Under the general editorship of E. B. Smilyanskaya, Moscow: Indrik, 2011. 840 p., fig.

The fundamental research carried out by three authors of the Russian Academy of Sciences and RSUH is undoubtedly an important stage in the study of the Mediterranean by Russian historians. And in terms of analyzing the Archipelago expedition of the Russian Fleet in 1769-1774, the initial period of the formation of Russia's presence in the Mediterranean and the Russian-Arab, Russian-Italian and Russian-Greek relations of the XVIII century, the reviewed monograph has no equal not only in Russian, but also in world historiography. Of course, some of these stories were touched upon in one way or another by our own and especially Western authors, but they covered them, as a rule, one - sidedly, fragmentally, incompletely, often without involving Russian sources or even evidence from the Russian side, and most importantly-in a spirit hostile to Russia. This is not surprising, because Russia's access to the Mediterranean expanses threatened the positions of England, France, and Austria in this region, objectively undermining their influence in Italy, which was still divided at that time, and in the Balkans, as well as in the Ottoman Empire. The latter was no longer feared in the West, gradually taking it into their hands, and they were interested in preserving it as a counterweight to the young, full of energy and rushing to the southern seas of the Russian Empire.

The introduction (pp. 9-26) provides a general description of the theme and situation of the Mediterranean in the XVIII century, the gradual maturation of the main postulates of Russia's Mediterranean policy since the XVI century, explains and justifies the structure of the work, in which, in addition to the main chapters, "appendices are essential", namely, 9 newly found documents and related topics. monographs I. M. Smilyanskaya's essays on the symbols and realities of the Eastern Mediterranean in the cultural consciousness of Russians of the XI-XVIII centuries, as well as on the mission of Konrad Tonus in Egypt during the war of 1787-1791. This also includes a study by V. E. Bulatov on the collection of handwritten maps of the XVIII century by Count I. G. Chernyshev. The total volume of appendices - 276 pages (pp. 483-758) - indicates their significance for the monograph. The introduction also contains an interesting, albeit small, review of sources and literature (pp. 21-26). I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the source and historiographic base of the study (pp. 765-792) includes materials in Russian, Greek, Italian, German, French, and Ukrainian. Among them: archives of Russia, France, Venice, Livorno, Pisa, Turin, Florence. Only published sources - 117, unpublished - even more. Out of more than 500 monographs and articles, over 10 (including those written by V. O. Klyuchevsky, E. V. Tarle, the Romanian researcher Camariano-Cioran, and a number of Greek authors) are critically analyzed in the introduction. With the rest, at least with many of them, especially with Western authors, the controversy is conducted in the course of the presentation, and with the work of the St. Petersburg author G. A. Grebenshchikova (on the Baltic Fleet of Russia under Catherine II) - both in the introduction and in the course of the presentation.

The text is divided into three parts:" The Archipelago Enterprise of Empress Catherine II "(p.29-140)," Russians in the Mediterranean "(p. 143-410), and" War of Words " (p. 413-476). The first part deals with the political, diplomatic, military and economic preparations for a naval expedition to the eastern Mediterranean. "Preparations for war" (as the first chapter of the book is called) also included secret operations with the participation of Greeks in the Russian service, and the struggle of opinions in the empress's entourage about the upcoming expedition. Myself

Catherine actively participated in the development of the expedition plans along with Count A. G. Orlov and sought to involve in the implementation of these plans not only the Greeks, Albanians and Slavs of the Adriatic coast, but also, what is less well known, the leader of the struggle for the independence of Corsica, Pasquale Paoli (pp. 53, 62, 70). The monograph shows quite convincingly both the wide scope of plans to establish a "Russian presence" in the Mediterranean, and their riskiness (it is enough to recall the calculations of the French minister Duke de Choiseul to take advantage of the Russian-Ottoman war in order to "overthrow the empress from the throne she captured"), and the success in implementing these projects, and the failures associated primarily with with a reassessment of the readiness of the Ottoman Christians to oppose the Sultan (p. 73 et seq.).

