The article analyzes the results of Turkey's economic development over the past decade, examines both the main achievements and problems of the national economy. At the same time, the main question that the author seeks to answer is whether the decline in growth rates in 2012-2013 should be considered a short - term period of turbulence, including the aggravation of the domestic political situation, or the exhaustion of the potential of the previous model of economic development, which means that the country faces a large-scale task of restructuring production and changing specialization in international trade. The author leans in favor of the second version.

Keywords: Turkey, economic growth, financial stabilization, current account deficit, dependence on external sources of financing, reorientation of international financial flows, "middle-level development trap".

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) period of rule in Turkey (from 2002 to the present) is generally considered to be a very successful one, in part because its economic strength has significantly increased during this time, while seemingly effectively addressing a number of long-standing problems that have hindered sustainable growth. However, the events of recent months have raised doubts about the strength of Turkey's economic position, as well as other countries with growing markets, which were largely beneficiaries of the economic downturn in the West, which caused about 60% growth in capital inflows to developing countries in 2009-2013, according to World Bank estimates [Sri Mulyani Indrawati, 2014]. The prospect of a rebound in the US economy, and the euro zone economies following it, makes the economic future of a significant number of emerging market economies unclear. So, what can it be like for Turkey? The answer to this question can only be found through an analysis and correlation of real achievements and problems in the country's economic development.

In order to objectively assess the economic achievements of the Justice and Development Party over the more than ten-year period of its rule, it is necessary to characterize the so-called starting level, i.e., the state in which the country's economy was at the beginning of the XXI century. At that time, the features of the country's economic development were strongly associated with chronic inflation and unstable growth.

In 2001, the Turkish economy experienced another financial and economic crisis. Such "populist budget crises" repeatedly hit the country's economy at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. The fact is that since the late 1980s, low-resilience governments, which sought to increase their popularity, began to consider additional budget expenditures as a means of reviving consumer demand and the economy as a whole. The flip side of this kind of incentive poly is-

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Table 1

Key indicators of Turkey's macroeconomic development in 1993-2013

Year

GDP growth rate (in base prices of 1998)*

Budget deficit / GDP (%)

Primary budget surplus / GDP (%)

Inflation rate (average annual consumer price growth,%)

1994

-5.0

3.9

3.7

106.3

1995

6.7

4.1

3.3

88.0

1999

3.4

8.7

2.0

64.9

2000

6.8

7.8

6.0

54.9

2001

5.7

12.0

6.8

54.4

2002

6.1

14.6

4.3

45.0

2007

4.7

1.6

4.2

8.8

2008

0.7

1.8

3.5

10.4

2009

4.7

4.8

0.1

6.3

2010

9.2

3.6

0.7

6.4

2011

8.8

1.4

1.9

10.5

2012

2.2

2.0

1.4

6.2

2013***

3.6

1.0

0.8

6.8

* For 1993, 1994, and 1995, the base prices for calculating GDP growth are those of 1987.

** The ratio of budget revenues and expenditures excluding payments for servicing public debt. Thus, the surplus forms a real, i.e. not related to new loans, source of repayment of public debt.

*** Preliminary estimates.

Compiled and calculated by: [TUTK. Istatistik gostergeler 1923-2008, 2009, s. 599, 644, 646, 693, 753, Ekonomik Rapor 2005. 2006, s. 79; Ekonomik Rapor 2006, 2007, s. 78; Ekonomik Rapor 2009, 2010, s. 78, 135; Ekonomik Rapor 2010, 2011, s. 89, 144; Ekonomik Rapor 2012, 2013, s. 131, 206; Orta Vadeli Program (2014-2016), 2013, s. 5].

tics have become chronic, with budget deficits increasing in absolute and relative terms. But the liberalization of Turkey's financial market has opened up the possibility of using short-term foreign loans through national banks as an additional source of financing. As a result, the sustainability of the country's economy has become dependent on the influx of "hot money" from abroad, which is characterized by high mobility and sensitivity to the deterioration of the local economic situation. The long-term risky methods used by the country's governments to maintain economic growth (or rather, to overheat the economy) inevitably led to the crisis that broke out in 1994.

The authorities ' efforts to reduce public spending, due to their lack of consistency, did not produce results for a long time, but the first positive results achieved in 2000 were not strong enough, which led to a crisis in 2001.

The post-crisis implementation of the Strong Economy Program in Turkey provided the first signs of recovery, but a number of key macroeconomic indicators still indicated the difficult situation that persisted in the country by the end of 2002: the average annual inflation rate was 45%, and the budget deficit exceeded 14% of GDP (see Table 1). I), and the national debt reached almost 80% of the country's GDP (calculated from: [http://www.luik.gov.tr...; Ekonomik Rapor 2008, p. 170]).

