commander-in-chief did not allocate "troops for the defense of Strasbourg", the French would have to "act independently" 49 . Not convincing him, de Gaulle turned to the leaders of the United States and England. Roosevelt refused to interfere in this matter, and Churchill, who arrived in France on January 3, agreed with Eisenhower's updated decision by that time to withdraw only one corps from the sharply protruding arc of the front to the Vosges, without touching the units defending Strasbourg. De Gaulle also agreed .50
The situation on the entire western front, especially in the Ardennes and Alsace, was difficult for the Allied forces. Eisenhower was forced to appeal to Washington with a request to urgently send additional forces to Western Europe. However, the transfer of several connections was promised only within the next two months. The main command of the Allied forces placed great hopes on the offensive of the Soviet Army. To this end, Eisenhower proposed sending the top staff officer of the Allied Command to Moscow. On this occasion, on December 24, the US president asked J. V. Stalin to accept a "fully competent officer" from the headquarters of the Allied command, whom he wants to send to Moscow "for discussion... Eisenhower's state of affairs on the western front and the question of cooperation with the eastern front. " 51 This mission was assigned to Eisenhower's deputy, British Air Chief Marshal A. Tedder, who arrived in Moscow in early 1945,52
The German offensive in Alsace caused extreme concern among the Allied command, which expected attacks by the Nazis in other directions as well. In one of his reports to the U.S. Department of War
44 Тоland J. Op. cit., p. 303.
45 MacDonald h. An ordeal. American Armed Forces in the European Theater during the Second World War, Moscow, 1979, p. 345 (translated from English).
46 World War II. A brief history, p. 418.
47 Pogue F. Uk. soch., p. 414.
48 Cit. by: Matthew F. Uk. soch., p. 415.
49 Eisenhower D. The Crusade to Europe, Moscow, 1959, p. 414 (translated from English).
50 Pogue F. Uk. soch., p. 416.
51 Soviet-American relations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Vol. 2, pp. 276-277.
52 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].
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Eisenhower reported that "the Battle of the Bulge is, in my opinion, only an episode, and we should expect enemy attempts to strike in other areas." 53 He shared his concerns with British Prime Minister Churchill, who was also attended by de Gaulle and Montgomery. Eisenhower suggested that in the current situation, the Soviet Army needed help. Agreeing with the opinion of the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, the head of the British government turned to Stalin with a request to inform him whether they could "count on a major offensive (of the Soviet Army. - A. S.) on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other time." The Soviet Union responded to this request, deciding to provide immediate assistance to the Allies. Churchill was notified of this the very next day .54 And this is despite the extremely difficult weather conditions at that time and the incomplete preparation for the offensive.
The USSR, which honestly and consistently fulfilled its obligations to the allies, did everything possible to assist the American-British troops as soon as possible. Already on January 12, earlier than planned, the Soviet Armed Forces launched an offensive from the Vistula to the Oder. Following this, on January 13, in East Prussia, the Nazis were dealt another powerful blow.
The Vistula-Oder and East Prussian offensive operations achieved the most important military and political goals: the liberation of the Polish people from the fascist enslavers was completed, the outpost of German militarism in the East was eliminated, the largest strategic enemy groups were defeated, favorable conditions were provided for the final strike on Berlin and the diversion of part of the German fascist troops from the western front. They ended with the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Vistula in its lower reaches and the Oder, on the left bank of which large bridgeheads were captured. The fighting was transferred directly to the territory of Germany, with Berlin 60 kilometers away. The largest enemy groups were defeated. Thus, during the Vistula-Oder operation, the enemy lost 35 divisions, and 25 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their composition .55 In East Prussia and Northern Poland, 37 enemy divisions were defeated, and 25 of them were destroyed 56 .
In the post-war period, a large number of books were published abroad, including military memoirs, which give an exaggerated assessment of the results of the battles in the Ardennes and Vosges regions. It is argued that the defeat of the Nazis in the Ardennes largely contributed to the achievement of success in the winter offensive operations of the Soviet Army. 57 However, this statement is not true. Of course, the events that took place on the western front in 1944 had a certain influence on the actions of the Soviet Army, but the main, decisive role belonged to the Soviet - German front. It was here that the decisive events of World War II took place and the main forces of the Wehrmacht operated, it was precisely the offensives between the Vistula and Oder and in East Prussia that were of great importance for thwarting Hitler's plans in the West, and not vice versa, precisely as a result of winters-
53 Cit. by: ibid., p. 237.
54 Soviet-British relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Doc. and m-ly. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. 1944-1945. Moscow, 1983, pp. 254-255.
55 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Brief History, Moscow, 1970, p. 466.
56 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].
57 For more details on the distortions of bourgeois falsifiers of history and their criticism, see: ibid., vol. 9, p. 279; Zaitsev I. UK. soch., pp. 48-49, 62; Kulkov E. Uk. soch., pp. 95-96, 99-100; Rzheshevsky O. A. Uk. soch., pp. 170-176.