I. M. Smilyanskaya, in chapters 1 and 2, seeks to cover all aspects of the preparation, strategy, features and implementation of the "Archipelago Enterprise", conceived as a continuation of the policy of Peter I, but implemented at a different time, with a different balance of military and political forces in Europe and the Middle East. Everything was important here: the correct definition of the goals of the "enterprise", and a sober account of the real forces of the enemy, and the correct choice of allies, and even more-the infallible selection of performers. Initially, the main goal of the war against the Ottomans was "to gain the right of navigation on the Black Sea, on the shores of which a port and fortress should be established" (p. 72). This goal was fulfilled and even exceeded with the receipt by Russia, according to the terms of the peace concluded in 1774 in Kyuchuk-Kainardzhi, the fortresses of Kinburn, Kerch and Yenikale and the right of free navigation in the Black and Mediterranean Seas. As for the "Russian presence" in the Mediterranean (Catherine's secret plan, which she revealed only to A. G. Orlov), everything turned out to be much more complicated for many reasons.

In purely military terms, Russia was already stronger than the Ottoman Empire, which was proved not only by the victories of Peter Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov in Moldavia and Novorossiya, but also by the success of the Russian fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, sent around Europe in fifteen separate squadrons. "Catherine was able to delve so deeply into all the details of organizing an expedition to the Mediterranean," note I. M. Smilyanskaya and E. B. Smilyanskaya , " that in addition to the selection of command personnel, technical training of ships for navigation, weapons, judging by her correspondence, she was concerned about providing squadrons with maps and pilots, the morale of officers and sailors, the choice of equipment and equipment for points of connection of squadrons, not to mention the unification of common tactical tasks assigned to each squadron, diplomatic support for navigation in foreign waters, etc. " (pp. 85-86). In other words, the Empress attached much more importance to the "Archipelago Enterprise" than a simple sabotage against the Ottoman Empire from the south, in order to distract Istanbul's attention from the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the northern Black Sea coast in general.

Sending squadrons of G. A. Spiridov, J. Elphinstone, I. N. Arf, V. Ya. Chichagov (later - M. T. Konyaev), S. K. Greig to the Mediterranean Sea one after another, Catherine closely followed their actions, "maintained constant courier communication through Italy" with them. And the couriers were also, as a rule, people of high rank - diplomats, staff officers, military engineers who were rare in Russia at that time. Among them were many foreigners who were in the Russian service and were familiar with the situation and living conditions in Europe. However, they also (an Englishman, a Dane, a Scot) prevailed among the squadron commanders.

Naturally, Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who had long been oriented towards Russia, or people from their midst who had long settled in Russia, were involved in the" Archipelago Enterprise". Among them, in the first place were the Greeks, who hoped for Russian help in liberating the territories inhabited by Greeks, including those outside Greece proper, in particular the northern Black Sea region (future Novorossiya), Crimea, the North Caucasus and Moldavia, where there were always many Greeks among the Orthodox priests associated with the traditionally ruling under the Ottomans in Moldavia and Wallachia by the Greek Phanariots (rich nobility of the Phanar quarter of Constantinople). Among them, the most famous in Russia were the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir, who left with Peter I for Russia after the unsuccessful Prut campaign, his son Antioch Cantemir, a diplomat and scientist who became one of the first Russian writers, and Antioch's sister Maria, the last love of Peter I. Subsequently, among the Russian Greeks, Princes Kantakouzenos who served in the army, General Kuruta, the tutor of Tsarevich Konstantin, and the leader of the national uprising of 1821 were promoted. Prince Alexander Ypsilanti and Vice-Chancellor of the Russian Service Ioannis Kapodistrias, first President of independent Greece in 1827-1831.