The essence of the AKP's economic policy, which came to power in November 2002, was to reach a compromise between the implementation of the stabilization program.-

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We, which provided for compliance with the relative size of the budget deficit and the level of inflation agreed with the International Monetary Fund, and more or less active social policy, which was supposed to ensure the preservation of the political face of the party as pro-Islamic. Already by the next parliamentary elections, held in the summer of 2007, the AKP came up with convincing economic results. In the party's pre-election declaration, the period 2003-2007 was declared the most brilliant in the republic's economic history. Among developing countries, Turkey was recognized as a "rising star" and a "successful role model" [Guven ve Istikrar icinde durmak..., p. 26]. This statement was supported by the following set of facts. Against the background of a noticeable reduction in the budget deficit to 1.6% (see Table. 1) the ratio of public debt to GDP has decreased from 80 to 40% [Ekonomik Rapor 2009, p. 87]. As a result, for the first time in the last 34 years, it was possible to reduce the annual inflation rate to single-digit figures: according to the results of 2007. it was less than 9% (see Table 1). Macroeconomic stabilization allowed maintaining stable and at the same time rather high average annual growth rates: in 2003-2006 — 7.3%. Since 2002, the country's national income has grown 2.2 times, from $ 181 billion to $ 400 billion [Guven ve Istikrar icinde durmak..., s. 31].

During the years of the global economic crisis, macroeconomic indicators have worsened. Thus, in 2009, the growth rate was negative, although the decline in production volumes was less significant than in other countries - about 5% (see Table 1). Still, the Turkish economy survived the first wave of the crisis relatively painlessly. Its mitigation was largely facilitated by the successful reform of the banking sector, which made it possible to avoid bankruptcy and preserve it in full (see for more details: [Ulchenko, 2009]). In addition, as the Turkish economist 3. Onish wrote, the successful interpretation of the crisis as "a phenomenon that has an entirely external origin" contributed to preserving the image of the AKP [Onis, 2010, p.60].

In 2010-2011, the Turkish economy surprised with a strong post-crisis recovery with a growth rate of about 9% (see Table 1). In 2010, Turkey's economic growth was the most noticeable among the OECD countries.

In 2010, the government refused to continue credit cooperation with the IMF, thus demonstrating its unwillingness to continue maintaining external control over the development of the economy. As noted by 3. Onis, the systematic delay in signing the agreement with the IMF, and then the complete rejection of it, was presented "as a manifestation of the strength of the Turkish economy and growing national autonomy" [Onis, 2010, p. 60]. Currently, the country's economic development within the framework of macroeconomic stability, which remains an official priority, is ensured by three-year medium-term development programs. In 2010-2013, Turkey quite successfully coped with the task of independently maintaining the budget deficit and inflation rate within the framework that allowed us to talk about maintaining a stable situation in the country's economy (see Table 1). Inspired by the success of 2011, then the country's Minister of Economy 3. Caglayan made a statement in July that Turkey's task to achieve the goal of 2023-the centenary of the republic-to enter the top ten largest world economies with a per capita income of 25 thousand dollars and an export volume of 500 billion dollars. [Ekonomi Vakat Zafer...]. At that time, the Turkish economy ranked 18th in the World Bank's ranking, with GDP per capita at the current exchange rate of $ 10,605, and exports of $ 135 billion. [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator / NY. GDP. PCAP.CD; Ekonomik Rapor 2012, s. 151].

What seemingly visible mechanisms have enabled the AKP government to achieve economic success? Maintaining a relative balance between-

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The Government has managed public revenues and expenditures by increasingly reducing investment spending. Since 2005. they accounted for less than 10% of total budget expenditures, whereas in the second half of the 1990s they accounted for 15-20%. But if in the 1990s and early 2000s their reduction and keeping at a low level were unavoidable due to the pressure of interest payments to service the cumbersome public debt, then the success of stabilization (the average share of interest payments in total budget expenditures after 2005 is slightly more than 15%, whereas in 2003 the share of interest payments in the total budget expenditures It was above 40%) theoretically allowed the government to resume active investment activities, but it did not do so. At the same time, the authorities did not seek a noticeable increase in expenditures on civil servants ' salaries, as was the case in the 1990s: they were kept at a stable level of just over 20% of total budget expenditures (calculated from: [Economic Report 1997, s. 68, 74; Ekonomik Rapor 2003, s. 78, 86; Economic Report 2004, s. 79, 85; Ekonomik Rapor 2005, s. 78, 84; Ekonomik Rapor 2007, s. 83, 88; Ekonomik Rapor 2009, s. 77, 82; Ekonomik Rapor 2010, s. 88, 92]).

