V. VOZNESENSKY. Тъй изгря свободата. 9 септември 1944. Sophia. Partizdat. 1976. 185 p.
In Bulgaria, a book by V. D. Voznesensky, Candidate of Historical Sciences, executive Secretary of the journal "New and Modern History", devoted to the foreign and domestic policy of the last Bulgarian governments in August - September 1944, the revolutionary anti-fascist resistance of the masses led by the Bulgarian Workers ' Party (BRP), including the popular uprising of September 9, 1944, which opened the door to the Bulgarian people's the people's path to socialism.
There is a considerable literature on this issue in Bulgaria, and some aspects of the country's political history are being developed on the eve of September 9, 1944. How did the work of the Soviet historian attract the attention of Bulgarian specialists? The significance of his book lies in the fact that, perhaps, for the first time, the Bulgarian reader had the opportunity to get acquainted with the events of the last weeks of the existence of old Bulgaria and with the formation of a new life in the country in such a detailed and comprehensive presentation. The author managed to reveal the complex interaction of components that formed the political life of Bulgaria at that time. On the one hand, the maneuvers of various representatives of the bourgeois camp, from those who strongly supported the preservation of monarcho-fascism and did not want to break with Hitlerite Germany under any circumstances, to those who were anti-fascist and ready to enter into negotiations with the Fatherland Front (PF), although, of course, only in order to save the foundations of the capitalist system in the Soviet Union. the country and not allow the Office itself to take power. On the other hand, there is a deeply popular struggle against monarcho-fascism, led by communists, the goals and objectives of which were determined by the general democratic platform of the Communist Party, developed in 1942. This complex topic could not be fully developed without simultaneously considering the course of military operations on the fronts of World War II: the development of combat operations in the immediate vicinity of Bulgaria - in the Balkans - influenced all aspects of the country's political life, as well as the direction of diplomatic efforts of both the Bulgarian rulers and the states participating in the anti-Hitler coalition.
The work is based on Soviet, Bulgarian and American publications of documents, on materials drawn from the collections of a number of Soviet and Bulgarian archives, on significant special and memoir literature, as well as on materials from verbatim reports of the Bulgarian Parliament; the press is used to a lesser extent.
In the introduction, the author notes that the bourgeois literature often distorts the picture of revolutionary events in a number of countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. The liberation mission of the Red Army is often presented as a "Soviet export of communism", internal political changes in countries are ignored, and the liberation struggle of the masses of the people is hushed up (p.10). However, in reality, the revolutionary transformation became possible only as a result of a favorable combination of external and internal political factors, namely, thanks to the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless broad national consciousness.-
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the national liberation struggle of the peoples of European states, who used favorable external conditions to overthrow reactionary regimes. The book shows that only with such an approach can a historian reflect real events.
The author begins his research by analyzing the crisis of the upper classes in monarcho-fascist Bulgaria, which intensified as the Soviet Army advanced into the Balkans and the people's liberation struggle grew in the country. With I. Bagryanov's government coming to power on June 1, 1944, the new Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister are plotting a clever diplomatic game. In order to save the existing system and dynasty, they want to prepare a change in the pro-Hitler course of foreign policy, but in such a way that the allied relations with Germany are not disrupted. However, they were not successful. The tactic of delaying the Soviet demand for the restoration of Soviet consulates in a number of cities, and then the demand to break off relations with Hitler's Germany, also proved to be untenable. One of the arguments of the monarcho-fascist rulers against breaking with the Nazis is the fear of a repeat of the "Hungarian case", when, after learning about the attempt of the Hungarian ruling circles to conclude a truce with the Western powers, the Nazis occupied the country in March 1944. An analysis of the international situation in August 1944 and the development of events on the fronts of the Second World War is given by V. D. Voznesensky came to a reasonable conclusion that "in the autumn of 1944, it was very problematic for the Nazis to allocate the necessary forces for the occupation of Bulgaria" (pp. 45-46) and that the Bulgarian rulers covered up their unwillingness to break off relations with Nazi Germany by talking about the possibility of such an occupation. Much more real, the author writes, was the danger of an internal coup in the country from right-wing extremists and Nazi agents. Unfortunately, V. D. Voznesensky repeatedly mentions the plans of the Hitlerites to carry out a coup in Bulgaria and transfer power to the hands of extreme reaction (pp. 15, 46, 70).
Much attention is paid in the book to how exactly the balance of power in the country changed under the influence of the decisive victories of the Red Army. The Iasi-Kishinev operation was an event of great importance in this regard, the results of which plunged the ruling circles of Bulgaria into a state of complete confusion. The National Committee of the PF decided to take an action that was appropriate to the new situation-to get a meeting with the regents and openly demand that the authorities form a new government from representatives of the PF. This step was fraught with a big risk: after all, the death penalty for participating in the PF was not abolished. The reaction to the bold move of the National Committee of the Public Front was peculiar: the regents did not accept the demands of the delegation, but they did not punish the underground workers either. Meanwhile, just a month earlier, Bagryanov's cabinet decided to establish a blockade in all areas where partisans were operating, and by the end of August to eliminate the People's Liberation Rebel Army.