The reviewed monograph provides us with detailed information about the Greeks who either prepared the Archipelago expedition or participated directly in it. They are artillery lieutenant George Panazoli, businessman Manuel Saro, noblemen Ivan and Spyridon Palatino, rich aristocrat Panno Maruzzi, military sailors and diplomats brothers Teodor, Panagioti, Alessandro and Anton Alexiano, Anton Psaro and others. The Greeks, however, were not the only ethnic group whose anti-Ottoman sentiments Catherine II relied on, although initially the calculations in St. Petersburg were based on the hope of Greek rebels.

Historically, Russia was even more connected with the Slavs of the Balkans, for whom the oppression of the Ottomans was no less heavy than for the Greeks. Of these, Montenegro was the most independent, even after it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in 1499, trying to fight off the Ottomans with the help of the Venetians, and from the Venetians with the help of the Ottomans. In particular, the city of Perast on the picturesque shore of the Boko Kotor Bay has always maintained its independence and even created its own naval school of Captain Vuk Markov Martinovich, where Peter I in 1698 sent up to 70 Russians to study, who later did a lot for the formation of the Russian navy. This school was graduated by Matija Zmajevic, who served in the Russian Navy under Catherine and received the Order of Alexander Nevsky from her (Montenegrin historian Milun Lutovac even claims that Zmajevic rose to the rank of admiral in Russia).

Be that as it may, but an important part of the preparation of the Archipelago expedition was the appeal compiled with the participation of the Empress "to the Greek and Slavic peoples", calling on them to "overthrow the Ottoman oppression" (p.76). And it is not without reason that the first action in the framework of the "Archipelago Enterprise" was the landing of Major General Yu.V. Dolgorukov in Montenegro (where even before that, Colonel Ya. Ezdemirovich and Lieutenant E. Belich, Montenegrins, were sent, but, unfortunately, to no avail). Together with the landing party was Ivan Voinovich, a Serb from Montenegro, but who defected to the Russian side. Subsequently, the entire Voinovich family, which belonged to the Venetian aristocracy, followed his example, and he himself, like his son Mark (the future admiral of the Russian Fleet), distinguished himself in many battles and diplomatic negotiations. Dolgorukov did not succeed in raising a Montenegrin uprising against the Ottomans, although he brought many weapons to the mountains and assured the mountaineers of Russia's support. But that didn't seem to be his task at all.

According to I. M. Smilyanskaya and the authors cited by her, this " operation was only a cover-up operation." But, perhaps, both Ekaterina and A. G. Orlov, who managed the entire "enterprise" from Italy, hoped for more, without knowing the details of the situation in Montenegro. And when it turned out that, as Ekaterina put it, "the incident is Montenegrin... unworthy of great respect", Dolgorukov's landing automatically became "only a cover-up action", but at the same time raised "a lot of noise in the European press" (p.83). The Russian presence in the region became a fact, and specifically in Montenegro - worried both the Ottomans, and Austria, which always disputed the Balkans with them, and Venice, then still an influential maritime power, which traditionally considered the Adriatic "its own" and, by the way, had cities in Montenegro that then belonged to it (p.253).

But I would like to draw your attention to one more circumstance, in my opinion, related to the Dolgorukov raid. Although even under Metropolitan Danil Negos (1697-1735), the founder of the Negos dynasty, the local feudal lords who converted to Islam were actually expelled from Montenegro (and the remaining ones were actually killed), it is after the Archipelago expedition that the rapprochement between Montenegro and Russia is planned and gradually strengthened. Having felt the support of the great Slavic power, the Montenegrins could more successfully resist all attempts to subdue them, including from Napoleon, which was expressed in the pro-Russian orientation of Peter I Negos (1784-1830).