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after the offensive of the Soviet Army, the leadership of nazi Germany was forced to abandon active operations here and began to urgently transfer forces to the East. The inconsistency of the claims of bourgeois authors is also confirmed by the fact (which, as a rule, is hushed up by them) that the Allies appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance, as well as the transfer in January 1945 of reserve formations, forces and means of the enemy, directly participating in the offensive in the Ardennes and Alsace, to the Soviet-German front. It is enough to give just two examples here. Despite the fact that in the second half of January, the Allies launched operations to eliminate the breakthrough of German troops, Hitler was forced to order the withdrawal of the 6th SS Panzer Army formations from the battle and transfer them to the reserve of OKB 58 in order to further transfer them to the East. By the end of January, eight of the best German divisions had been sent to the Soviet-German front, including four panzer and motorized divisions with 800 tanks and assault guns. In addition, three infantry divisions stationed in Denmark and intended for use in the Ardennes were also transferred to the Soviet-German front .59
The decisive role of the Soviet-German front in thwarting the German offensive is also indicated by the fact that the powerful blows of the Soviet Army in 1944 and in the winter of 1945 forced the military leadership of nazi Germany to send the bulk of its reinforcements to the troops operating in the East. So, in January alone, 1,328 tanks were sent to the Soviet-German front, while only 291 tanks60 were sent to the western front .
Summing up the results of the January offensive, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in his order of February 23, 1945, pointed out: "The success of our winter offensive led primarily to the fact that they disrupted the German winter offensive in the West... and allowed the armies of our allies, in turn, to go on the offensive against the Germans. " 61
The decisive influence of the Soviet Army's winter offensive on Allied combat operations is confirmed by the confessions of former Hitlerite generals, as well as by the statements of bourgeois statesmen and military figures. The huge role of the Vistula - Oder operation in thwarting German plans in the West was recognized by the former chief of operations of the headquarters of the German western front, Gen. B. Zimmerman, who wrote that "as a result of the Russian offensive... from the Baranow bridgehead on the Vistula, a threat was created for the Upper Silesian industrial region and for Germany itself. Only now has the high Command finally ordered the gradual withdrawal of its troops from the Ardennes to the positions of the Western Wall and the simultaneous transfer of almost one-third of all forces to the East. " 62 And the former commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Gen. X. Manteuffel, goes even further in his confessions. He concludes that "the rapid advance of the Red Army negated the effects of the respite achieved by the Ardennes offensive and made a quick end to the war inevitable." 63
58 Composition, grouping and regrouping of the land forces of fascist Germany outside the Soviet-German front for the period 1941-1945. Issue 2. Moscow, 1961, p. 193.
59 Collection of materials on the composition, grouping and regrouping of the land forces of fascist Germany and the troops of its former satellites on the Soviet-German front for the period 1941-1945, Issue 5. Moscow, 1957, pp. 17-27; KTB/OKW. Bd. 4, pp. 1358-1361, 1385.
60 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].
61 Stalin I. V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M 1947, p. 178.
62 Cit. by: Rzheshevsky O. A. Uk. soch., p. 174. In Soviet literature, the Baranow bridgehead is called the Sandomierz bridgehead.
63 Westphal West et al. Uk. soch., p. 303.
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Churchill, the head of the British government, gave a high assessment of the Soviet Army's offensive and its impact on changing the situation on the western front. On January 16, 1945, he said that the enemy now needed troops primarily to fill the "terrible gaps" created on the eastern front "as a result of the magnificent onslaught of the main forces of the Russian armies along the entire front - from the Baltic to Budapest." 64
General D. Eisenhower in his post-war memoirs, published in 1948, summing up the results of the fighting in the Ardennes, wrote that the enemy's resistance "because of the losses incurred in the battle of the Bulge, the enemy was not able to fight... heavy losses " weakened. "Moreover," he continued, " and this was very important, on January 12, the Russians launched a long-awaited powerful winter offensive. We had already received reports of their great success, and it was obvious that the sooner we launched the offensive, the more likely it was that the Germans would not be able to re-strengthen the western front in their efforts to avoid defeat. " 65
It was the enemy's refusal to take active action as a result of the Soviet Army's winter offensive that allowed the Americans, British, and French to begin preparing for new operations. They invariably linked their plans for the future conduct of the war with the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces .66 A "memo" prepared by US government departments for the President and the American delegation that participated in the Crimean Conference (February 1945) stated :" We must have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany. We desperately need the Soviet Union for war with Japan at the end of the war in Europe. " 67
Thus, the military-political situation before the final stage of the war in Europe is characterized primarily by outstanding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces. The above data convincingly demonstrate the failure of attempts by bourgeois historians to belittle the role of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front, undeservedly exaggerate the significance of the Ardennes operation, and put it on a par with the greatest battles of the Second World War. It was the events on the Soviet-German decisive front, where the Soviet Union achieved outstanding military successes in 1944 and in the winter of 1945, that predetermined further plans and the course of military operations on the western front, created the necessary prerequisites for the final defeat of the aggressive fascist-militarist bloc and the victorious end of World War II.
64 Cit. by: World War II. A brief history, p. 419.
65 Eisenhower D. Uk. op., p. 417.
66 For more information about the plans of the Allied command, see: History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 10, pp. 234-244; Erman J. Uk. soch., pp. 42-118; Pogue F. Uk. soch., p. 420-429.
67 Cit. By: Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945. Vol. 10, p. 129.
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