On the other hand, various types of social expenditures have become a pronounced new priority in budget expenditures. At the same time, if for a long time in the "upset" budget, interest payments on public debt remained the largest expenditure item, then as a result of the government's efforts to financially stabilize and activate social policy, the share of expenditures was only for the largest complex, but not the only social item "health care, pension provision and social assistance" in 2010, amounting to 17%, for the first time exceeded the share of expenditures absorbed by public debt servicing [Ekonomik Rapor 2011, p. 92]. By a margin of 3-4 percentage points, this item of social expenditure also dominated in 2011-2012 (Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 136). Social expenditures in the budget increased by at least 8-9 percentage points by 2010 compared to 2002. The scale of social assistance coverage of the poor in the last few years has been at least 10 million people annually [Hukumet Programs, 61, p. 45].

While there is a wide variety of government social programs, most of them are aimed at supporting the poor and those close to the marginal. According to Turkish researchers, the AKP's innovation is to transform social policy from a means of weakening the influence of the poor into a tool that ensures the steady growth of marginal sympathies for the authorities. As a result, for a long time, the government managed to secure a reliable position among" its " voters and guarantees against the development of a scenario in the image and likeness of Arab countries, where, according to a number of researchers, it was the isolation of a significant part of the population from the ability to solve the problem of personal and family well-being that became a prerequisite for anti-government revolutions (see, for example: [Lesser, 2014]).

The investment process was delegated to the private sector, whose activity was largely based on the financial stability provided by the authorities. At the same time, the investment rate increased from 16.5% in 2002 to 25.2% in 2007 [Istatistik gostergeler 1923-2008, s. 746; Ekonomik Rapor 2008, s. 34].

The dominance of the private sector as an investor has partially solved the problem of structural adjustment of the Turkish economy, which consists in its transition to a new level of export-oriented development by increasing the production of more high-tech products. In 2011, the share of high-tech goods in Turkey's manufacturing exports was only 3.5%, which is, firstly, lower than Turkey's own figure in 2002 - 5.1% and, secondly, significantly lower than the EU average for the same year 2011 - 19.8%. However, the share of medium-tech exports increased from 45% to 60% between 2002 and 2011 [2013 Yili Programi, p. 170]. Turkey's recent economic development plans and programs

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time invariably includes the strategic goal of ensuring a shift in favor of producing products with higher added value.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's" technological " ambition was also reflected in the fact that at the end of 2011, he put on the agenda such an important issue for national pride as the production of a fully Turkish car. The National Union of Automobile Manufacturers supported the Prime Minister's initiative, noting in its report that Turkey, where the automotive industry has existed for 40 years and where 13 models of passenger cars are produced (assembled) in partnership with foreign companies, has the opportunity to start producing its own car in four years [Hurriyet, 29.09.11; Sabah, 30.09.2011].

But in 2012, the growth rate of the Turkish economy only slightly exceeded 2%, while preliminary estimates of the results of 2013 - 3.6% (see Table 1). What is behind the decline in growth rates - a temporary stalling or the beginning of a long-term recession? To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the problems that have clouded the picture of favorable economic development of the country in recent years, and at the same time identify the growth drivers and the possibility of using them in the future.

Since the early 2000s, the current account deficit of the balance of payments in Turkey has steadily increased. In 2002, it had more than modest values - about $ 1.5 billion. By 2008, it reached $ 42 billion. Having decreased three times in the crisis period of 2009, by the end of 2010 it exceeded the pre-crisis level and amounted to more than $ 46 billion. The deficit reached its historical maximum in 2011 - $ 77 billion, which corresponded to more than 10% of the country's GDP [Ekonomik Rapor 2003, s. 109; Ekonomik Rapor 2010, s. 14; Ekonomik Rapor 2012, s. 207].

In 2012, the current account deficit of the balance of payments decreased to $ 66 billion (Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 207). But this seemingly positive shift occurred against the backdrop of a decline in growth rates to 2%. Thus, the main vulnerable point in the development of the country's economy is the inability to independently support economic growth and its dependence on external sources of financing. The reduction in their use, which is confirmed by the experience of 2009 and 2012, is strictly linked to a decrease in growth rates.