The campaign of the Russian squadrons is considered in the monograph literally in all aspects, but above all in the military and political. Among the battles and battles in the first place, of course, is the Chesmenskaya victory. But also mentioned is the defeat of the "Dulcinot" fleet of Ottoman vassals - Poturchens from the port of Ulchi (Ulcinj) near Patras. Now very few people remember this corsair's nest, which inspired fear throughout the Adriatic. In passing, let me just remind you that the myth of Cervantes is still alive in Montenegro, captured by corsairs and brought by them not directly to Algeria, but first to Ulchi, where he dreamed of Dulcinea (lit. - "ulcinjanka"). All this is absolutely untrue, but it does indicate certain cultural contacts and even, to a certain extent, the cultural community of the peoples of the Mediterranean.

A special chapter of the monograph is devoted to controversial issues of the "military history of the Mediterranean enterprise" (pp. 112-140). These include the following: "how to evaluate the operations of 1770 in the Morea (Peloponnese - R. L.) - as a heroic page of the Russian-Greek wars-

or as an adventure that led to a bloody massacre? What significance did the military support of the inhabitants of the Balkans and the Archipelago have for the Russian expedition? Were the Russians able to take advantage of all the successes of the "perfect victory" in the Battle of Chesma, or did they miss out on the unexpected success that fell on them in the holidays and fireworks? What was the military dominance of the Russian navy in the Eastern Mediterranean - in the blockade of the Ottoman Empire or in "piracy" and the threat to the entire Levantine trade - and was it dominance or predominance?" (p. 113-114).

I. M. and E. B. Smilyansky, having studied a considerable array of Russian and Greek primary sources and literature, give, as it seems, a fairly realistic and objective answer to all the above questions. Of course, much of what Catherine and A. G. Orlov planned did not come to fruition, and could not have come to fruition due to the Russians 'lack of knowledge of the situation in Greece, psychology and high expectations of the Greeks, their "Romanticization" of Catherine's policy - on the one hand, and on the other - the limited possibility of an "Archipelago Enterprise", the absence of A. G. Orlov forces and means sufficient to finally break the military and naval power of the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean in the middle of the XVIII century. In addition, the lack of awareness of the Russian command about the true balance of forces of the Greeks and Ottomans, the exaggerated data received from the Greek side about their forces, also affected, which fueled the not entirely justified optimism of the Empress, who wrote to Voltaire in July 1770: "... it depends on the Greeks to call Greece to life " (p. 115). At that time, such hopes were still premature.

It was also a mistake on the part of the Greeks to consider only their liberation as the goal of the "Archipelago Enterprise". When it became clear that this goal was far from the only one, there was disappointment, which determined much in the future of bilateral relations. In particular, "mythological perception... the mission of the expedition left its mark on Greek historiography and the views of modern historians " (p. 19). To this was added the severe consequences of the defeat of the Russian and Greek detachments in the Morea in April-May 1770: "the death of a seventh part of the population of the Morea in the course of brutal reprisals" by the Ottoman punishers (p. 127). Hence - "mutual resentment, which for centuries overshadowed the intercultural communication of Greeks and Russians" (p. 129).

Failures on land, due to the small number of Russian soldiers, poor coordination with Greek detachments, usually undisciplined, disorganized and extremely unprofessional in military terms, and the gradually determined numerical superiority of the Ottomans, were compensated for by a number of brilliant victories of the Russian fleet, starting with the Battle of Chesma on June 24-25, 1770, after which the Russians were able to occupy several dozen islands of the Archipelago, create a fleet base on the island of Paros, block the Dardanelles and in 1772 achieve new successes at sea, in particular at Patras (under the command of M. T. Konyaev), again at Chesma (where S. K. Greig distinguished himself) and at Damietta in Egypt (under the command of P. Alexiano). The last victory was achieved at the end of May 1774 by A.V. Elmanov's squadron, which again destroyed 25 Ottoman ships near Chesma (p. 131).