The author thoroughly analyzes the maneuvers of the Bulgarian ruling elite in order to prevent the entry of the Red Army into the territory of Bulgaria. On the night of August 25-26, Bulgaria declared its neutrality. Referring to archival data, V. D. Voznesensky writes that even in those conditions, the Bulgarian rulers did not dare to get out of the state of dependence on fascist Germany and turned to Hitler for a blessing to declare neutrality (p. 66). Another maneuver designed to prevent Soviet troops from entering Bulgaria was a change of Government. The role of" Bulgarian Kerensky " fell to the representative of the right wing of the Bulgarian Agricultural People's Union (BZNS) K. Muraviev. The situation in the country was eloquently characterized by the fact that the regents did not manage to form a full-fledged cabinet: some of the ministerial chairs remained vacant, there were no hunters among the representatives of the bourgeoisie.
In 1972, a discussion was held in Bulgaria about the nature of the Muraviev Government. In the course of it, opposing views were expressed that it was just as monarcho-fascist as the previous one, and that Muraviev's cabinet represented the voluntary transfer of power by monarcho-fascists to bourgeois neo-fascist parties, and some intermediate points
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point of view 1 . The book presents the opinions of the main participants in the discussion, but the author does not clearly define his own position. However, it is impossible not to agree with him that the Muraviev government lasted only seven days and did not have time to fully reveal its social and political face. But, undoubtedly, a more focused analysis of the nature of this government's platform and its specific activities would not only be appropriate in the work, but would also help V. D. Voznesensky avoid some statements, in particular, such as on page 84, where the author, pointing out that with the help of the new cabinet, the regents intended to change only policy, adds: "but not the foundations of the existing system." Such demands are unrealistic in relation to the most radical bourgeois-democratic cabinet, not to mention the Muraviev government, which was represented mainly by conservative groups.
It is with great interest to read those pages of the book that address the issue of resuming contacts between the Muraviev government and Anglo-American diplomats in order to conclude a separate truce. As the negotiations progressed and the Red Army advanced further, the author writes, the intention of the ruling circles of Britain and the United States to use the armistice with Bulgaria became more and more clear, not so much in the interests of the early collapse of the fascist bloc and the end of the war, but in order to create a political barrier to the Red Army, V. D. Voznesensky draws attention to a characteristic feature: despite the external similarity of the positions of British and American diplomacy in relation to Bulgaria, in a particular situation the allies acted differently. So, unofficially, the Americans advised the Bulgarian representative at the negotiations not to rush to conclude an armistice: with the Red Army approaching the borders of Bulgaria, they did not want to create a reason for discord between the allies, because Washington did not hide the US interest in joining the USSR in the war against militaristic Japan. It is known that even later American diplomacy took somewhat different positions in relation to Bulgaria and some other countries of South - Eastern Europe, 2 and it is important that the author records the presence of such discrepancies as early as the eve of September 9 , 1944.
Describing the situation in which the USSR declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, V. D. Voznesensky writes: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. decided to take such an extreme measure after all other methods of diplomatic influence on the Bulgarian rulers had been exhausted in order to force them to break off relations with Hitlerite Germany" (p.120). The Soviet Union's declaration of war on Bulgaria is rightly regarded in the book as an act entirely directed against the monarcho-fascist clique. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the appeal of the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front F. I. Tolbukhin to the Bulgarian people on September 7, 1944. It stated: "The Red Army has no intention of fighting the Bulgarian people and their army, because it considers the Bulgarian people to be a fraternal people. The Red Army has only one task - to defeat the Germans and speed up the time of universal peace. " 3
The book shows how the old order collapsed in Bulgaria during the September days, and emphasizes that it was the workers themselves who were united around the Communist Party, and that the revolutionary process began even before the Red Army entered the country. The author cites historical circular No. 4 of August 26, 1944, with which the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers ' Party appealed to the Bulgarian people for a resolute armed struggle for the creation of a Government of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, and in which the main directions of the political, military and military policy of the Bulgarian people were indicated.-
1 For the discussion materials, see "Izvestiya na Instituta po istorii na BKP", vol. 30, Sofia. 1974.
2 For more information, see: L. Y. Gibiansky. South-Eastern Europe in inter-Allied relations at the Final stage of the Second World War "Etudes balkanique", 1976, N 1; his. Preparation of the Potsdam Conference and issues of South-Eastern Europe. Ibid., 1973, No. 3; same name. Problems of the Balkan countries at the Potsdam Conference. "Balkan studies. International Relations in the Balkans", Moscow, 1974.
3 "Soviet-Bulgarian relations and relations". Documents and materials. Vol. I. November 1917-September 1944, Moscow, 1976, p. 604.
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planning and organizational preparation of the revolutionary assault. On September 5, 1944, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers ' Party and the General Staff of the People's Liberation Insurgent Army decided to deliver a decisive blow to monarcho-fascism in Sofia. Anti-fascist political actions of the masses, the transition to active actions of partisan detachments and the armed seizure of the buildings of the central administrative bodies ensured the transfer of power to the people on September 9, 1944. On September 9 and 10, the People's democratic government was established in most villages and towns in Bulgaria.
There are some compositional blunders in the book, which sometimes break the complex consideration of plot lines; there is also a certain disproportion in the distribution of material - too little space is allocated to the revolutionary act of September 9, 1944. But in general, the reviewed work is an undoubted success of the author, it contributes to the development of Soviet Bulgarian studies.
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