Some of the necessary external sources of financing come to the country in the form of foreign direct investment, which Turkey has made significant progress in attracting in recent years. However, the maximum inflow of $ 22 billion is expected to reach the end of the year. it was observed in the pre-crisis 2007. In all subsequent years, it remained at a lower level. For example, in 2012, Turkey was able to attract only $ 12 billion in foreign direct investment (Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 207).

Thus, the main part of the necessary external financing goes to Turkey through the system of portfolio investments, whose structure after the 2009 crisis is steadily dominated by various debt securities, and in the form of credit loans from the international financial market. As a result, the Turkish financial market, primarily for the private sector, which now holds about 70% of the country's external debt, is firmly tied to the international financial market and changes in its conjuncture. This is reinforced by the fact that a significant part of the borrowed funds are short-term loans: in 2012, they accounted for about 40% of the total debt of the private sector (calculated according to: [Ekonomik Rapor 2012, s. 171]). Turkey's external debt has also grown quite predictably: from $ 130 billion in 2002 to $ 337 billion in 2012 [Ekonomik Rapor 2005, p. 109; Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 207], i.e. by 2.6 times. However, to be fair, it should be noted that against the background of a noticeable increase in GDP, the relative size of external debt has not become dramatic.

Turkey successfully attracted a significant amount of capital from foreign markets due to relatively high interest rates. In the pre-crisis years

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The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CSTD) has used the high cost of credit as the main tool for achieving financial stabilization and controlling inflation. For example, in 2005, with an inflation rate of 8%, the rate on long-term loans in Turkey was 16%, which meant a real level of about 8%, while in the EU countries it was 1-2% [Dilekli and Eraslan, 2007, p. 37]. As one Turkish journalist noted, "The Central Bank's policy of high interest rates spread butter on the bread of hot money holders, and the country turned into a "paradise" for their investments "[Milliyet, 24.06.2013]. Attracted by high returns, speculative short-term capital readily entered the Turkish market, ensuring that the Turkish lira's exchange rate against the dollar remained relatively high.

In the post-crisis years, the favorable interest rate policy for foreign investors, which Turkey managed to return to as an economy that quickly entered the recovery phase after the 2009 crisis, was supplemented by the stagnation of major Western markets. In the context of their sluggish dynamics, international capital flowed to Turkey, which remained dynamic.

External financing allowed not only to increase the rate of investment, but also to expand domestic consumption, as evidenced by the fact that the growth of the current account deficit (statistically it is equal to the difference between the savings of the national economy and the volume of investment) occurred against the background of a rather noticeable decrease in the savings rate

Table 2

Dynamics of the savings rate in Turkey in the late 1990s-2000s (% of GDP, current prices)

Year

Savings rate

Gender

Savings rate

1997

19.4

2006

17.2

1999

19.3

2007

15.9

2000

17.8

2008

17.4

2002

19.3

2009

13.8

2003

16.6

2010

14.0

2004

16.8

2011

14.9

2005

16.5

2012

15.0

Calculated from: [Istatistik Gostergeler 1923-2011] (Turkish Statistical Society database).

Note that for the group of middle-income countries, which includes Turkey according to the World Bank classification, the average savings rate in 2012 was 32% [http://wdi.worldbank.Org/table/4.8].

Against the background of growing availability of funds from foreign markets and weak incentives to save, the country experienced a boom in consumer lending: in 2010-2011, the volume of consumer loans issued by Turkish banks increased annually by at least a third [Bankalarimiz 2009, s. 1-39; Banks in Turkey 2010, p. 1-39; Banks in Turkey 2011, p. 1-41].

Thus, the main mechanisms for maintaining economic growth in the country have not changed significantly compared to the period of the 1990s.The only difference is that during that period, consumption and investment in the national economy were supported by budget injections. A part of the budget was reallocated to the private sector in the form of generous interest payments on

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government debt securities. The budget deficit, burdened by the cost of servicing the growing national debt, was financed by both private sector savings and external sources of financing. In the 2000s, with a relatively balanced budget, the source of artificial growth in consumption and investment was mainly external sources of financing, more precisely, foreign loans from the private sector. At the same time, the model of two deficits - the budget deficit and the current account deficit of the balance of payments, if we consider today's Turkish budget to be deficit - free or close to it, was replaced by the model of one-the current account deficit, but significantly increased in volume.

It should be recognized that in the context of sluggish external markets (Turkish exports were able to reach the pre-crisis level of $ 140 billion in 2008 only in 2011) [Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 207], expanding the capacity of the domestic market, although at the cost of active use of external borrowing, became an alternative development model, which allowed Turkey to demonstrate good growth rates in the post-crisis years. Thus, in 2010, the weighted contribution of household consumption to GDP growth of 9% was estimated at 4.7%, and in 2011, with GDP growth of 8.7%, it was estimated at 5.3% [Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 60].