However, absolute dominance at sea was not supported by equally successful actions on land. Amphibious operations continued all the time, but were usually unsuccessful: with small forces it was impossible to take a single fortress, and twice as many "Slavs and Albanians" took part in sieges, who, although they showed heroism, often died due to inconsistency of actions, " their willfulness, habit of pranks"and other manifestations of unprofessionalism (p. 135). As for the reproaches about the "privateering" carried out by the Russian Fleet, here it was more about Greek ships "with Russian patents", although there were, especially after the Chesma victory, "excesses" on the part of the Russians. In addition, A. G. Orlov reported that many French ships carrying military contraband violate the blockade of the Straits, using the cover of French frigates.

E. B. Smilyanskaya describes in detail the "Greek Principality of Catherine the Great" (p. 143-218), which is considered as a "unique experiment" of building an overseas state under the protection of Russia, namely the "Archipelago Grand Duchy" of 18 islands that existed in 1770-1774. Subsequently, Admiral F. F. Ushakov repeated this experiment, participating in the creation of the Ionian Republic in 1800-1807. Admiral G. A. Spiridov's efforts to create management structures for the Archipelago, as well as all the minuses and advantages of the difficult task of developing the islands, including the growing interethnic tensions and contradictions between Russians and Greeks, Greeks and mercenaries from the "Albanians" (among whom anyone could be), are described in more than detail, as well as the participation of the Greek Navy in the development of clergy in the affairs of the k pol archipelago-

ze of Russia. Also interesting is the information about Auz - "Mediterranean Kronstadt", both the capital of the principality and the base of the Russian Fleet. In general, this section of the monograph contains the most new data. The author's conclusion is interesting: "The Russian members of the expedition, who came to the Mediterranean as" strangers", became quite comfortable in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of this" civilizational cauldron", in which many cultures have mixed over the millennia. In the 1770s, a Russian ingredient also appeared in the Mediterranean "cauldron" (p.204).

The archipelago expedition was accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of Russia's international relations. In particular, it was a time of rare in the history of friendly relations between England and Russia. Apparently, England, which received Gibraltar as a key to the Mediterranean as a result of the "war of the Spanish Succession", was interested in pushing (including with the assistance of Russia) the old" masters "of the Mediterranean space - and its traditional rival France, and the once formidable, albeit weakened Spain, and the Ottoman Empire, which is still quite strong, not to mention such ancient semi-medieval" lords " of the sea as Venice and the Order of Malta. With all these and other states discussed below, Russia had to enter into certain relations, because the fleet, heading for the Mediterranean, had to provide itself with places for parking, supplies and repairs. Some of them have had relationships before. For example, Peter the Great sent Field Marshal Sheremetyevo to Malta, who not only fulfilled a diplomatic mission, but was also elevated to the Knight of the Order of Malta. Later, as is well known, such gentlemen were other prominent Russian people, in particular A.V. Suvorov and Count Jan Potocki, a famous writer, traveler, historian and philosopher, who was in the Russian service, not to mention Emperor Paul I, who at one time held the post of Grand master of the order.

Establishing relations with the order, Catherine, on the one hand, continued the work planned by Peter I, on the other hand, proceeded from the purely practical needs of the Archipelago expedition. But these relations developed in different ways: restrainedly neutral before the Battle of Chesma and more friendly after it, the Maltese, although with reservations, but received Russian ships, repaired them, and supplied them with water. Relations deteriorated after Francisco Jimenez de Tejada became Grand Master of the order in early 1773, following the Bourbons who then ruled France, Spain, and Naples. They were afraid of Russia and tried to " keep it out of Europe." Nevertheless, in general, relations with the order still remained, as well as the memory of them later. This is evidenced, for example, by the portrait of Catherine II next to the portraits of the French kings Louis XIV and Louis XV in the Hall of Ambassadors of the former residence of the Grand Master of the Order, now the Parliament of Malta.

Chapters 6 and 7 written by M. B. Velezhev deal with Russia's relations during the war of 1768-1774 with the Duchy of Tuscany, Venice, the Kingdom of Sardinia, Genoa, Naples (officially the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) and the Papal State, as well as with the life of the Russian colony in Tuscany in 1769-1775 (p. 219 - 332). The importance of Tuscany for Russian politics at that time was difficult to overestimate. The duchy's rulers were linked to Austria (Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo was the son of an Austrian monarch and became one himself in 1790 under the name Leopold II). But it was the Tuscan cities of Pisa and Livorno that in 1769, respectively, became the residence of Count A. G. Orlov, who commanded the Archipelago expedition, and the berthing place of Russian ships. Greeks and Slavs were constantly arriving here to take part in the fighting against the Ottomans, which Austria, France, and other related states tried to prevent, guided by peace treaties with the sultan (not to mention the traditional alliance of France with the Ottomans from the beginning of the XVI century). Orlov and Russian diplomacy in general had to show wonders of flexibility and maneuverability in order to achieve their goals, and the duke (who coordinated his policy with his brother, the Emperor of Austria) flattered. The latter, showing (especially after the Battle of Chesma) "benevolence" towards the Russians, carefully collected information about their army, navy and politics (not disdaining the perlustration of A. G. Orlov's letters), and reported everything to Vienna.

More complicated were Russia's relations with Venice, which tried to preserve its neutrality in the Russo-Ottoman conflict as much as possible, because it had economic interests in Istanbul and was afraid to quarrel with it because of the threat of an Ottoman strike on Venetian positions in the Adriatic. A number of conflicts, including the desire of many Venetian Greeks to join the Russian service, as well as the formal absence of diplomatic relations established only in 1782, complicated the situation. Judging by the facts presented in the monograph, on the position of Venice,

As in Tuscany, it was influenced by the Ragusa (Dubrovnik) merchant class, which is quite prominent in the Adriatic and usually pro-Ottoman.

Despite the extreme reluctance to help Russia, in the end, the king of Sardinia was forced to agree to the calls of Russian ships to their ports and to supply them with food, who was under double pressure-the Franco-Spanish Bourbons hostile to Russia and Great Britain helping Russia at that time. But the establishment of official relations and the exchange of ambassadors between St. Petersburg and Turin date only to 1782-1783.Contacts with the Republic of Genoa were even more limited, since the Senate of the Republic of Genoa prohibited the purchase of weapons and arming ships for the war with the Ottomans in the territory under its control. Practically in Genoa, during the war between Russia and the Ottomans, only one Russian ship was repaired and a loan of 2.5 million florins was granted "for the maintenance of the Russian fleet in the Archipelago" (p.272). An equally insignificant amount of services was rendered to the Russian Navy in the ports of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (p. 275). Practically nothing and did not help the Russian Navy Papal state, seemingly interested in the fight against the Ottomans.

Last but not least, the monograph deals with the problem of Russian-Arab military-political contacts. This is a detailed study by I. M. Smilyanskaya (both in Chapter 8 of the reviewed monograph and in some of her previous works) of a very large-scale Arab attempt to get rid of the domination of the already rapidly declining Ottoman Empire. Taking advantage of the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774, the ruler of Egypt Ali Bey al-Kebir (an Abkhazian by origin) in 1770 declared himself Sultan of Egypt and Arabia, ruler of the Red and Mediterranean Seas, and also began to mint coins in his own name. To fight the Ottoman sultan, he entered into an alliance with the Palestinian Sheikh Zahir al-Omar and in 1769 began to look for ground for contacts with Russia. In turn, Sheikh Zahir in 1750 made the fortress of Akka his capital, the center of crafts and maritime trade, created an army of 60-70 thousand people and a navy. In 1771, Ali Bey and Sheikh Zahir launched an offensive against the Ottomans in Syria and Palestine, occupying Damascus and Saida. However, the betrayal of one of the Egyptian military leaders and the accession of the Emir of Lebanon to the Ottomans, who besieged Said, dramatically changed the situation. Then Ali Bey and Sheikh Zahir turned in May 1772 for help to the Russian squadron, which helped to lift the siege of Saida and seize the capital of Lebanon, Beirut, but quickly leaving it. In the autumn of 1772, an armistice was signed and the Russians stopped military operations, which resumed in June 1773.