However, the obvious costs of the chosen growth model and the increased risks associated with its use have forced Turkey to gradually move away from its current economic policy. As noted in the annual development program for 2013 approved by the country's Council of Ministers, " The Central Bank of Turkey had to take into account the main trends in the development of the global economy in its monetary policy, since the decisions taken by the central banks of developed countries at the end of 2010 resulted in a rise in the price of the Turkish lira and a significant expansion of credit supply in the domestic market which led to a rapid increase in the balance of payments deficit" [2013 Yili Programi, p. 42]. To control macroeconomic risks, the CBTR was forced to lower short-term interest rates (one-day repo rates decreased by one percentage point by May 2013 compared to the end of 2012 [http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/]), thereby limiting the inflow of short-term capital, and at the same time increase the rate of mandatory reserves for banks.

As a result, 2012 was marked by a cooling of the national consumer market: the contribution of household consumption to the reduced economic growth was negative (-0.5%) [Ekonomik Rapor 2012, p. 60]. As noted in official documents, "as a result of measures taken to stabilize domestic and external demand, the growth rate slowed in 2012" [Orta Vadeli Program (2014-2016), p. 4].

The situation with the use of external financing will continue to change, but this time due not so much to Turkey's independent choice as to changes in the international financial situation. For the US, the gradual abandonment of fiscal restraint measures is becoming increasingly urgent, which means that we should expect an increase in interest rates in the US market. A gradual revival of the economic situation is also taking place in Western Europe. It is the developed markets that the IMF sees as the new leader in the global economy, as follows from the Fund's report prepared for the leaders of the G-20 countries [Vedomosti. 06.09.2013]. This means that in the long run, the geographical priorities of investment for international capital will begin to change: the period of return of capital to the "center"begins. As a result, Turkey, like other countries like it, will not be able to withstand the competition of booming Western markets and, most likely, will face the inability to maintain a growth model that relies heavily on external sources of financing.

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It is still difficult to say how thoroughly Turkey has managed to prepare for the upcoming changes. In May 2013, emerging markets, including Turkey, experienced the first wave of massive outflows of funds, caused by information that the US Federal Reserve (FRS) may reduce purchases of US Treasury bonds, i.e. take the path of reducing the growth rate of the money supply. As a result, Morgan Stanley included Turkey in the group of so-called five fragile economies, which also included Brazil, India, South Africa and Indonesia [Morgan Stanley Presents..., 24.09.2013]. A common feature of all of them was a high degree of dependence on short-term foreign capital inflows, and they reacted to the outflow with a rapid and noticeable devaluation of the national currency. Thus, by September 2013, the Turkish lira lost 10% of its value year-on-year. In September 2013, The Economist magazine calculated the value of the so - called capital freeze index for emerging markets, which reflects the degree of vulnerability of the national market in the event of a stop in the flow of external financing. Turkey was assigned the highest index value (about 18 with a risk limit of 20), indicating the highest level of risk among growing markets [The capitalfreeze index, 2013].

The next shock hit the country's economy at the end of January 2014, after the Fed announced a further reduction in its quantitative easing program, reducing the volume of debt purchases from $ 75 billion to $ 65 billion. As a result, the Turkish lira fell by more than 10% against the dollar.

It should be noted that in both cases, the development of events in the global financial market coincided with increased internal tensions in Turkey, which suggests that there is a link between the decline in the lira and political conflicts in the country. They should probably be given only the role of a catalyst in the development of fundamental economic trends laid down in the course of using the growth model outlined above. The secondary nature of domestic political factors is also indicated by the fact that the devaluation of the lira in both cases was synchronized with the devaluation of the currencies of other countries that, like Turkey, have one or another form of close linking of economic development to world markets. In the case of Turkey, we should rather speak of the opposite effect of economic factors on the aggravation of political instability and complicating the overall prospect of emerging from a period of turbulence.

So Turkey will have to go through very unfavorable changes in the international financial environment, which may turn out to be a serious test for the economy, and at the same time for the country's internal political development, to maintain the achieved level.