However, even before that, in the spring of 1773, Ali Bey moved to Egypt to suppress the Mamluk rebellion, but was defeated and soon died of wounds. In June 1773, Russian squadrons again approached Beirut, which fell after three months of siege. In October 1773, the Emir of Lebanon, Yusuf Shehab, who had defected to Zahir al-Omar and broken his alliance with the Ottomans, appealed to Empress Catherine II to accept him as a "citizen". As a result, this request (later repeated again) was rejected. The Russian squadron left the Middle East after the conclusion of the Kuchuk-Kainardji peace with the Ottomans in July 1774. A year later, the Ottomans resumed the war against Sheikh Zahir, who died in this war.

Russia could not go to establish its dominance in any area of the Mediterranean for so many reasons: domestic, foreign, economic, geographical and others. It had no, and could not have had, colonial ambitions. In addition, Catherine II simply could not simultaneously suppress the Pugachev uprising, win the Black Sea region from the Ottomans, participate in Polish and European affairs in general, and in addition to this, conquer distant unknown lands. She was an intelligent and far-sighted pragmatist in politics.

As you know, formally both the Archipelago expedition and the subsequent "Greek Project" of Catherine, i.e. the plan for the revival of the Greek Empire led by her grandson Constantine, ended in nothing. But they weren't meaningless at all. Russia's access to the Black Sea also coincided with its breakthrough in the Mediterranean - the most important political-economic, military-strategic, and cultural-historical region of the globe. Here the influences of Europe, Asia and Africa (or, to use Toynbee's terms, Eurasia and Afrasia) have long interbred, mixed and mutually enriched each other. Historically, there is a rare diversity of ethnic groups, confessions, cultures, social and economic forms of life. The Black Sea, which is connected with the Mediterranean, has long determined the significant participation of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in the Mediterranean processes. Therefore, it is quite logical that Russia's access to the northern coast of the Black Sea also meant the inclusion of our country in a complex and contradictory space.

sociohistorical, geopolitical, confessional and ethno-cultural space of the Mediterranean. This was, as the authors write in the conclusion of the monograph, "an important confirmation of Russia's entry into the 'concert' of great powers" (p.477). It should not be forgotten that in the eighteenth century these powers included not only England and France, which were then fiercely competing for hegemony in the Mediterranean (as well as in India and America), but also Austria, which had possessions in the region (specifically in Italy and the Slavic Adriatic), as well as the Ottoman Empire, which had long since passed the apogee of its greatness, but still dominated the Balkans, the South Caucasus and the Arab world.

War of 1768-1774 it was an important stage in the history of Catherine's reign, and in general in the history of Russia in the XVIII century. It has demonstrated to the world the increased power of Russia and its ability to play not only a significant but also, in some cases, a decisive role in Europe and the East. The prestige of Russia has increased significantly in these years. The subsequent mass immigration of Greeks to Russia after the war further contributed to the settlement and development of its southern territories, especially those conquered from the Ottomans. Suffice it to recall the transformation of the inconspicuous village of Hadzhibey into a magnificent city and the largest Black Sea port of Odessa. Finally, during the Archipelago expedition, talented political and military figures A. G. Orlov, G. A. Spiridov, A.V. Elmanov, S. K. Greig, and I. I. Shuvalov came forward. And if we recall that after them, or simultaneously with them, the star of G. A. Potemkin, P. A. Rumyantsev, A.V. Suvorov, F. F. Ushakov rose, then we should recognize that time as extremely happy for Russian talents, and for the prosperity of Russian statehood in all the trials and difficulties of the "Catherine's century".

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