As follows from the text of Turkey's medium-term development program for 2014-2016, the country's leadership is aware of the acute problem of the balance of payments deficit and the need for measures to address it. To this end, it is planned to increase the level of savings of the national economy, as well as reduce the high level of dependence of national production on imports, and develop exports. Thus, according to the program, the size of the deficit will decrease from the estimated 7.1% of GDP by the end of 2013 to 5.5% by the end of the medium-term program period [Orta Vadeli Program..., s. 10]. However, the opposition did not fail to note that, without providing for deep structural changes, the program is aimed at reducing the balance of payments deficit while increasing the growth rate (indeed, according to the program, the growth rate in 2014 should increase to 4%, and in 2015 and 2016 - to 5% [Orta Vadeli Program..., s. 9]. As noted above, for the current Turkish growth model, these goals are mutually exclusive. "If these goals are achieved, our economic elite will demonstrate success that will be included in the world economic literature.-

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ratura, " says A. Sezer, who is responsible for the economic development of the Democratic Party of Turkey [Sezer, 2013].

Since, in reality, Turkey is unlikely to be able to quickly solve the urgent task of increasing savings without losing growth rates, it is very likely that the country's economy will fall into the so-called middle-development trap, or middle-level development trap. This implies a long-term decline in growth rates after a period of active development, which provided the country with access to the global average level of development. And the main issue here is not that Turkey has achieved the values of the corresponding economic indicators that, according to empirical data, precede the beginning of sliding into a trap. For example, according to recent studies, a decline in growth rates is most likely when the country reaches the level of GDP per capita of 11 thousand or 15 thousand dollars, calculated at purchasing power parity in constant prices in 2005 [Eichengreen, Park, Shin, 2013, p. 3] According to the World Bank, for Turkey in 2012, the corresponding indicator in current prices was just over $ 18 thousand. [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD], which in 2005 prices obviously corresponds to approaching or even passing the milestone of 15 thousand rubles. United States dollars. At the same time, it is estimated that the peak of growth, followed by a decline, occurs when the level of employment in the country's manufacturing industry reaches 23%. In Turkey, as of 2012, the share of people employed in industry, including construction and extractive industries, was 26%, which again indicates that it is approaching the declared critical point [Ekonotnik Rapor 2012, p. 194].

However, first of all, the authors of the idea of the" middle-level development trap "believe that there is no "iron law of decline". Assuming a fairly high standard deviation of the per capita GDP value from the median (up to $ 6 thousand), they recognize the possibility of significant interference of various factors [Eichengreen, 2012, p. 411-412]. Secondly, the average values themselves cannot have any magical properties, but are associated with certain trends in the development of the economy, as a rule, which are manifested when they are reached. The authors of the trap idea try to look beyond the barrier of formal indicators and come to an understanding of the essential causes of an economic downturn after a long period of strong growth. In their opinion, changes in the labor market are crucial, namely, the exhaustion of opportunities to support the development of industry due to the influx of cheap labor from rural areas. The moment when the "reservoir of hidden rural unemployment is drained" represents a certain turning point in development, after which an increase in real wages in industry is inevitable. Soon after, the share of employed people in industry reaches its maximum, and then the share of the service sector in GDP and employment begins to grow, which is not able to provide such a rapid and convincing increase in labor productivity [Eichengreen, 2012, p. 411].

Such a system of relationships is more or less true for the countries of South-East Asia, with their characteristic experience of a rather late transition to democracy and a long period of maintaining control over the labor market and low wages under the pressure of power and capital.

As for Turkey, the country made the transition to an effective multi-party regime as an essential component of the democratic system in the mid-20th century. At the same time, the rapid development of the trade union movement began. By the way, since the 1950s in Turkey, the migration of the rural population to the city has also noticeably intensified, significantly outstripping the scale of industrial labor needs, and consequently, employment has begun to grow not only and not so much in industry as in the tertiary sector. So, from 1970 to 1980.

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The share of people employed in agriculture in Turkey decreased from 70 to 63%, the share of people employed in industry increased from 10 to 12%, and in the service sector-from 20 to 26% [Ulchenko, 2002, p. 119]. In the second half of the 20th century, Turkey fully understood the features of a transitional democracy, in which democratic institutions that have not managed to become stable, and therefore remain weak, create additional prerequisites for intensifying competition for buying votes (see for more details: Kaufman and Stallings, 1991). Active inter-party struggle has made populism an important component of the economic policies of Governments, regardless of the nature of the political forces they represent. In addition, the policy of import substitution implemented in the 1960s and 1970s did not at all contradict the strategy of increasing wages.

"Import substitution provided for the expansion and revival of the domestic market, under this model, wages, being an element of costs for an individual entrepreneur, at the same time were a component of demand, which provided support for the production process," wrote Turkish researcher K. Boratav. - As a result, there was no need to put pressure on wages by political methods, as required by the zkeportorientirovannaya model of industrialization. The system of public bargaining, which included the right to strike and the wide spread of trade unions, ensured " sustainable growth of real incomes of the working class "[Boratav, 2003, p. 123-124].

In 1980-1988, Turkey experienced a period of decline in real wages during the transition to a policy of expanding exports, which again began to grow steadily from the end of 1989 due to political factors, including increased internal instability and the desperate struggle of unstable governments for the electorate. According to the Turkish economist 3. Onish, an important role in the revision of economic policy in the late 1980s was also played by the completion of the restoration of the democratic regime, which began after the civilian government came to power in November 1983, which replaced the military who had been in power for three years. Since then, Onish believes that pressure on the authorities over wages has become "an important factor in the macroeconomic arena" due to the current system in Turkey, under which, at least in the public sector of the economy, there was a de facto dominance of trade unions. Summing up the above, 3. Onis draws attention to the difficulties of implementing an export-oriented development policy in a country like Turkey with a large domestic market [Onis, 1995, pp. 117-118, 122].

Thus, Turkey's economic growth strategy, which was used in the late 1980s and 1990s, can be described as a growth strategy based not only on exports, but also on domestic demand. The specific feature of socio-economic modernization in Turkey lies in the early transition to wage growth in industry compared to the countries of East and South-East Asia, apparently long before the "draining of the reservoir of cheap labor" (in 1989, the share of people employed in industry in the country was 15.5%, and in agriculture-about 50% [Economic Report 1990, p. 71]), and the associated rather high level of domestic consumption, which was maintained through the use of external sources of financing.

The fact that Turkey has long passed the period of effective inclusion of an abundant and cheap labor force in industry is confirmed by the fact that the average annual growth rate of total factor productivity remained weakly negative or almost zero (depending on the initial assumptions in the calculations) for almost four decades - from 1970 to 2006 [Pipitone, 2009, p. 44-45] 1.

1 In his work, V. Pipitons makes calculations for the variant of the minimum and maximum contribution of physical capital to the total productivity of factors of production.

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Based on the above, understanding the future prospects of Turkey's economic development requires a broader interpretation of the phenomenon of the "middle development trap" as a result of the exhaustion of any economic resource that was previously abundant. And if for the countries of East and South-East Asia it was really cheap labor, then for Turkey, which lost this advantage relatively early, this kind of resource, previously available, but now under the threat of sharp restrictions, is external sources of financing, the use of which made it possible to increase domestic consumption.

Indeed, as the authors of the "trap" concept note, the probability of falling into it decreases with a significant level of domestic consumption. "The probability of a decline is minimal with the share of consumption (private.- N. U.), which is 60% of GDP, " writes B. Eichengreen [Eichengreen, 2012, p. 412]. The same thesis is developed in his joint work with D. Park and K. Shin "When Fast-growing economies Slow down: international experience and its application to China":

"It also raises the question of whether the likelihood of a slowdown increases in economies with high levels of investment, high levels of consumption or public spending.... Only the share of consumption is essential. The nature of the relationship is negative: as consumption increases, moving away from low values, the probability of a slowdown in the economy decreases. The probability of a slowdown is minimal at the consumption level of 62-64% of GDP" [Eichengreen, Park, Shin, 2011, p. 5].

The expansion of the domestic market is an alternative to exports, which lose their competitiveness as wages increase. Since Turkey managed to avoid a long period of real wage contraction, the relative capacity of the domestic market (the share of private consumption in GDP) remained very impressive (current prices):

Table 3

Share of private consumption in Turkey's GDP ( % , current prices), 1980-2012

Year

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Share of consumption in GDP

77.8

77.0

80.5

79.8

78.9

77.6

72.5

68.6

65.2

67.7

68.9

68.6

Year

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Share of consumption in GDP

67.3

66.4

67.2

68.9

69.3

68.3

66.5

68.5

70.5

68.4

68.0

Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Share of consumption in GDP

71.2

71.3

71.7

70.5

71.3

69.8

71.5

71.7

71.2

70.2

Compiled from: [Istatistik Gostergeler 1923-2011, s. 748] (database of the Turkish Statistical Society).

The process of its very limited narrowing during the period of the country's most active promotion in export markets in the 1980s can be traced only against the background of

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even more loyal to the domestic market policy of the 1970s: in the crisis of 1980, i.e. at the time of the adoption of the stabilization program, which also provided for an active increase in exports, Turkey had a level of private consumption approaching 80%. It reached its" historical minimum " in the 1980s and 1990s-65.2% - in 1988, then throughout the entire period of the 1990s it remained just below 70%, and since 2003 it has almost constantly exceeded the mark of 70%, twice, in 2005 and 2010, reaching the maximum for the period values of 71.7%.

The cooling of the economy in 2012 was accompanied by a 1.2 percentage point decline in private consumption.

Thus, the economic growth of Turkey since the late 1980s can be interpreted as a result of the fall into the "trap" that has been delayed due to the artificial "pumping" of private consumption. At the same time, external sources of financing remained important in the 1990s, and since the 2000s-the main means of maintaining it.

If the availability of external financing is indeed expected to decrease in the near term, then the question of the country's economic prospects is tightly linked to its ability to increase savings and self-finance investments.

When discussing this topic, we should keep in mind two aspects: the reasons why savings have fallen to such low levels in recent years, and the factors that could ensure their growth.

As for the first aspect, the main reason is the temptation of the Turkish economy with cheap money from international markets. Other factors that reduce savings (growth in private consumption), which are mentioned by Turkish experts , are the growing availability of loans, lower interest rates, the desire to take advantage of the situation to meet previously pent-up demand, the use of excess funds to buy gold and jewelry, the strengthening of the lira against the background of active foreign currency inflows and, as a result, an increase in purchasing power Finally, the introduction of a broad - coverage health insurance system by the ruling Justice and Development Party, which freed the country's citizens from the need to accumulate funds to pay for medical services, is secondary.

In fact, researchers also recognize macroeconomic policy as the primary basis for the consumption boom that has occurred: "Many people consider the deficit (for current balance of payments items ) as the result of excessively soft monetary policy and the revaluation of the Turkish lira. The latter is the proclamation of a policy that was not firm enough to exercise the necessary caution in a situation of overheating of the economy" [Eken and Schadler, 2012, p. 41].

Consequently, as soon as the threat of external financing cuts becomes a reality, the root cause of consumption growth will be eliminated due to a decrease in the money supply and an increase in interest rates. Under these conditions, the growth of household savings will again be a necessary and necessary measure, while the proposed measures to stimulate them (more active involvement of women in the labor market, improving the educational level of the population, developing schemes for the formation of private pension savings, developing the country's financial market) can only play a supporting role. But an increase in savings will inevitably lead to a narrowing of the domestic market, which means that by depriving the economy of the growth factor that was active until recently, it leaves open the question of new growth drivers.

An increase in the aggregate productivity of factors of production can provide certain opportunities in this regard. First, as the calculations of Turkish researchers show, a more significant growth rate of the total

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productivity factors (2% per year) allow us to achieve the set growth rates (4% per year per employee) at lower levels of savings - 18.3% in the next five years and 14.2% over 25 years, against 26.0% and 31.1%, respectively, with an average annual growth rate of aggregate productivity of 1% per year [Sustaining High Growth..., 2011, p. 16]. Thus, an increase in the growth rate of aggregate factor productivity would allow us to adhere to a growth model that is significantly more sparing for the domestic market. Secondly, higher growth rates in the aggregate productivity of factors of production would mean a gradual change in the development of the algorithm of the Turkish industry as capital-intensive (meaning that in the last period of time, despite some growth in aggregate productivity, the main factor of growth remained the accumulation of production capital), giving it more modern structural features, and hence the development of improving the quality and competitiveness of Turkish exports. This would make it possible to move to a more sustainable development with a less pronounced dependence of exports on the cycle phase in Western countries.

So, this is not the first time that the task of ensuring growth on its own basis has been actualized for Turkey. Although this kind of task has been set repeatedly, its severity has always been mitigated in a timely manner as a result of finding one or another form of access to external sources of financing that is relatively comfortable for Turkey, for example, reminding its Western allies of its own geopolitical importance. This is exactly what the Central Bank of Turkey tried to do when it announced a two-fold increase in the base interest rate at the end of January. But in such an expensive competition with Western markets for investment attractiveness, Turkey is unlikely to win: "Politicians are not able to protect the exchange rate by raising rates - the pressure from outside is strong: there is a global regrouping of investment flows," Western analysts emphasize [Vedomosti. 03.02.2014]. In addition, a new noticeably higher level of interest rates already means new conditions for economic development that significantly change the previous growth model and, obviously, slow down its pace. All that remains to be seen is how Turkey's new attempt to achieve economic, above all financial, independence will end, or whether, however unlikely it may seem, it will find a new reliable source of external support. At this stage, the prospect of getting into the coveted top ten of economic leaders depends on solving this problem.

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